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I.A.RICHARDS' THEORY OF VALUE AND ITS RELATION TO
PRACTICE IN HIS LITERARY CRITICISM
Synopsis of Thesis
I.A.Richards, Lecturer in English Literature 
in Cambridge, is a many-sided personality who has 
expressed his various intellectual interests in voluminous 
writings. Semanticist, educationalist, philosopher, 
psychologist, and, last but not least, literary critic, 
he has written on all these subjects separately, though 
in his two most important books - "Principles of Literary 
Criticism" and "Practical Criticism"-he attempts to be 
all these at the same time. But the purposes and the 
methods of these various disciplines are different and 
sometimes conflicting. It is this conflict between 
Richards the exponent of a certain type of psychological 
aesthetics and Richards the practical literary critic 
who is not bound by his own theoretical preconceptions 
that is the central theme of my thesis.
I have devoted the first four chapters to an 
exposition and criticism of Richards* theory of language 
and his psychological theory of aesthetic'value. Having 
shown that the theory of "Synaesthesis" as a criterion
of aesthetic merit implies aesthetic pluralism and. is 
inapplicable in practice, because vacuous, I have tried 
in Chapter 5 to find Richards' actual standards of 
aesthetic value as revealed in his own literary criticism.
In Chapter 6 I have discussed the nature and 
function of the aesthetic judgment and have emphasised, 
as against Richards, its status as a judgment of value 
and not of psychological fact.
In Chapter 7 I have attempted to show that the 
psychological approach to the problems of aesthetics is 
not as such to be ruled out as irrelevant; on the contrary, 
as practised, e.g. by E.Bullough it is worthy of being 
further developed, because it both offers a comprehensive 
view 01 aesthetics, art-criticism and culture, and provides 
in the principle of "Psychical Distance" an aesthetic 
principle capable of practical application.
The main assumption underlying my critical 
attitude to the kind of aesthetic theories of which 
Richards is a typical exponent is that in Aesthetics 
theory and practice must be connected: Aesthetic theory 
must begin with an examination of aesthetic judgments, 
and practical art-criticism - if it is to be valid - must 
be based on theoretically established criteria of value.
If this is so, then the aesthetician*s task can 
be much wider than a "journeyman*s".^  By affirming the
1. W.B.Gallie: "The function of philosophical Aesthetics" 
in Aesthetics and Language ed by Vv.Elton. (Oxford,
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underlying similarity of most great works of art of 
past cultures, by pointing out the essentially humanistic 
values of great art, he might perhaps actively contribute 
to their re-emergence.
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PART I
Chapter I 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL
a) Meaning
"But the kind of criticism that dominates our 
intellectual life is that of the French mathematician, 
who, after reading a tragedy by Racine, asked: "Que'est- 
ce que cela prouve?"
(Allen Tate, "On the Limits of Poetry",
p.113)
New York, The Swallow Press,
Y/. Morrow, 1948.
I.A.Richards, who is one of the most important 
modern English critics and who has been writing on 
aesthetics, on theoretical and on practical aspects of 
literary criticism for the last 35 years, began his career 
as the initiator of a positivist (i.e;'scientific *) 
and behaviouristic school of criticism, and,together 
with C.K.Ogden, as the founder of a new science of 
Symbolism.
His first question on the nature of beauty in 
"The Foundations of Aesthetics" led to a general theory 
of meaning developed in "The Meaning of Meaning" (M.M. ) 
and to a view of the nature of poetry expounded in ’ t’he 
"Principles of Literary Criticism" (P.L.G.) and in 
"Practical Criticism" (P.O.). His question was more complex 
than, but essentially the same as, that of the French
mathematician: "What does poetry prove, what does it 
refer to, and what does the poetic statement assert?"
The answer he gave to this question is wholly 
negative, hut followed from a highly positive and new 
general theory of meaning, involving a view of the dual 
functions of language, and an original theory of 
interpretation in sign-situations. In order therefore 
to understand Richards* assertion that poetry proves 
nothing, refers to nothing, and that the poetic statement 
does not correspond to anything in the objective world 
but at most to an elusive subjective experience of the 
poet, we must first understand his general view of 
language.
In "The Meaning of Meaning" (M.M.) Ogden and
Richards undertook "A Study of the Influence of Language
upon Thought", and hoped that with the emergence of the
new "Science of Symbolism", with its canons of symbolism,
theory of interpretation and of multiple definition,
P "the way is open to the systématisation of all that is
known and further of all that will ever come to be known.
They thought that this new science would solve the most
2
important problems of the theory of knowledge, would
1. "The Meaning of Meaning", p.180.
2. -do.- Ch.3 and 4#
8enable them to give "a proper account of perception of
1 Pthe Nature of Things", "provide a new basis for Physics",
lay the foundations of a science of Aesthetics'^, do away
with the "problem of Truth"azid "provide both what has
been covered by the title Philosophy of fethematics and
what has hitherto been regarded as Meta-physics"..
This vast and ambitious scheme was not to be
limited to theory alone, but vmuld have far-reaching
influence on practical affairs as well, especially
"in the lives of thoughtful people, who were they fully
acquainted with the relations of Symbols, References and
Referents, might be led to think and act very differently."
The authors assumed that most controversies, be they
philosophic, ethical or aesthetic, and even some scientific
disputes (see footnote 7)» spring not from the nature of
reality but from the nature of our language. If we want
to resolve them we need only clear up the verbal muddles
and then the metaphysical problems will disappear.
"Examples of such problems are those of Truth,
Reality, Universals, Abstractions, Negative Pacts,
o
Virtuous Triangles, Hound squares and so forth."
1. M.M., p.182 2. M.M., p.l84
3. M.M., p.391 (and Ch.?) 4. M.M., p.384
5. M.M., p.390 6. M.M., p. 94
?. "Scientific controversies constantly resolve themselves 
into differences about the meaning of words." Prof. 
Schuster, quoted in the TPfeface to M.M. p.XXXII
8. M.M., p.386.
These different problems are all considered as similar 
and as equally 'pseudo *. According to the authors they 
arise from an incorrect theory of language (that words 
have significance in only one way, by standing for objects), 
and from an inexact use of language, usually in some way 
from the same term being used with different meanings. 
Therefore, if we want to resolve the problems by means of 
this account of them, we must begin with an exhaustive 
analysis of Meaning, which forms the basis and cornerstone 
of the new science of language.
In analysing 'Meaning* in general, and "The 
Meaning of 'Beauty'" in particular, the authors wanted 
to dispense with ambiguous, unscientific terms like 
'images', 'thought', 'mind', to discard "mystical relations 
between the knower and the known" and to treat the 
meaningful use of terms and therefore knowledge, "as a 
causal affair open to ordinary scientific investigation. 
Finally the term 'meaning' itself was discarded in favour 
of terms which were deemed more precise (and indeed, 
which are more precise) as different and more specific 
paraphrases of 'meaning* in various contexts, like:
1. M.M., p.384.
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'Intention' ("They meant no harm, He means well, I 
meant to go"^, = they intend no harm, his intentions are 
good, I intend to go).
'Value' ("The world longs for a new expression of the 
MEANING of life and reality",^  = of the value of life). 
'Referent' ("Nobody's certainty as to his reference, 
his 'meaning', is of any value in the absence of corrobor­
ative evidence..."^).
Expression of Emotion. (In "This is good", 'good' has no refer­
ential^; or symbolic function. "This peculiar ethical use
4
of 'good' is, we suggest, a purely emotive use").
The authors draw up a list of 16 different 
definitions of 'Meaning' (and we shall see in the sequel
that they do the same with 'Beauty'). Of these 15 are 
rejected either as standing for linguistic phantoms 
(e.g. when 'Meaning* is taken as an intrinsic property 
of, or relation to, things,) or as being definitions 
not of 'Meaning' proper but only of its "Occasional and 
erratic usages" (for example, when 'Meaning' is defined 
by W.James in a sense in which it is a property of things 
rather than symbols as "The Practical Consequences of a thing 
in our future experience.")^
1. M.M., p. 313 2. M.M., p. 285
3. M.M., p. 329 4. M.M., p. 228
5. M.M., p. 307
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After listing and rejecting these traditional
definitions of Uteaning', Ogden and Richards put forward
a definition of meaning in terms of Sign and Symbol-using
situations generally and of their interpretation. The
authors refer to O.S.Peirce as the first modern philosopher
who had made a "determined attempt to give an account of
signs and their m e an i n g . B u t  although in their account
of 'meaning* they use some of the terms used by Peirce^
like 'sign', 'symbol', 'reference', their whole approach
differs fundamentally from his, because, as they say,
"he constantly endeavours to exclude psychological
considerations from his treatment of signs", whereas
2
their approach is psychological throughout. Thus they 
formulate their definition of 'meaning* in terms of the 
"psychological contexts" and the interpretation of the 
"external contexts" in which signs are used.
"A sign is something which has once been a 
member of a context or configuration that worked in the 
mind as a whole. When it reappears its effects are as 
though the rest of the context were present.
A "psychological context" is "a recurrent set 
of mental events peculiarly related to one another so as 
to recur, as regards their main features, with partial 
uniformity.
1. M.M., p. 432 2. M.M., p.126
3. P.L.G., p.90 4. M.M., p.145
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Their account of 'interpreting' a sign will
naturally be in terms of the effects of a sign on the
mind: "Our Interpretation of any sign is our psychological
reaction to it, as determined by our past experience
in similar situations, and by our present experience."
Then, "... the meaning of A is that to which the mental
2
process interpreting A is adapted." and "that to which 
the mental process" is adapted is the "external context", 
configuration of things or events :
"A context is a set of entities (things or 
events) related in a certain way; these entities have 
each a character such that other sets of entities 
occur having the same characters and related by the 
same relation; and these occur 'nearly unif ormly '. "
The difference between an 'external context* 
and a 'psychological context' is that the one is physical 
and the other mental; nevertheless,, the 'external context' 
is the meaning of the 'psychological context'.
In order to understand this definition of 
'meaning' we must see its close connection with a causal 
theory of thinking. In the Principles of Literary Criticism 
Richards states the latter very simply:
"The striking of a clock is the cause of our 
thinking of its striking. In such a case the external 
thing (i.e. the external context) is linked with
1. M.M., p.384.
2. M.M., p.325.
3. M.M., p.146.
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the thought 'of* it in a fairly direct fashion, and the 
view here taken is that to be a thought 'of the 
striking is to be merely a thought caused in this 
fashion by the striking. À thought of the striking is 
nothing else and nothing more than a thought caused 
by it."l
To say therefore "I am thinking of A" is simply a shorter 
expression for thought is being caused by A", v (Thus 
suppose I mistakenly think I hear an owl hooting when my 
nephew gives vent to his war-cry; I am thinking of my 
nephew, and not, as I should suppose, of an owl. )
As M.Black has pointed out, such a theory does 
not differentiate between thoughts of X in the forms of 
expectations, imaginations, perceptions or memories of 
X, and could never be used to explain how and why 
"expecting (an event) Rn differs irreducibly from 
perceiving an event qualitatively similar to Rn or 
remembering such an event.
But let us return to the definition of 'meaning' 
in terms of sign-interpretation. This use of the notion 
of 'interpretation' is not clear but we are given an 
illustration of what is meant by it. A very simple case 
of such a basic act of interpretation is analysed. (It 
is to be noticed that this is not a case of what we 
normally call 'interpretation' at all. It is nevertheless
1. P.L.G., p.126
2. M.M., p.142
3. M.Black, "Language and Philosophy", p.194.
(New York, Itaca, Cornell University Press, 1949.)
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taken as a paradigm case for more complex and quite 
different acts of interpretation in the ordinary sense, 
like those involved in reading a poem, listening to a 
symphony or studying a piece of advanced research. The 
authors do not try to prove that these complex acts of 
ordinary interpretation can he explained in the same 
way as the simple one, nor that interpretation is in 
general the same mental process as understanding the 
meaning of a work - they just assume it.
The basic act of interpretation which serves 
them as working-model is the following: on striking a 
match we expect a flame.^ This they take to be a simple 
case of the interpretation of an event as a sign of a 
further event. They explain this phenomenon as occurring 
because and only because previous occasions of such a 
conjunction of events striking-of-match-followed-by- 
production-of-flame (i.e. "the external context" of the 
mental event) has left a "residual trace" or "engram" in 
the brain. Innumerable past occasions of striking a 
match have conditioned our organism to expecting a flame, 
and this expectation is really an incipient form of 
behaviour: "Expectation, ... becomes a peculiar form of
1. M.M., p.138 ff.
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action, getting ready, namely, to receive certain kinds 
of stimuli rather than o thers.Thus our expectation of, 
(or being "directed to",)the occurrence of the external 
event, 'flame*, is undergoing a mental (neural) process 
as described above, and "understanding the meaning of 
scraping-of-match" consists of undergoing this same 
mental process.
At this point there are several objections to 
such an account of 'meaning':
1. There is no attempt to back up the 'engram' 
theory of an expectant condition by empirical evidence.
2. The account is open to the usual objections 
made against Hume's account of causal necessity - most of 
our expectations are not the result of experienced 
regular successions; if we hear a cock crow in the middle 
of the night we do not expect the day to break prematurely.
3. It is characteristic of the non-natural 
significance of words as distinct from the natural 
significance of such events that it does not depend on 
their always appearing in the same sequence.
4. It is characteristic of most, except for the 
most elementary, thinking, that we try to connect objects 
and events which are either not connected in experience, 
or which cannot be experienced by us at all (e.g. in the
1. P.L.C., p.88
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creative imagination, the recreation of the past, the 
construction of scientific theories).
The authors try to treat mental processes in 
terms of neural events. We saw that they equated "I am 
thinking of A" with "My thought is being caused by A" 
and 'thought' is taken as equivalent to the occurrence 
of "certain happenings in the nerves".  ^But 'expectation' 
is also treated as some kind of neural modification, as 
is 'meaning' itself. We are given to understand that 
'thought', 'idea', 'reference', 'meaning', all really 
refer to the same sort of thing, namely, "certain happenings 
in the nerves"; but this account of thinking in terms of 
neural happenings is not kept up throughout the book, 
so that we encounter a strange mixture of behaviouristic 
terms like 'stimulus-response', 'impulses', 'engrams* etc., 
and phenomenological terms like 'thoughts', 'mind*, 
'experiences'. It is never quite clear whether they are 
to be taken as interchangeable or as distinct.
The 'residual trace' or 'engram' type of explanation 
of meaning as a type of thought-process encounters a 
welter of difficulties in the cases, for example, of 
thought-processes involving false reference, thoughts 
of events which are only imagined and have therefore had 
no corresponding 'external context', or any more complex 
cases of interpretation of non-natural signs (symbols).
1. M.M., p.178
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In the case of a false reference, the quite implausible 
view is put forward that it is made up of a number of 
true constituents or references which somehow do not add 
up to the one true referent. For example, the statement 
"This is a book", where in fact what is referred to is a 
box, is "composed of a simple indefinite reference to 
any book, another to anything now, another to anything 
which may be here, and so on. These constituents will 
all be true, but the whole reference to this book which 
they together make up ... will be false, if we are in 
error and what is there is actually a box or something 
which fails to complete the three contexts, book,'here, 
and now.
The difficulties of distinguishing expecting, 
imagining, perceiving, remembering X etc., pointed out 
by M.Black recur in a more acute form if they are to be 
surmounted by distinctions in neurological happenings.
In order to do so , the authors would have to postulate 
ever more, finer and subtler differences in the neurological 
make-up with its psychological context parallel to, or 
diverging from, the "external context".
At all events, these rough and vague postulations 
are only possible accounts of causal processes assumed to 
go on when we think, imagine, expect, etc. But it is not
1) M.M., p.166.
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to be expected that an account of our understanding of
natural signs in a causal nexus will be adequate to account
for our understanding of conventional signs in a symbolism,
and as an account of how words come to have meaning for
us, it is hopelessly vague. It would seem impossible to
account engramma.tically for our selectively distinct or
similar responses to, for example, the words *99 miles*
and *100 miles * ; or for example 'athlete* and 'tall man*.
As Stevenson admits in elaborating a similar causal
theory of meaning, it is impossible to account for these
without invoking not just experienced regularities but
specifically linguistic rules distinguishing their uses,
besides experiences of distances of 99 miles and 100 miles
which for some purposes are practically equivalent and
for others vitally different, and of athletes who are
generally, but not always, tall men.^ But if we have to
invoke linguistic rules to account for our responses,
this is explaining how a word comes to mean something for
us by invoking its meaning. Finally, as Grice in his
criticism of Stevenson has pointed out, any causal theory
of meaning can at most account for the standard meaning
of a term, and in our analysis of the meaning of statements
we must consider the different external and linguistic
contexts of the utterance as well as their "relevance to
2
an obvious end."
1. C.L.Stevenson: Ethics and Language,( New Haven, Yale 
University Press, 1941)» pp.67-^7o.
2. H.P.Grice: "Meaning", -The Philosophical Review, July,1957
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We need not deny that we can treat learning as 
a causal process - in fact psychologists and education­
alists mostly do, but this is to give at most a scientific 
account of the necessary conditions, scientifically 
discovered, for A to learn the meaning of p; it is not to
' give an account of what we mean by "A knows the meaning
of p", i.e. the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the truth of this statement. No causal account can do 
this, though the causal theory of meaning tries to offer 
such an account for "A understands p".
So far I have given an account of the authors * 
'engram* theory of meaning and my criticism of it. I
shall now go on to discuss their other definition of
meaning in terms of reference, as a transition to their 
most influential work on meaning, viz., their distinction 
of referential and emotive meaning.
The 'engram* account of 'meaning' (applicable 
specifically to events which 'mean* further events to a 
perceiver, and not obviously applicable to words which 
'mean* the objects they signify to a hearer) leads 
naturally to an identification of 'meaning* with 
'reference* as found in the further definition of 'meaning* 
as "That to which the User of a Symbol actually refers". 
This seems to imply that every symbol or any expression
1. M.M., p.307. (My italics).
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must be used to refer to things. This, of course, is not 
the case: only certain types of expressions are referring 
expressions. They are, as Strawson has shown in his article 
"On Referring" (Mind 1950) roughly: proper names, 
substantives, pronouns, 'here', 'now', 'this', 'that'.
Other types of expression, e.g. adjectives, 'while',
'is', 'either-or ', etc. can be absorbed in this referenlaal 
account if the statements in which their meaning can be 
completed can as a whole be held to refer - to facts, 
situations, states of affairs, etc. But if one takes 
the whole statement rather than its referring expression 
as referring to a fact, as if a fact were a bit of the 
world, this gives rise to further difficulties for the 
meaning = reference theory. For then one finds two 
statements referring to each fact but contradictory in 
meaning, for example, "The fire is alight" and "The fire 
is not alight" referring to the same fact as well as to 
the fire (an object) and its state (a property); i.e. 
one has to fabricate objects = facts for whole statements 
to refer to, just as one has to fabricate objects = properties 
for adjectives to refer to. And the only reason for such 
fabrication would be a preconception that every expression
1. P.F.Strawson: op.cit., reprinted in "Essays in Conceptual 
Analysis", (Macmillan & Co.Ltd., 1956).ed. À. Flew, p. 21
21
has meaning by referring to something. Hence the authors* 
definition of meaning cannot be taken to be a general 
definition applicable to all meaningful expressions. But 
nor can it be taken as a definition even of specifically 
referring expressions, such as the referring use of a 
general name like 'the fire*. For although I say "The 
fire is alight", meaning by "the fire" the object in 
front of me (i.e., I refer to one particular object in 
using the expression "the fire"), this can not mean that 
the meaning of the expression 'the fire' (which is, of 
course, to be found in any good dictionary) is this 
particular object. Nor again can the meaning of such an 
expression be some particular mental process of inter­
pretation in some particular speaker or hearer.
In fact to be a statement a use of language must 
not only make a reference but also say something about 
the person, object, event, place or process referred to, 
(Strawson,, op.cit.)^ ; and for an adequate account of 
meaning we must distinguish (and not identify) "What 
Jones meant by saying 'X'" from "the meaning of 'X'." 
("The meaning of an expression cannot be identified with 
the object it is used, on a particular occasion, to refer 
to.") (Strawson, op.cit.).
1. p.40.
2. p.30.
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Thus, "the meaning of *Z’,” where *X* is an 
expression, is not to he confused with what a particular 
speaker or hearer would mean hy ’X*. Yet explanations of 
the meaning of an expression are often a confused 
conflation of various things that may he meant hy *means * 
in
"A means X hy Y."
"When A says Y he intends to commit himself to X."
"V/hen A says X is good (or had) he is attributing 
p, q_, r, to it as a hasis of evaluation:
For example in suitable contexts:
When A says "that bullying jackass" he means Mussolini.
When A says "M is not religious" he intends to commit
himself to M*s not being a Christian.
When A says "M is not a Christian" his criterion is
that M does not go to Church.
There are also many possible paraphrases of the 
expression "Y means X to A”, kor example in suitable 
contexts :-
"WTien A sees Y he thinks immediately of X".
(Y/hen A sees a red flag he thinks immediately of Communism).
"Vvhen A sees Y he responds to it as if to X".
(V/hen A sees a red flag he responds to it as if to danger).
"When A says Y he intends to refer to X".
(Y/hen A says 'the red flag' he intends to refer to the 
Communist emblem);
i.e. we know how to cope with the sense of 'meaning' in
23
which people mean X by Y, and with the sense of 'meaning* 
in which things mean X to people, but "the meaning of 
the expression X* is a complex notion and of much more 
indeterminate meaning in general. It is roughly a whole 
range of linguistic jobs which can be done by X in 
combination with other appropriate expressions.
Nevertheless the name and object named model 
retains its powerful attraction as the model of all cases 
of significant expression and their meaning, and we can 
preserve it in traditional company by fabricating suitable 
referents; e.g., facts for statements, (preferably true); 
universals for adjectives, feelings of hesitation for 
'either-or' etc. Thus we might save the meaning = reference 
definition. But the authors (especially Richards) abandon 
it' to make their most influential distinction within 
meaning, namely that of referential versus emotive meaning.
b) Referential and emotive meaning
We have found that the causal theory of meaning 
provided by Ogden and Richards was not based on sufficient 
empirical evidence, and that no explanation of its adaptation 
to fit the more complex cases of meaning and interpretation 
arising through the use of non-natural signs in language 
was given. We may new consider Ogden and Richards* theory 
of language and its functions.
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Their main tenet is that language has two 
functions: referential and emotive. These terms are 
perhaps the most famous among the many coined by Ogden 
and Richards, and have been adopted (with due modifications), 
by many succeeding philosophers and aestheticians (e.g.
Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, Stevenson in Ethics 
and Language, Collingwood in The Principles of Art).
Tn the terms of this dichotomy the language used in 
science (and in common sense factual statements) is held 
to be referential and all other uses of language are
necessarily emotive, since these are held to be "two
1 2 totally distinct uses of language" and exhaustive . The
referential function of language consists in "the recording,
the support, the organisation and the communication of
references", whereas "the emotive use of words is a more
simple matter; it is the use of words to express or
excite feelings and attitudes"^.
At this point I want to draw attention to two
things :
l) That 'referential* and 'emotive * are said to
supply to uses, not to bits of language, and we can
1. P.L.C., p.261
2. In M.M., p.360, the authors enumerate five functions of 
language, l) "Symbolisation of reference ; 2) The express­
ion of attitude to listener; 3) The expression of 
attitude to referent; 4) The promotion of effects intended; 
5) Support of reference." This list they think to be 
exhaustive, but they g enerally talk of only two functions, 
referential and emotive. Functions 2-4 are included in
the emotive function, functions 1&5 in the referential.
3. M.M., p.257.
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presumably put the same sentence to both uses, according 
to our different purposes.
2) Ogden and Richards talk of 'communication of
references* where we should expect 'facts' or 'information*, 
i.e., the communication of both references and descriptions 
(or attributions and ascriptions in Strawson's words).
Tn keeping with their general scientific positivism, 
Ogden and Richards assume that reference can only be to 
objects which can be scientifically (i.e.empirically) 
demonstrated - tables, chairs, florins, i.e. referents 
which can as it were be pointed at, seen, and touched, or,
as Black says, be part of "a specific spatiotemporal
1 •
event!' They would no doubt allow also for scientific
reference to such unobservable but scientific objects
as electrons, bacteria, inferiority complexes, in terms
of which the behaviour of observable objects is theorized
about. Now Truth, Goodness, Beauty, Virtue, etc! are not
such spatiotemporal particulars, since their instantiation
is incapable of scientific verification; they are therefore
for these authors merely 'symbolic fictions' or "quondam
2
denizens *' of '* The World of Pure Being" and are of no 
use to positivists - except for furnishing examples of 
the emotive use of language. 'References' to these must be 
pseudo-references.
If we say "The height of the Eiffel Tower is
1. Black; Language and Philosophy, p.194
2. M.M., p'.I94T
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90ü feet"^ we are making a statement amenable to scientific
verification and hence either true or false. But if we
say "The Eiffel Tower is beautiful" we are not making a
statement, not even a false statement, for no scientific
verification procedure is appropriate to it. Yet we do
not seem to be using language nonsensically. The authors*
answer is: "We are most probably using words merely to
2
evoke certain attitudes." The objection to this suggestion 
is that on such a view it would be self-contradictory to 
say "The Eiffel Tower is beautiful but I'm glad you don't 
admire it," whereas, in fact, this is quite free from 
self-contradiction, e.g. I may be pleased that we won't 
have to miss our train while you contemplate it. Moreover 
on this view it is hard to see why we should even say or 
think to ourselves that the Eiffel Tower is beautiful 
(or ugly). In fact we may be far from wanting to arouse 
anyone's feelings or attitudes, and far even from wanting 
to express our own feelings or attitudes; we may be simply 
making an evaluative judgment. But I shall defer the 
question of the uses of such statements to Chapter 6.
Here it .suffices to point out that the dichotomy of factual 
statement or merely emotive expressions cannot accommodate 
such judgments.
With this "crude antithesis between emotive and
1. M.M. p.257.
2. M.M. p.257.
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scientific utterance even such a favourable critic of 
the theory as Bertrand Russell found fault, objecting that 
"the distinction between the emotional and the logical 
use of words is illusory, since we can always give both 
an emotional and a logical force to our words. This is 
however itself too crude an objection to the distinction. 
Richards and Ogden are of course av/are of the fact that 
the two functions of language mostly occur together, and 
that except in the case of a language v/holly made up of 
artificial symbols (for example as in 'Principia Mathematica'), 
all discourse, whether ordinary, poetic or scientific, 
contains a reference to objects of some sort, and generally 
implies an emotional attitude towards them, being often 
intended to have the effect of evoking in the listener 
similar or different references and attitudes. Still 
Richards upholds as possibly exclusive this distinction 
between the two functions of.language as the necessary 
premise for the new theory of poetry which he developed ■
later.
The 'referential' and 'emotive' functions of 
language clearly do not exhaust all types of meaning, 
and Stevenson tried to fill the obvious gaps in Ogden 
and Richards' theory of meaning somewhat sketchily in 
his chapter on meaning in Ethics and Language. Thus he
1. B.Russell:'Review of "The Meaning of Meaning" in Dial 
(Chicago), August 1926.
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finds that
"It would be well to supplement the terms 'emotive' 
and ’descriptive’ by subdividing meaning in a number 
of other ways. If meaning is taken as a disposition 
of a sign to produce psychological reactions, one may 
subdivide it by classifying the psychological reactions 
in any way that occasion requires.
He then talks of 'pictorial meaning' and of 'confused 
meaning' as separate kinds of meaning different from both 
descriptive and emotive meaning. Stevenson also differentiates 
between different kinds of 'emotive meaning', namely;
1) laudatory and derogatory (according to "the kind of 
feelings or attitudes that constitute the response");
2) dependent and independent emotive meaning (according 
to whether the emotive meaning of an expression is 
dependent on a primarily referential meaning).
Whatever the merits of Stevenson's additions to 
and subdivisions of meaning, Richards' and Ogden's division ■ ; 
of meaning into 'referential' and 'emotive' is both 
historically and philosophically the most influential. J
I shall therefore in the sequel discuss only the original 
simple theory of 'emotive meaning', as found in Ogden 
and Richards' work.
In order to distinguish and disentangle the woof • i 
of the referential from the warp of the emotive use of 
language, we must, so we are told, apply the test of 
verifiability : "Is this true or.false in the ordinary
1. C.L. Stevenson, op. cit . , p.77* .uh
2. ibid, p.79.
3. cf. p.79.
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strict scientific sense? If this question is relevant then
the use is symbolic, if it is clearly irrelevant then we
have an emotive utterance.
To this distinction between referential and
emotive meaning there are many objections. In the first
place, the notion of a class of clearly referential
statements, based on a clear criterion of empirical or
scientific verifiability, is by now recognised to be much
less clear than was assumed. The problem of giving a
satisfactory and rigorous definition of 'empirical
verifiability' was, as is well-kno^/m, a source of trouble
to Ayer in his successive editions of Language, Truth and 
2
Logic; and has developed into a still unsolved problem
of a satisfactory and rigorous definition of the notion
4
of 'confirmation'.
Although a precise specification of verifiability 
has hitherto failed, the criterion was useful in 
eliminating certain metaphysical statements as unverifiable 
in any acceptable sense at all and hence meaningless.
(For example, "Poetry is a Spirit", "The world longs for 
a new expression of the Meaning of life and reality").^
And when the test of empirical verifiability came to be 
applied to moral and aesthetic statements Ogden and Richards 
either had to reject them as meaningless, or to invent
1. M.M., p.259.
2. A.J.Ayer, op.cit., (V.Gollantz Ltd., 1953). Cf.Intro.
3. M.M., p.285 (quoting Prof.Munsterberg.)
W k / e ' r o # ' Analytic Philosophy (The Macmil.
pp. 3 I •
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a special, non-cognitive kind of meaning for them, and 
since such statements are in fact often significantly made, 
emotive meaning was a helpful candidate for the job.
Unfortunately Ogden and Richards never make it 
clear what it means for a use of language to have emotive 
meaning. They usually imply that its emotive meaning is 
the actual emotive effect of a particular utterance of 
the language in question. But this is plainly something 
different from, though usually dependent on, its meaning.
If, as is usually the case, this emotive effect is 
derivative from the meaning of the utterance, this would 
seem to show that the expression 'emotive meaning' is 
itself non-referential, its reference to 'meaning' a 
pseudo-reference, and only used for its emotive effect.
That 'emotive meaning' is really emotive effect, though 
perhaps restricted to usual emotive effect among a certain 
group of language uses, emerges quite clearly from 
Stevenson's definition of 'emotive meaning' in his paper 
on "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms":
"The emotive meaning of a word is a tendency of a 
word, arising through the history of its usage, to 
produce (result from) affective responses in people.
It is the immediate- aura of feeling which hovers about 
a word."1
On such a view words like 'love*, 'Christ', the
1. C.L.-Stevenson: op cit., in Readings in Ethical Theory, 
ed.by W.Sellars and J.Hospers,(New York, Appleton Century 
Crofts Inc., 1952,) p.422.
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*hydrogen bomb,'would probably qualify as having 'emotive 
meaning', i.e. a usual emotive effect in whatever 
context they are used. But this account of emotive meaning 
can hardly be used to explain the whole significance of 
what would otherwise be taken to be true or false ethical 
or aesthetic judgments.
At all events, as Richards and Ogden are aware,
the distinction between 'referential' and 'emotive' language
is a distinction between uses of language, not between
bits of language. Yet it is bits of language, words and
sentences as such, capable of many and varied uses, which
have meaning, and can acquire emotive force only in
virtue of this. Most bits of language can be used both to
make statements and to evoke or express attitudes, though
usually the one function or the other predominates,
sometimes to the frustration of the subordinate function.
From this the authors conclude that in exclamations,
greetings, oaths, military commands, threats, questions
and requests, the referential function is either negligible
or absent altogether, so that they can be safely counted
1
as emotive language.
If this is so, we have to consider whether 
'meaning' at least at sentence level is not best confined 
to that aspect of the use of language in which it is
i. M.M.,pp.371, 372.
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capable of being true or false and having logical 
implications and p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s,yet leaving its emotive 
effects as a separate study.
In any case there are uses of language which claim 
to assert truths as clear as those of scientific statements 
or the factual statements of common s ense which do not 
purport to be either, e.g., assertions of moral truth; i.e. 
the assumption that an assertion must report the sense- 
perceived world or be a disguised ejaculation is not self- 
evidently true.
c) The Poetic use of Language 
Let us now consider the poetic use of language.
Ogden and Richards are right that from the point of view 
of the reader, the main function of poetry as of art in 
general - is not the conveying of some specific kind of 
information about particular matters of fact (which is 
done more efficiently in plain prose), but the evocation 
of a certain mood, attitude, experience or perhaps the 
conveying of a new insight. But they were mistaken when 
they assumed that this effect could be achieved independently 
of, or in spite of, the meaning of the language used in 
poetry. It is only in virtue of the meaning of the words 
that compose it that a poem can and does achieve its 
appropriate emotional effect. V/hen listening to poetry
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in an unknown foreign language one m a y  of course be aware 
of some emotional effect due to the sounds of the words, 
their rhythm, the voice and tone of the reader, our mood, 
etc., but this is an emotional effect independent of the 
maaning of the poem. Such a kind of emotive effect would 
probably be dismissed by Richards as inappropriate. In 
short, not any kind of emotional reaction can even for 
Ogden and Richards be taken as a sign that the 'emotive 
meaning' of an utterance has been understood.
Though poetry is not concerned with literal truth 
and does not usually use assertive language to make assert­
ions factually true of particular objects in the world, 
it could not achieve its full emotive effect of inducing 
"a fitting attitude to experience"^ if it were composed of 
nonsense 'words', or words having only 'mythological 
referents' unconnected with human truths. We must first of 
all know the 'referential' meaning of a statement (poetic 
or otherwise), and only afterwards can we take up an 
attitude made appropriate by it, be it favourable, 
unfavourable or indifferent.
When, for example,William Blake says:
"0 Rose, thou art sick! "Has found out thy bed
The invisible worm, Of crimson joy.
That flies in the night. And his dark secret love
In the howling storm. Does thy life destroy."
he is not concerned to make an assertion about a specific 
1. M.M., p.270
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rose and a specific worm, yet he uses a rose and a worm 
as images in order to convey to us indirectly hut more 
forcefully a general assertion about human life. 'The 
sick rose* is a symbolic poem, i.e., there is no simple 
relation between the words used and the objects, feelings 
or states referred to. Therefore it is almost impossible 
or very difficult to give their prose equivalents - at 
most we can interpret his poetic symbols in various, 
approximate ways. For example we can say thatihe.rose is 
a symbol of love and 'the howling storm' a symbol of 
jealousy which slowly, inexorably leads to the corruption 
of love. But we can also give a different interpretation 
of the poem, as does for example Arnold Kettle in his 
article on the "English Blake". He says: "The rose is a 
rose, with the scent and colour and texture of a rose; 
and it is also Blake's world, a sick society, corrupted 
by its spectre, eaten away by false feelings and false 
ideas based on false relationships.
We see that 'the sick rose' contains a whole
complex of meanings, and even if we give its prose
equivalent as being a report of either or both individual
and social corruption, whether physical, intellectual,
or moral, we still feel that no explanation can fully
exhaust the richness of the poem, but nevertheless this is
constituted by the referential meanings of the words used.
1. Arnold Kettle: "English Blake", Marxism Today, Oct.1957, 
p.19.
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The meaning of Blake's poem depends on the meaning 
of the words of the poem; the emotive effect and the 
assertive meaning are not mutually exclusive but inter­
dependent, though it is in virtue of the poetic formulation 
of the assertion that the force of the emotive effect is 
what it is.
Therefore it is only in virtue of the meaning 
of a sentence, or expression or statement, be it 
scientific, empirical or poetic, i.e. in virtue of "the 
rules, habits, conventions governing its correct use, 
that the appropriate emotive effect occurs. That a use of 
words has an emotive effect is not a distinguishing 
characteristic of a poetic use of language. Every judgment 
has its emotive aspect (and the 'aura of feeling' is not 
restricted to uses of sentences with purely 'emotive 
meaning' as Stevenson suggests), and most emotional states 
depend on our beliefs, i.e., our explicit or implicit 
judgments about what is the case. To want to separate, 
as Richards tries to do in his account of the poetic use 
of language, the referential from the emotive functions is
to force language into a^bed of Procrustes in order to
justify a theory.
Now since Ogden and Richards realise (as Russell
does not) that it is uses of language rather than bits
1. P.F.Strawson: "On Referring", Essays in Conceptual 
Analysis,p.31.
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(e.g.sentences) which must be distinguished as used primarily 
to state facts or used primarily to evoke emotions, they 
could have distinguished the poetic use of language at 
least to some extent as that in which the hearer is aware 
that it is only the latter which is intended. Then if they 
had some way,independently of 'adapted response',for 
identifying the referential meaning of utterances, they 
could say that utterances could be used in poetry with 
their referential meaning for their emotive effects even 
though their actual referential function was cancelled 
by the poetic context. Indeed Ogden and Richards hold 
that in poetry "any symbolic function that the words 
may have is instrumental only and subsidiary to the evocative 
function.But since on their theory understanding the 
referential meaning of an utterance just consists in 
adopting adapted attitudes of expectation, it follows 
that poetry where such expectations are cancelled by the 
context, cannot be understood by the hearer; yet it is 
appropriately emotively effective. Clearly something is 
wrong with this account of the poetic use of language.
r- Sometimes the use of the expression 'meaning' 
in 'the meaning of a poem' is very like that in 'the 
meaning of Christ's crucifixion', i.e., as equivalent to 
'practical importance', and very nearly 'emotive effect'
1. M.M., p.259
X
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But for a poem to have such an effect a necessary condition 
is that it should he made up of words which have meaning 
in a different sense. Having meaning in this further sense 
is what makes words words rather than marks or noises, 
and if a poem must be made up of words, these must have 
meaning in the primary sense of meaning applicable to the 
language of the poem as to all language. 'Referential* 
is far too specific a label for it.
To sum up: 'the meaning o f  the language used in, 
for example. The Ancient I/Iariner is the quasi-factual 
narrative it reports, and it is not the emotions it does 
evoke, nor the emotions Coleridge meant it to evoke, nor 
the emotions it appropriately evokes: i.e. emotive effect 
is perhaps vital in poetry, and is dependent on, but quite 
different from, meaning in any sense.
Another distinction between the referential 
and the emotive uses of language lies, according to 
Richards, in the different kind of internal relations and 
interconnections appropriate to each. The logical inter­
connection of references is characteristic only of scientific 
language, whereas the proper organisation of emotive 
language is one of "emotional interconnection", for which, 
"logical arrangement is not necessary".^
1. P .Xi.C., p.268.
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This is surely a dogmatic assertion, not to say 
an irrational one. Even if it is true that "Le coeur a ses 
raisons que la raison ne connaît pas," it does not follow 
that there are n£ reasons, i.e., no justifications for 
one's emotional choices and attitudes; it would mean only 
that they are too fine and elusive to be caught in the 
web of a logical schema, unless one uses an extended 
concept of logic. It is probably only the mentally unbalanced 
person's use of language which may be allowed to have no 
logical connection, and even here we often find a para­
logical 'method in his madness'.
The difference then between the two uses of 
language is not that one is logical and referential and 
the other illogical and emotive (as Richards asserts), 
but that the interconnection we mostly find in poetry is 
mediated by emotional phenomena and hence apparently 
concentrated and elliptical, often resulting in the 
joining together of apparently unconnected images and 
thoughts. It is we, the reader, who must supply the missing^, 
intermediate links and stages of the emotive development 
in the poem - and this is one of the jobs of clarificatory 
criticism. There is no justification for Richards' sweeping 
generalisation that emotional interconnection often has 
no dependence upon logical relations of references. There 
is a logic of the emotions (a rational as against an 
irrational connection between them and the world), just
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as there is a logic of thought. The main difference lies, 
as I have tried to show, in the degree of their verbalisation. 
When - and if - we have as rich a theoretical vocabulary 
for the discrimination of emotions as we now have for the 
most varied objects of thought, their interconnection will 
also become more amenable to analysis. (It may, of course, 
be argued that all we need is not a richer vocabulary but 
only a finer sensibility.)
Let us consider what Richards might take as a 
justification for his view, an example from - the main 
source of emotive language - poetry. Let us take Blake's 
poem "The Clod and the Pebble".
"Love seeketh not itself to please.
Nor for itself hath any care.
But for another gives its ease.
And builds a Heaven in Hell's despair....
Love seeketh only self to please.
To bind another to its delight,
Joys in another's loss of ease.
And builds a Hell in Heaven's despite."
Here we have a typical example of emotional interconnection 
which seems to support Richards in being clearly of the 
form *A is B and A is not-B'. Richards would say it is 
not logical, but that for Blake's "emotive purposes logical 
arrangement is not necessary.But the poet would strongly 
object to our transformation of his poem into its logical
l.P.L.C.p.268
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equivalent - *A is B and A is not-B' because it constitutes 
both a logical contradiction and a factual falsification: 
the Love of the first stanza is not the same love as that 
in the second, and therefore we cannot refer to both of 
them as A, as we were trying to do; the self-abnegation 
and the self-seeking do not qualify the same emotion 
(which would be logically self-contradictory), but either 
tv7o different emotions in general, or two different 
particular cases of emotion in two different people.
The Clod and the Pebble are both right and they are right 
at both levels - at that of referential meaning and at 
that of emotive effect. If it were otherwise, if there 
really existed this utter independence of factual reference 
and emotional attitude and the supposedly different mental 
processes corresponding to them, there v/ould be no 
possibility of ever justifyi% our attitudes by appealing 
to facts.
Science, (always with a capital S), says Richards, 
always deals with undistorted references; art, poetry, 
and "innumerable other human activities not less important"... 
"require distorted references or, more plainly, fictions.'^
This again is itself a distortion of facts, not 
to say a fiction. The scientist who deals with atoms,
1. P.L.C., p.266. (Author's italics.)
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protons and neutrons, or the poet who deals with daffodils 
are both dealing with fictions or both dealing with words 
used to refer to objects. They are simply using different 
techniques of describing these objects. If the scientist's 
references are distorted, if they are fictitious, then his 
theory will ultimately be invalidated. If the poet's 
references are distorted, they will not be excused by 
being called 'fictions' but will rightly be called 
implausible fictions. If we accepted Richards' view, we 
would expect all literature and all poetry to be but 
variations on the theme of Alice in Wonderland. And our 
judgment of them, if it is to accord with Richards' demands, 
would have to be like Alice's after reading "Jabberwocky":
"It seems very pretty ... but it's rather hard 
to understand! Somehow it seems to fill my head with, 
ideas - only I don't exactly know what they are!"...
But then Alice did not realise that as she was reading • 
poetry she had no right and no need to know "what they are". 
For Richards, her initial response was both adequate and 
sufficient. But not for us.
Perhaps the ambiguity and inconsistency of the 
theory of emotive meaning arises from Richards' adopting 
different attitudes to, and hence giving different accounts
1. Lewis Carrol: Through the Looking Glass, (London, Lean 
& Son), p.103-
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of, science and art. In the case of science he describes 
the way scientific statements are actually made and never 
uses prescriptive language in the sense of how he thinks 
these statements ought to be made; and he is right in 
applying to them the test of verifiability or correspond­
ence to fact because this is ultimately the test which 
science (by experiment) does in fact apply to its state­
ments, and the application of such a test is what makes 
them scientific rather than metaphysical or perhaps 
pure-mathematical statements.But in the case of poetry, 
he was not content only to describe the way he thought 
poetry worked, but proceeded to explain how we ought 
to understand poetic statements. If he had been satisfied 
with drawing our attention to the fact that the truth 
about particular matters of fact which may be expressed 
by a poem should not be the sole, or the most important, 
factor in our aesthetic appreciation, much controversy 
would have been avoided. But when he says that "poetry 
seems about the return to the conditions of its greatness, 
by abandoning the obsession of knowledge and symbolic 
truth"^ he commits himself to the rejection of much great 
poetry which does embody truth-claims, and whose greatness 
as poetry is inseparable from them. Subtract from 
Prometheus Bound Aeschylus* concern with true freedom, 
from Paradise Lost Ivlilton*s concern with man's spiritual
1. M.M., p.271.
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fall, from War and Peace Tolstoy's concern with the life 
of man (and of woman), take away the truth-claims of these 
works, and their greatness will surely be impaired. We 
admit that these truth-claims are not made by means of 
assertive statements, but we hold that a poetic statement 
which is purely emotive (non-referential) would be 
meaningless and hence even emotively ineffective, because 
incapable of arousing any kind of "attitude to experience" 
Rimbaud's poem Voyelles is a case in point:
"A noir, E blanc, I rouge, 0 bleu, voyelles,
Je dirai quelque jour vos naissances latentes.
A, noir corset velu des mouches éclatantes 
Qui bombillent autour des puanteurs cruelles, "# # #
Richards might say that this poem justifies his belief 
that in poetry "Many arrangements of words evoke attitudes 
without any reference being required en route",^ but actually 
even here the language is 'referential', and apart from 
its discriminating references (e.g. to vowels and colours) 
we could not get any emotive effect from it.
We find therefore that any comprehensible use of 
language will be referential, and that directly or indirectly 
a question of truth or falsehood applies equally to all
i our statements, whether they are predominately referential
J
or emotive. But a given statement is verified in different 
ways in different situations. If I say "I am miserable
. X:,
1. P.L.C., p.267
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today", the question whether this is verifiable in any 
strictly scientific way is surely not the right question 
to ask (unless perhaps for a doctor), because misery or 
happiness, just like beauty or goodness is not something 
that can be measured or weighed, though 1 can tell whether 
I am more or less miserable today than last time, and 
therefore it can be measured - roughly, by introspection. 
But the labelling of such a statement as a 'pseudo­
statement* by Ogden and Richards, a mere expression of 
feeling without any referent is surely unwarranted. If I 
honestly mean what I say, if the statement corresponds 
to my experience of 'feeling-miserable-here-now', then it
y
is just as true as if I had said "I weigh 8 stones today". 
The difference of course is in the kind of test by which 
we verify the two statements: the one by means of weighing 
machines, the other by careful consideration of how we feel 
or by psychological tests. And if "I am miserable today" 
is considered as an 'emotive statement' just because it 
reports an emotional state, then there is no reason for 
regarding "I am having synaesthesis" as descriptive.
Philip Wheelwright has rightly pointed out that 
Richards' view rests on the mistaken assumption "that 
only scientifically determinable objects ... are the only 
objects there are, and the only objects which can 
significantly be talked a b o u t . P r o m  this basic tenet
1. P.Wheelwright : "On the Semantics of Poetry", Kenyon 
Review, Summer 1940.
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it logically followed that all those referents which are
not 'scientifically determinable*, like Goodness, Beauty,
1
Virtue, etc., are therefore "mythological referents".
But Ogden and Richards not only set up an antithesis
between referential and emotive meaning, they also asserted
their independence of each other. They say that "It is not
necessary to knov/ what things are in order to take up
2
fitting attitudes towards them,"...Let us try and apply 
this statement (is it referential or emotive?) to a 
concrete instance ; I do not have to know that the noise 
in the jungle is that of a tiger in order to take up an 
attitude, but my attitude will not be fitting unless 
what I heard ^  what I took it to be, the noise of a 
tiger or something comparable. If I cannot identify the 
noise I may take up 'the fitting attitude' to take up on 
hearing an unidentified noise in the jungle, but I know 
that I have heard an unidentified noise and the fittingness 
of the attitude is a function of this judgment. If they 
mean that one can elicit a fitting attitude from a person 
whom one keeps in ignorance of the object the attitude 
fits, this is true, but the person does not 'take up' 
such an attitude towards the object, it is just evoked in 
him. Perhaps this is the way Ogden and Richards thought 
poetry worked.
1. M.M. , p.250.
2. M.M., p.271.
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Thus, hy confining the 'referential* (true-or-
false) use of language to bare science, poetry, literature,
philosophy and ethics were relegated to the limbo of emotive
language, with the task of evoking 'fitting attitudes*
to 'mythological referents'; and though we may now be made
conscious by Ogden and Richards' work of the whole
make-believe procedure, we are yet still to be encouraged
to go on giving them our wholehearted 'imaginative assents *.^
But one cannot keep up for long two contrary beliefs:
the belief that poetry (and emotive language in general)
is not concerned with truth and the belief that it is
all-important for the ordering of our inner lives. Richards
came therefore to abandon one of these positions for the
sake of the other. Indeed, as A.Tate puts it, "Mr.Richards'
books may be seen together as a parable, as a mythical
and dramatic projection, of the failure of the modern
mind to understand poetry on the assumptions underlying
2the demi-religion of positivism."
The belief that there is only one kind of truth 
or knowledge, the scientific, if brought to its logical
conclusion, would have led to the wholesale "renunciation
of poetry because it cannot compete with the current 
version of our objective world.
1. "Imaginative assents, unlike verifiable beliefs, are
not subject to the laws of thought." Richards:. "Belief",The 
Symposium, Oct.1930.
2. A.Tate: "On the Limits of Poetry", p.48.
3. A.Tate: -do- p.48.
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In his maturest work, Coleridge on Imagination,
Richards tries to resolve this apparent antithesis between
science and poetry, truth and falsehood, objective fact
and experience. So he prudently abandons his early
extreme position and has now come round to regard all
man's accounts of himself and the world as equally mythical
He admits that now "knowledge in all its varieties -
scientific, moral, religious - has come to seem a vast
mythology with its sub-orders divided according to their
different pragmatic sanctions. Now all systems of
knowledge, all traditional schemas of beliefs and
religion, all scientific and historical accounts are
regarded simply as different systems of myths. Of all
these myths, "It is the privilege of poetry to preserve
us from taking our notions either for things or for 
. 2
ourselves." Y/hereas once Richards regarded only Science 
as capable of furnishing an exact and truthful account 
of 'reality', as the only indubitable source of knowledge,
he now seems to hold that poetry too is a source of
knowledge, or rather of mythology ! But how can we classify 
anything as mythology except by contrast with something 
we take to be reality? However if all accounts of the
1. Richards: Coleridge on Imagination, p.227
2. Richards: -do- p.163
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world are equally arbitrary projections of the mind, then, 
if we have to choose between the prosaic accounts of 
science and the imaginative accounts of art, we should 
naturally choose the latter. And this is the choice 
which Richards makes, and which he wants us to make as 
well: "Poetry is the completest mode of utterance,he 
says, and implies that this completeness is more valuable 
than the incomplete, piecemeal accuracy of scientific 
utterance.
We may agree with the late Richards that the poetic 
is more nearly complete than the scientific utterance 
' because it gives us not only the bare fact, the 'this'
I or 'that', but the fact as seen and &lt and experienced 
by a human being from his unique point of view, the 
complete relation of a specific subject to a specific 
object, the given-in-experience to an individual perceiver. 
Poetry goes beyond science to realms where science cannot 
tread. Although poetry cannot reach the vast abstractions 
of science, it is no less capable of its special kind 
of truth in its rendering both of the universal element
I in human nature and in life and of the particularity and
) 1
; uniqueness of things and their meaning for particular 
persons. Science and poetry are not two opposites but
1. Richards; Coleridge on Imagination, p.163.
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two different techniques of describing our world (and 
man), the one in order to master and change it, the other 
in order to Imow and understand it better. But whereas 
the scientific statement must correspond to the objective 
interpersonal fact if it is to be applied successfully 
in practice, the poetic statement is true if it corresponds 
to imagined, actual or possible human experience.
We shall see in the sequel how the early Richards' 
belief in the primacy and universality of scientific 
method for establishing truth led to his attempt to outline 
a descriptive psychological theory of value, and drove 
him to adopt a subjective view of the nature of the 
aesthetic evaluation, and an emotive-expressive analysis 
of the aesthetic judgment. On the other hand he never 
put his psychological theory of value into practice, and 
in his practical criticism (in contrast to his theory) 
he'insists on the equivalence, if not the primacy of 
recognition and understanding over emotional response 
in aesthetic appreciation.
My main objection to Richards* theory of language 
is thus that his categories are unclear and make it 
impossible to distinguish the scientific from the poetic 
use of language, including assertive language. The main 
points of my criticism are
1. We must separate the referential use of 
language from the statement-making use of language. As
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Strawson has shown, there are different linguistic rules 
for referring (or mentioning), and rules for attributing 
and ascribing.
Nearly all uses, except pure ejaculations, are 
’referential* in the broad sense, i.e., contain certain 
expressions used to refer to things (in the vaguest sense 
of that word, covering anything mentionable). Commands, 
questions, most exclamations, requests, etc., all contain 
references but do not make statements. Poetry (except 
nonsense verse, and even this really - see Lewis Carroll * s 
word by word explanation of the meaning of the words 
used in *Jabberwocky*) is clearly referential in this 
sense.
2. We might separate the *scientific * referential 
use of language (in Richards* sense of * scientific *) 
from the general referential use; as consisting of 
expressions used to refer to sense-perceptible objects, 
and to such objects as are merely theoretical aids to 
explaining the sense-perceived behaviour of such objects.
But poetry just as much as science refers 
to roses and rainbows, though it makes different sorts 
of assertions about them.
Assertions can be made about other sorts of 
objects, e.g., the virtues and vices, Beauty, Goodness, 
etc., though it may be that references to such objects
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must be connected with statements about sense-perceptible 
ones in some way if they are to be significant, as must 
references to electrons, vitamins, phlogiston, the 
ether, etc.
3. Considerations of ease and determinacy of 
interpersonal verifiability might then lead us to accept 
some objects as basic and statements about these as 
verifiable in a primary sense; and to the view that all 
language v;hatever gets what interpersonal significance 
it has from its logical connections with such statements 
(though these connections must be envisaged as of very 
complex and varied character if the view is to be plausible 
at all). Some such view might be an acceptable version
of Richards* anti-metaphysical position as to the status 
of Beauty etc., while leaving scope for rejecting his 
account of the relation these notions must have to his 
*basic* statements in order to retain significance, but
4. We must recognise the various types of 
assertive utterance (utterances which can be used to make 
assertions) and the various kinds of truth and falsity 
distinguishing them,
e.g. those which are true-or-false of particular 
facts in the world which may be
private (about misery, synaesthesis) or
public (about this rose, this worm);
those which are true-or-false of some general
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aspect of reality or human life referred to or described 
as such,
e.g. All matter is composed of atoms.
Some love corrupts; 
those which are true-or-false of some general aspect of 
reality or human life referred to indirectly by means 
of direct reference to some imaginary particular situation, 
e.g. Blake *s rose.
A reference to an imaginary particular situation 
mediating a general truth may look like a reference to 
an actual particular situation about which the statement 
would be false. "I am miserable today" might be written 
by a happy poet who had found a way to describe truly 
human misery via a particular but imaginary self-description
It should be clear from the above that no simple 
exclusive dichotomy of referential and emotive uses, 
or of scientific and poetic uses, of language is possible.
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Chapter 2 
RICHARDS* THEORY OF VALUE
a) Rejection of the Metaphysical theory of value
"Realise thyself, Amoeba dear," said Will: 
and Amoeba realised herself... And in the latter 
days Homo appeared... And when Homo came to study 
the parts of speech, he wove himself a noose of Words.
And he hearkened to himself, and bowed his head and 
made abstractions, hypostatising and glorifying.
Thus arose Church and State and Strife upon the Earth...
Then had Reason compassion on him, and gave 
him the Linguistic Conscience, and spake again softly:
"Go to now, be a Man, Homo I Cast away the Noose of 
Words that thou hast woven, that it strangle thee not. 
Behold! the Doctrine of Symbolism, which illumineth 
all things...
Thus the Realisation of Amoeba ended in the 
Realisation of an Error..."
("The Meaning of Meaning", Appendix E,p.449)
I have quoted from the Fable of the Amoeba at 
length, because, in spite of its apparent tone of self- 
mockery, it was meant to be taken seriously. It is 
important because it gives Richards* view on many problems 
and their solution in a nutshell.
If v/e try to extract the literal meaning from 
its metaphorical language, it comes to this: all the 
problems that have preoccupied man from the earliest time 
to the present day, the pivotal questions of Philosophy,
Ethics and Aesthetics, are merely 'pseudo-problems'.
Elan has lived and died for Abstractions he himself
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created. Now that he has woken up at last to realise his 
error, (thanks to the revelations of linguistics) the 
golden age of Reason is at hand. With the help of the 
Science of Symbolism, the study of the influence of 
language upon thought, and’ the theory of Definition, all 
the ambiguities of meaning of words like Truth, Reality, 
Beauty, Goodness, and the ghostly Universals and Values 
such words were thought to stand for, 'will vanish to 
airy nothing'. In short, all, or at least most, philosophical 
problems were merely "Phantoms due to linguistic miscon­
ception.
Of these metaphysical phantoms. Beauty is one 
of the most important and elusive. In The Foundations of 
Aesthetics, The Principles of Literary Criticism, and to 
some extent in The Meaning of Meaning, Richards is intent 
to prove that all the aesthetic theories of the past 
were mistaken because they were theories of Beauty - 
a metaphysical phantom, based on the mistaken "belief 
that there is such a quality or attribute, namely Beauty,
2which attaches to things which we rightly call beautiful." 
Richards holds the same view about all the following 
aesthetic terms: 'construction*, 'form*, 'balance',
1. M.M., p.391.
2. P.L.C., p.20
55
'composition*, 'design*, 'unity*,'expression*, 'depth',
'movement', 'texture', * solidity *, 'rhythm*, 'stress',
'plot', 'character', 'harmony', 'atmosphere','development * ;
these are all, wrongly, taken to stand for "qualities
inherent in things outside the m i n d . T h e y  "do not apply
2
to such objects but to states of mind, to experiences."
We saw in the foregoing chapter that for Richards
the literal meaning of a word was what it referred to; 
hence the literal meaning of "Beauty" must be sought in 
what 'it' refers to. But, says Richards, "To think about 
Good or Beauty is not necessarily to refer to anything, 
because Beauty has no referent. What we take to be its 
referent is only a 'linguistic phantom*.
It is in order to do away with such 'linguistic 
phantoms* that the method of Definition is put forward.
It "consists in the substitution (for any doubtful concept)
'bf a symbol or symbols which can be better understood"
and accordingly on Richards* theory of meaning, "It 
involves the selection of known referents as starting- 
points and the identification of the definiendum by its 
connection with t h e s e . I t s  task is to find out the 
referent to which people are actually referring when they 
use ambiguous concepts like Beauty.
With this view of Definition, Richards divides
1. P.B.C., p.21 3. P.L.G., p.264
2. P.L.C., p.22 4- M.M., 38?
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all aesthetic theories into three main groups according 
to the objects they take to be referred to by means of 
the concept of Beauty.
1. Doctrines which "begin with the object itself"^ 
(i.e. with the beautiful object).
2. Doctrines which "begin with things such as 
Nature, Genius, Perfection, the Ideal",^ (i.e. such 
general conceptions as these).
3- Doctrines which begin with the effect of 
beauty on us.
Each group is in its turn further subdivided 
so that we get an "approximately complete"^ list of 16 
definitions of the expression *is beautiful*.
And this is the 'approximately complete* list 
of definitions:
1. "Anything is beautiful which possesses the simple
quality of Beauty.
2. Anything is beautiful which has a specified Form.
3* Anything is beautiful which is an imitation of
Nature.
4. Anything is beautiful which results from success­
ful exploitation of a medium.
5. Anything is beautiful which is the mark of Genius.
6. Anything is beautiful which reveals (a) Truth,
(b) the Spirit of Nature, (c) the Ideal,
(d) the Universal, (e) the Typical.
7. Anything is beautiful which produces Illusion.
8. Anything is beautiful which leads to desirable
Social effects.
9* Anything is beautiful which is an Expression.
10. Anything is beautiful which causes Pleasure.
1, 2. M.M., p.247.
3. M.M., p.248.
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11. Anything is beautiful which excites Emotion.
12. Anything is beautiful which promotes a specific
Emotion.
13. Anything is beautiful which involves the processes
of Empathy.
14. Anything is beautiful which heightens Vitality.
15. Anything is beautiful which brings us in touch
with exceptional personalities. 2.
16. Anything is beautiful which induces Synaesthesis."
The first fifteen definitions are rejected by 
Richards as either false, (involving an hypoétatisation 
of Beauty), vague (what is Imitation and what is Nature?), 
or insufficient (it is true that the experience of the 
beautiful heightens vitality but many other experiences 
also do so). Although in his general criticism he is far 
more lenient towards other psychological theories of
I
beauty, they err in assuming a special kind of pleasure, 
the aesthetic, which is taken to be superior to all other 
pleasures, or a special kind of aesthetic emotion 
unrelated to practical life, or by ascribing to the 
aesthetic experience a special form "disinterestedness,
2
detachment, distance, impersonality, subjective universality," 
which distinguishes it from all other experiences.
Richards also rejects these modern theories of beauty, 
because his introspective evidence does not corroborate 
the special aesthetic experience, or emotion, or form, 
they postulate.
1. M.M., p.248.
2. P.I.e., p.15.
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Plato, Aristotle, Horace, Longinus, Boileau, 
Burke, M.Arnold, Ruskin, Croce, Clive Bell, Roger Pry, 
TMnsterberg, Lipps, Vernon Lee, - philosophers, 
aestheticians, poets and critics throughout the ages - 
have, in short, unconsciously fallen into their own 
linguistic pitfalls because their problem (What 
Beauty?) was only a pseudo-problem which could not be 
significantly answered.
Richards now is confident that, armed v/ith the 
scientific method of Definition. he will escape their 
fate. This method will enable him, he thinks, to transform 
Aesthetics from a barren branch of Speculative Philosophy 
into a Science. Its function will no longer be the 
positing of unanswerable questions and it will not try 
to probe into the ultimate nature, meaning and value of 
Beauty. Convinced that only Science could tell us what 
'Beauty' really referred to, viz. Synaesthesis, a 
psychological phenomenon, Richards, on his rejection of 
Metaphysics turns to Psychology.
And so, Aesthetics will now pose problems which 
can be solved, and will thus consciously limit its field
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of inquiry to the description of the describable, viz. 
the actual psychological processes and attitudes aroused,
i.e., the effects produced on us, by works of art.
"Critical remarks are merely a branch of psychological 
remarks"; "no ethical or metaphysical ideas need be 
introduced to explain value" and it follows that 
Aesthetics loses its raison d'etre as an independent 
discipline and will become a branch of Psychology.
Richards thus brings to its conclusion his long 
inquiry into the nature of Beauty and the meaning of 
'beauty' with the coining of a new term for a psychological 
state - Synaesthesis - which is to be the corner-stone 
of his scientific theory of Aesthetics. Having rejected 
all traditional and modern theories as unscientific and 
emotive, he now concludes that the theory of'Synaesthesis' 
"may perhaps be regarded as the Theory of Beauty par
p
excellence" . The single, exhaustive definition has 
been found at last; the much-criticised term 'beautiful' 
has come back redefined as a simple description = "productive 
of such and such feelings in so and so."
Now as a matter of fact, there a branch of 
Psychology which deals with responses to acknowledged 
works of art, and in so far as 'Synaesthesis* is put 
forward merely as a name for the typical response of-
1. P.L.C., p.23*
2. The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.7
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of this kind, Richards doing science (even if not 
very well-grounded science) in investigating such 
responses, in so far as he is doing merely descriptive 
work; and 'beauty’ in this definition becomes a merely 
classificatory descriptive word. But he does not and 
cannot stick to plain description, and we find him in 
practice smuggling in a value-content ; for not anyone's 
response to a work of art, on any occasion, qualifies 
as the proper aesthetic response; the synaesthesis occasioned 
in the vulgar mind by a sentimental appeal to 'stock 
attitudes' evokes his sternest reprobation. Moreover, 
in retaining the misleading term 'beauty', even in its 
sterilised, newly defined sense, Richards must have 
been conscious of a certain irony in this situation.
In the summary on the Meaning of Beauty (in The Meaning of 
Meaning) he adds an explanation: If "we elect to continue 
to employ the term Beauty as a shorthand substitute
for the definition we favour, we shall do so only on
- ■ 1 
grounds of ethics and expediency" ...^ He seems .to
have overlooked the fact that his distinguished
predecessors might equally well have been doing exactly
the same. But in view of his criticism of their practice
 ^ it is far more serious to find in him this candid admission
of following it "on grounds of ethics and expediency",
1. M.M. , p.388.
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i.e. using beauty not as a precisely defined term now 
freed from misleading associations, but as an emotive 
expression still carrying those misleading associations - 
a Word of Power.
As regards the Definitions of Beauty, it is not
clear whether they have been used as Richards thinks they
have, i.e. as equivalent symbols (what he calls substitute-
symbols; for ’is beautiful' or whether they were generally
put forv/ard as necessary and sufficient conditions,
offering criteria of Beauty,^ itself to be taken as a
rather general value-term. I think the latter position
is that taken by most aestheticians. But if Richards
himself offers 'synaesthesis-inducing' as an empirically
testable term containing the whole literal meaning of
'beautiful', any additional effect of the latter term
being purely emotive, then he is committed to the former
position. And in so far as we take.'X is beautiful' to
be a value-judgment and 'X induces synaesthesis' to be
empirically testable we must hold him to commit the 
. \ / 2
/ K 'naturalistic fallacy'. We will consider this aspect
of Richards' theory later. Here we can notice his motive 
for offering such a definition.
Just as the naturalistic philosophers in Ethics
1. cf.J.O.Urmson: "On Grading", Mind lix (1950) Section D: 
and cf. R.M.Hare: The Language of Morals (O.U.P., 1952), 
especially Part II.
2. cf. G.E.Moore: Principia Ethica (Cambridge University 
Press, 1951), p.13 and passim.”
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"are unwilling to admit the existence of any characteristics 
v/hich cannot he reduced to empirical terms"^ •* _ ' 
so Richards and other naturalistic philosophers in 
aesthetics hold that we could never he justified in 
asserting (and as a matter of fact never are asserting) 
more hy 'This is beautiful' than what can be analysed 
in empirical psychological terms, in this case, 'the 
occurrence of synaesthesis'.
Now although there are some cases in which the 
speaker uses 'beautiful* naturalistically and he can 
therefore be taken as meaning "This induces synaesthesis 
in me here, now", it neither follows that the meaning 
of 'beauty' is identical with the meaning of synaesthesis- 
producing, nor, therefore, that any evaluative conclusion 
can be deduced from a non-evaluative premise.
In brief, Richards' argument in his theoretical, 
anti-metaphysical, pro-scientific moments is as follows: 
There is no one valued property common to all 
objects which we.call beautiful, i.e. there is no Universal 
'Beauty* (Fact).
But there is just one valued experience which we 
signalise by any judgment that X is beautiful i.e. there 
is a psychological state of 'Synaesthesis* (Fact).
1. Readings in Ethical Theory: W Sellars and J.Hospers,
A . G..Ewing, "Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics", p. 121.
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Hence we say 'X is beautiful when and only when 
X gives us Synaesthesis*(Theory).
Hence 'X is beautiful* means *X gives us Synaesthesis*
(Theory).
Hence 'Beautiful* = *Synaesthesis-inducing* 
(Definition).
Hence the (descriptive scientific) theory of 
the occurrence of Synaesthesis = the theory of aesthetics.
This argument is acceptable if the theory of
meaning and therefore the definition of 'beautiful*
is acceptable in any such form as 'X is beautiful
(at least one )
if and only if X gives (some specified person(s) )
(most people )
synaesthesis, 'where the definiens is empirically
ascertainable. (This leaves open the question as to
whether this is so with Synaesthesis.) But if we take
'beautiful* to be a value-term (rejecting Richards'
theory of meaning) it commits the Naturalistic Fallacy.
In his scientific moments Richards adheres to his theory
of meaning and his definition and is unmoved by this
objection.
But in his practical, literary-critic moments 
he forgets his theory of meaning and his definition and 
takes instead:
'X is beautiful - if and only if X gives the right
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sort of Synaesthesis’ (no 'stock attitudes'), where the 
'right sort of Synaesthesis* is obtained from responding 
to the right poems, and the 'right poems' are such as 
have characteristics which Richards is willing to indicate. 
Clearly Richards is forced to make a genuine value- 
judgment (not any sort of scientific prediction about 
actual experiences) and we find him doing so in those 
very words he wants to throw out as representing linguistic 
phantoms, but which he has to use for their evaluative 
force.
Synaesthesis, in so far as it is a distinguishable 
psychological phenomenon, might v/ell be a necessary 
condition in our valued aesthetic experience, but its 
occurrence is not a sufficient condition for our aesthetic 
judgments and its avowal is not a logically adequate 
substitute for them. Ewing's argument against a naturalistic 
definition of 'good * applies mutatis mutandis to 'beautiful* 
here :
"Suppose a future physiologist were (as is 
logically possible) to discover a specific' modification 
of the brain which accompanied every good experience 
or action"(or experience of beauty). "The brain- 
modification would then be an infallible sign of 
goodness", (or of beauty) "but it still certainly 
would not follow that 'good*" (or beautiful) "just 
meant 'accompanied by this new brain-modification* 
or that goodness" (or beauty) "was identical v/ith 
the properly, of being thus accompanied. If it were, 
no people who lived before this physiological discovery 
could have meant anything by 'good' . (or beautiful).
1. Swing, op.cit., pp-121, 122 (author's italics).
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If therefore we hold that the meaning of 'beauty* is not 
analysable in terms of any non-value description, it does 
not follow that it is to be rejected as redundant or a 
linguistic phantom. Even if the occurrence of certain 
emotions is a necessary condition of valued aesthetic ? 
experience and judgment it does not follow that the 
judgment is about the psychological phenomena occasioning 
it. Therefore Richards* naturalistic definition of beauty 
must be rejected.
We conclude from the foregoing that, if 'beauty* 
is a value-term, then one must reject not only metaphysical 
theories of beauty because they are metaphysically 
descriptive but psychological theories as well.
Thus the quest for a descriptive Science of 
Aesthetics is doomed to failure from the outset: its 
subject, Beauty, cannot be given a descriptive definition. 
And if we find Richards himself using it as a value-term 
in his practice, and thus according to his own theory 
using purely emotive noises, this may seem reason enough 
for rejecting out of hand any non-value definition 
offered. And in effect we shall find that even in his 
theory, in his attempts to define ' 'is beautiful* 
has to employ other \alue-terms, such as 'order *, 'coherence *, 
'balance *, 'being fully alive *, etc. For although it is 
often not clear what terms count as purely descriptive.
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(i.e. roughly, classificatory simply for the sake of 
convenient classification), and what terms as at least 
partly evaluative, in Richards' use these terms are 
clearly evaluative.
There is perhaps room for a search for proper 
criteria of an empirically testable sort on which to 
base beauty-judgments. But, even if we try to define 
'Beauty*, like Richards, in terms of psychological 
phenomena, we should have to define it in terms of the 
proper occasions of psychological phenomena, where 
'proper* implies the use of standards which refer us 
back to qualities of objects rather than individual 
responses.
Therefore, Aesthetics in so far as it is the 
theory of beauty must be the study of the character of 
special qualities of objects and not the study of 
psychological phenomena.
We have above examined two points of Richards* 
protest against earlier theories of aesthetics:
1. That Beauty is not a metaphysical entity or
quality.
2. That valuing is a psychological activity of 
which we can construct a descriptive empirical theory,
i.e.* that what we need is a scientific psychological 
theory of value.
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V/e found that his first objection was justified,
but we pointed out that his second objection directs 
attention to the psychology of aesthetic appreciation 
where aesthetics concerns the correct or incorrect 
performance of valuing. It is this latter type of theory 
which metaphysicians were concerned to establish, and 
with which Richards himself is concerned in practice, 
and to which he appeals in the development of his notion 
of synaesthesis.
b) The quest for a Science of Aesthetics
Y/e saw that Richards wanted to save aesthetics 
from the hands of speculative philosophers, and to put 
it into the competent hands of men of science who had 
no particular metaphysical axe to grind and could therefore 
be trusted to keep to facts.
Now Richards is quite right in rejecting certain 
metaphysical theories of beauty as vague and inadequate, 
for the invocation of 'Intuition*, 'Nature *, 'Genius',
'Form* > is certainly not the invocation of empirically 
instantiated concepts. Already before Richards, Roger Fry, 
in his Essay 'Retrospect* (1920), had arrived at the same 
conclusion:
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"Like our predecessors we sought for the 
criteria of the beautiful, whether in art or nature.
And always this search led to a tangle of contradictions 
or else to metaphysical ideas so vague as to be 
inapplicable to concrete cases."
On rejecting metaphysics, Richards turned to
psychology on the basis of which, he thought, the
empirically verifiable concepts relevant to aesthetics
could be found. Henceforth, he declared, the function
of Aesthetics as a Science will be the description and
2
ordering of the attitudes evoked by art, and not the
description and ordering of the objects of art which 
evoke these attitudes.^But Richards is aware that modern 
psychology has not yet reached the stage of an exact 
science like botany or chemistry, and he repeatedly 
gives warning against the excesses of psychoanalysis, 
while praising the work of Stout and Ward.^But his praise 
of these psychologists is no more than lip-service if 
we judge by his practice, for Richards adopts the outlook 
and the terminology of the Behaviourists in trying to 
transform Aesthetics into a science. Psychology indeed 
was not yet an exact science, but at least in its 
neurological form it was on the way to becoming one.
Watson,had done some reliable experimental work on the 
three 'primary emotions' - fear, rage and love,-without
1. Roger Pry; Vision and Design, p.292.(Chatto & Windus,1929)
2. M.M., p.271
3. PLG., pp.20-22 and passim.
4. P.O., p.322.
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using that necessary evil of the traditional psychologists, 
introspection, and its key term, * experience *. For these 
he was able to substitute observed "interaction between 
stimulus-situation and r e s p o n s e . S o  he dispensed with 
talk of emotion, feelings, thoughts, mind and consciousness 
altogether, and replaced it by talk of different 
modifications and adaptations of the nervous system to 
external stimuli.
It seemed thus reasonable to Richards to hope 
that he could do the same in Aesthetics, and could 
replace the traditional term 'aesthetic experience' by 
'interaction between stimulus-situation and response'.
At all events, the new terminology sounded reassuringly 
scientific.
Nov/ in order to use this behaviouristio terminology 
aesthetics must be restricted to a definitely limited and 
specified field, viz. the description and 'ordering' 
of attitudes evoked by art. So whenever the term 'beautiful' 
is used by Richards, he will avoid what he calls the 
'Utraquistic subterfuge', i.e. he will not be referring 
to "qualities of the beautiful object", but "to emotional 
effects of these qualities on the beholder." Thus whenever 
Richards asserts 'X is beautiful* he will not mean that
1. "Behaviourism" by J.Watson, reviewed by Richards, The 
Criterion, 1925-26.
2. M.M., p.239. (My italics).
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it is beautiful, but he will mean "that it causes an
experience which is valuable in certain w a y s . H e
justifies this by his statement that "the remarks we make
as critics do not apply to such objects but to states
2
of mind, to experiences."
Prom the above quotations it is apparent that 
Richards, while trying to escape from one extreme, fell 
into another. True, the quest for a simple quality or 
Porm of beauty where this was confined to a study of the 
objects thought to manifest it had had the bad consequence 
that, taking a restrictive definition of beauty as their 
premise, such inquiries proved theoretically rigid and 
gave what Richards thought to be implausible and irrelevant 
results like studies of the ugly, the charming, the 
grotesque and the ridiculous. Richards on the other hand, 
declares that although the business of the aesthetician 
is the pursuit of scientific or factual truth, it is 
scientific or factual truth only about the experience 
of the spectator, and the aesthetician may not go beyond 
the experience of the spectator in its subjective aspect. 
This is surely as extreme and implausible a view as 
that of the pure objectivists.
True a l s o , . in modern times, the same search 
for an all-embracing definition of beauty has led to an
1. P.L.C., p.20
2. P.L.C., p.22
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inquiry into the specific emotion (Croce, Bell, Fry) or 
the supposed specific imitative movement (Lipps' 
'Einfuehlung*) aroused hy art. But most of these theorists, 
though sometimes one-sided, held firmly to the view that 
the true object of their inquiry was the work of art, 
as picked out by this emotion, the aesthetic object, 
as distinct from the spectator (although by its very 
nature as an artefact it is meant for him). But even if 
we accept Richards* definition "anything is beautiful 
which induces synaesthesis", the conclusion he draws 
from it as to the proper field of aesthetic inquiry is 
not warranted : by; the premise. Even if 'beautiful* = 
'inducing synaesthesis', then the science of the beautiful 
is the science of those objects which induce synaesthesis 
and not just of the synaesthesis itself.
As H.Osborne (in Aesthetics and Criticism)^  has 
shown, Richards' position really springs from an epistemo- 
logical muddle. The problem whether the quality of 
beauty and, indeed, that of redness are objective (in 
the sense of inhering in objects) is a separate problem 
from that of the analysis of 'beautiful/ as ascribed to 
objects.
When I say: "This object is beautiful", the 
incontrovertible grammatical point is that beauty is 
predicated of the object and not of my feelings. Except
1. H.Osborne: Aesthetics and Criticism, p.212.(Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1955)•
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in the context of a general epistemological theory, this 
judgment cannot he adequately paraphrased by "This object 
gives me a valued (or a valuable) experience." In the case 
of redness, in the judgment "This object is red", the 
inadequacy of the analogous paraphrase (i.e., "This object 
gives me a perception of red") is clear, and constitutes 
the objectivity of the quality. The proof of this point 
is that the statement "This object is red but does not 
give me an experience of redness" is not self-contradictory 
(I may know that I am colour-blind). Now if I say "This 
object is beautiful but does not give me an experience of 
beauty", my judgment again is not self-contradictory 
because I may know that others better qualified than 
myself judge it beautiful, or that I have special non- 
aesthetic reasons for disliking, and therefore not 
appreciating it. Richards takes our assumption that, 'red * 
is an objective quality to mean that we "assume a 
universal'redness'because red things are every one of them 
r e d . N o t  at ail, we only mean that the judgment "This 
is red" may be truly made even by a colour-blind person 
who cannot experience the redness.
Thus neither 'redness* nor 'beauty' should be 
taken to be mere reflections of anyone's individual 
states of mind, i.e. wholly subjective. True, it was not
1. M.M., p.194.
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a philosopher who. said, "Beauty is in the eye of the
"beholder, " whereas no"body "but philosophers (amateur or
professional) have said this a"bout redness. As a matter
of fact, it is quite easy to convince a man that he is
colour-blind, but very difficult to convince someone who
thinks himself to have exceptionally advanced tastes b
— — — — —
that he simply has bad taste. in the first case we appeal 
to common usage, and whether the man who is colour-blind
k accepts or rejects it, the appeal is decisive. In the
absence of accepted criteria for the application of
words like 'red', the use of colour language, and 
probably any language, would be impossible. In the 
second case where a value judgment is clearly involved, 
we proceed in much the same way, i.e. by an appeal to 
general (expert) opinion; perhaps by showing that the 
objector takes a purely personal preference to be a 
generally based value-judgment ; or, if he invokes what he 
takes to be an aesthetic principle, by pointing out that 
this, if accepted, would entail the rejection of some 
acknowledged masterpiece as a bad work of art. But if our 
opponent still clings to his conviction, there is nothing p
more we can do. This means that the correctness or incorrect- : | 
ness of aesthetic judgments cannot be logically proved, that 
in such unfavourable casés they are ultimately undecidable, 
(though, of course, empirically they are continually 
being decided). In the absence of accepted criteria for
74
the application of words like 'beauty*, the use of such 
language leads to talk at cross purposes. But not, as it 
would in the absence of such criteria for the application 
of 'red* and other simple observation predicates, to a 
general breakdown of communication by language at all.
In this connection. Prof.Gallie's 'essentially contested
1 * concepts* hypothesis is useful in pointing to the actual
situation with many value- judgments; which is, that there
in no final solution of our problem, and that if there
were, the concept of Art as we know it would be superseded
altogether.
Further, if Aesthetics is to become the description, 
classification and ordering of states of mind, as Richards 
suggests, there arises the important preliminary problem:
"How do we distinguish between states of mind?" In the 
case of synaesthesis it cannot be by reference to the 
objects stimulating it, for Richards admits that the same 
state of Synaesthesis can be produced by the most 
different objects: "It can be given by a carpet or a pot 
or by a gesture as unmistakably as by the Parthenon, 
it may come about through an epigram as clearly as through a 
S o n a t a . I f  the most different objects can induce synaesthedg 
this seems to show that consideration of the object is 
irrelevant. But the real difficulty posed by this situation
1. W.B.G-allie: "Essentially Contested Concepts"; Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Society, 1955-56.
2. P.L.C., p.l>4b-
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is this:
In virtue of what are our reactions to such 
different objects grouped together as cases of synaesthesis, 
if this is not a specific detectable emotion? And if there 
is any detectable experience common to our reactions to 
all and only these objects,must this not be precisely the 
specific aesthetic emotion Richards has denied? However, 
whether there is or is not a specific, detectable emotion 
or experience induced by different works of art, in 
studying psychological phenomena in Aesthetics, we must 
constantly refer back to the works of art which aroused 
them. If it were otherv/ise. Aesthetics would indeed 
become superfluous as an independent discipline, and 
would have to become a part of the general psychological 
study of Perception and Emotion,though, even this, is 
/   ^ also the study of the objects perceived and of the
I
! objects arousing emotions.
We saw how Richards, in his quest for a new 
Science of Aesthetics, chose the occurrence of Synaesthesis, 
a subjective, psychological criterion, as the basis of 
his new theory. Eut no more than other psychological 
theories of Aesthetics, can Richards* theory give a 
satisfactory solution to the resultant problem of 
distinguishing the occurrence of the relevant experience.
His own criticism of a similar theory is both apposite 
and relevant here. In criticising Miss E.D.Puffer *s view
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as put forward in her Psychology of Beauty, where she 
takes the experience of balance to be the experience of 
a certain form of objective balance, inferred from a 
subjective state, Richards writes: "This objective balance 
must be capable of being independently ascertained, not 
merely inferred from a subjective state.
In short, there is no logical relation between 
the character of the actual psychological state aroused, 
by an object in a given person at a given time and the 
character of the object, although there is some logical 
relation between some characteristics of objects and the 
occurrence of some psychological phenomena, and this does 
in fact suggest a more plausible development of Richards* 
theory. Take for example the characteristic 'appalling*: 
it is objects which are appalling, yet it would surely 
be odd to say "X is appalling but nobody has ever been 
or ever will be appalled by X."
Perhaps the most plausible suggestion for Richards 
is that a similar logical relation holds between "X is 
beautiful" and an appropriate psychological state, which 
we may continue to call synaesthesis, such that it is 
logically odd to say "X is beautiful but nobody has ever 
experienced or will ever experience synaesthesis owing to 
X." He might strengthen this to: "X is beautiful = most
1. The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.88. (My italics)
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cultivated people usually experience synaesthesis ov/ing 
to X." Sut Richards expressly warns us against jumping 
to any conclusions from the occurrence of the subjective 
state to the qualities of the object arousing it: "The 
balance" (in Synaesthesis) "is not in the structure of 
the stimulating object, it is in the r e s p o n s e . T h u s  
he destroys an important field of inquiry for a Psychology 
of Aesthetics, viz. the study carried out, for example, 
by Sr.Eysenck of "the relation between a stimulus
‘(picture, poem, piece of music) and a person who reacts
2
to this stimulus in certain conventional ways," the 
comparison and correlations between different responses 
of different individuals and cultural groups to the same 
kind of aesthetic stimuli (shape, colour, sound) from 
which statistical data certain conclusions might be drawn 
"regarding the physical properties associated with high- 
ranking and low-ranking objects respectively."^ Such 
psychological phenomena - which include valuations - 
and the factual relations holding between them and some 
characteristics of objects are the proper study of the 
Psychology of Aesthetics, though Eysenck's own experiments 
on atomistic 'aesthetic' preferences seem to have little 
to do with aesthetic preferences proper.
1. P.L.C., p.248.
2. H.G.Eysenck: Sense and j^onsense in Psychology, p.309.
3. H.O.Eysenck: -do- p.311.
(Pelican, 1957)
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Dr.Eysenck's procedure was scientific, but was 
based on a self-consciously naturalistic definition of 
'beautiful* as "most generally preferred appearance."^.
From this he was able to draw approximately based aesthetic 
conclusions. Let us suppose thus on the basis of his 
somewhat arbitrary definitions, viz.
'beautiful' = 'most generally preferred' (statistically
ascertainable)
'objective' = 'resulting in generally agreed ascriptions' 
that beauty can logically be in this sense as 'objective' 
or 'subjective' as greenness. Then on this basis one can 
begin a scientific psychological theory of aesthetic 
preferences (or evaluations). But to take this as a theory 
of value implies its self-conscious naturalistic definition 
. , of beauty as 'most generally appearance', and depends
on taking as basic the whole stimulus-response situation. 
In so far as Richards also takes this to be the basic 
aesthetic situation, Eysenck can be regarded as carrying 
out Richards' programme.
We shall see in the sequel that Eysenck concerns 
himself with ascertaining:
1. What this generally preferred appearance is 
in different contexts.
2. How general the agreement is, and how 
individual judgments build up to 'good' or 'bad' taste
1. ibid, p.313.
79
(i.e. average/divergent preferences). (It is to be noticed 
that on this view it would be bad taste to like Bartok 
and good taste to like Victor Sylvester.)
In Eysenck's experiments, he started from the 
simplest stimuli (single colours and shapes) and gradually 
proceeded to more complex aesthetic stimuli like pictures 
by the same painter or by different painters. He claims 
that his subjects were drawn from widely distributed 
cultures, I.Q. groups, etc., and that his experiments 
enable him to conclude "that what is true of simple colour 
judgments is also true of judgments regarding colour 
combinations,namely, that in both cases there was 
a certain marked degree of agreement in preferences 
or 'objectivity' of the value-judgments based on them, 
and that persons sharing the most common preferences 
among simple stimuli also did so among complex ones, 
i.e. he could sort out persons with 'good' taste in all
I
tests. From this he concludes that the judgment of 
'good taste' is neither dependent on culture nor on 
individual intelligence but "is firmly anchored in 
biology" and that ultimately our judgments of beauty 
depend on "inherited properties of the central nervous
p
system." But since for him 'good taste' = 'average 
preferences' this is not a surprising conclusion!
1. ibid, p.316.
2. ibid, p.324.
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It is moreover relevant to our purposes to
notice that having established the existence of a generally
operating biological basis for our judgments of 'beauty',
Eysenck turned his attention to the stimuli of these and
tried to arrive at "a formula, of a completely objective ■
nature, for the measurement of b e a u t y . T h i s is a
concern which Richards would take as based on an illusory
phantom-property. But Eysenck found that "The most preferred
objects seem to be those having a high degree of complexity
2a m  a high degree of order." However he admits that only
the formal aspects of art
"lend themselves to measurement and, hence, 
to the formulation of laws and the accumulation 
of experimental evidence so desirable when exact 
statements of relationships are required.
Thus even for Eysenck only the formal aspects of stimuli of 
aesthetic experiences are "amenable to scientific laws."^
But the aesthetic experience which depends on a work of 
art, and the aesthetic judgment which results from it, 
refer, besides to this formal aspect to others as well 
(e.g. content, treatment) and these cannot be expressed 
in numerical form. Moreover (and this is most important) 
we must remember that Eysenck only provides pseudo- 
aesthetic conclusions in which the word 'beautiful’ 
means no more than 'generally preferred' and 'good taste'
1. ibid, p.325 3- ibid, p.331
2. ibid, p. 329 (author's italics)^, ibid, p. 332
1/
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no more than 'average preferences'. This is of course 
totally unplausible and unacceptable to Richards himself.
We must therefore conclude that neither Ethics 
nor Aesthetics are or can be descriptive sciences like 
chemistry or zoology. If sciences at all, they are 
normative sciences telling us what we ought to approve, 
not necessarily what we do approve. Within the field of 
aesthetical enquiry there are special branches having 
connection with other sciences. Thus the historical, 
social, cultural and psychological contexts of aesthetic 
experience have to be taken into account in a theory of 
Aesthetics, in as far as it is the study of works of art. 
If, as I think with G.Boas, "the arts are instruments 
originally, instruments for satisfying real interests 
which real human beings possess,then the study of 
works of art must t ake into account the psychology of the 
man who creates them and of the men for whom they are 
created, and to this, end a Psychology of Aesthetics, 
though perhaps not the statistical enquiry outlined by 
Eysenck, has a real contribution to make. But Aesthetics 
itself, being a normative science, if a science at all, 
looks for the criteria on v/hich we should pass judgments 
of value on works of art. If these criteria v/ere applicable 
only to experiences and not to objects, as Richards'
1. G.Boas : Wingless Pegasus, p.49. A Handbook for Critics.
(Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1950).
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theory of Synaesthesis implies, then Aesthetics would 
cease to be a normative science of judgments of value 
concerning art and would be reduced to a wholly subjective 
description of states of mind.
Thus Richards' quest for a Science of Aesthetics 
having Synaesthesis as its corner-stone fails, since 
Synaesthesis, being a subjective, psychological criterion 
applicable only t o the responses of the individual subject 
and not to objects causing these responses, cannot become 
the ground for any objective, i.e. impersonally valid 
judgments of value. Synaesthesis would be the lone 
criterion of the lone response of a lone experience of a 
lone observer, on which no system or theory of Aesthetics 
whatsoever could be cozsbructed.
When Richards came to apply his criterion in 
practice, it proved so utterly inadequate that he quickly 
abandoned it. In fact he is not really concerned any 
more than any other aesthetician with the evaluation of 
private experiences, nor does he accept Eysenck's naturalistic 
definition of beauty when he condemns 'stock-attitudes' 
as non-aesthetic. His practical aesthetic judgments 
actually refer to the work of art in question, and not 
to his momentary state of mind.
In one word, there is complete divorce between 
Richards' aesthetic theory and his practice.
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c) The new criterion of value; Synaesthesis
If Aesthetics was to become a branch of psychology, 
or rather of neurology, then the metaphysical theory of 
value had to be replaced by a psychological theory of 
value. Richards hoped that, while the terms used in the 
former had been vague, ambiguous and emotive, the latter 
would be scientific in its aim, method and terminology.
He found no aesthetic value-terminology which 
could fill the role of scientific, i.e. precise and 
unambiguous language, (as being connected in known ways 
with known, observable, referents), so he defined the 
aesthetic value terms he needed by means of those of 
behaviouristic psychology, which was, in the twenties, 
just coming into vogue. This had an exhilarating effect 
on the younger intellectuals and seemed to satisfy a 
definite intellectual and emotional need. Perhaps there 
was a need for a new prophet - and Richards found him in 
Watson, the author of Behaviourism. He dreamed of the 
approach of a new age of science, when man v/ould accept 
"Watson in place of the Bible, or in place of Confucius 
or Buddha, as a source of our fundamental conceptions 
about ourselves.Happily, his dream has not come true 
and Behaviourism has not ousted the Bible as the basis
1. P.O., p.323.
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of our understanding of ourselves and others*
Richards was a revolutionary not so much in 
removing the emotive pov/er-word 'Beauty* consecrated 
by tradition and great names, but in being the first to 
apply the new power-words of science to it. Christopher 
Isherwood, in his autobiography Lions and Shadows, 
describes Richards* impact on his generation;
"After attending Richards* lectures on modern 
poetry, in a moment, all was changed... Poetry wasn't 
a holy flame, a fire-bird from the moon! it was a 
group of interrelated stimuli acting upon the ocular 
nerves, the semi-circular canals, the brain, the solar 
plexus, the digestive and sexual organs. It did you 
medically demonstrable good, like a dose of strychnine 
or salts. We became behaviourists, materialists, 
atheists... We talked excitedly about the 'phantom 
aesthetic state*. But if fe.Richards enormously 
stimulated us, he plunged us, also, into the 
profoundest gloom. It seemed that everything we had 
valued would have to be scrapped."1
The last statement is significant, because it shows not 
only a possible misinterpretation of Richards* theory 
but its inherent weakness if it could thus be misinterpreted 
Talk in terms of response and appetency, 
order and coordination of impulses, and synaesthesis, 
had ousted the absolute values Beauty, Truth and 
Goodness, i.e. behaviouristic psychology had replaced 
Metaphysics. It remained only to apply the new 
terminology and to realise the promise that most problems
1. Isherwood, op.cit. An Education in the Twenties.
(Methuen & Co., 1938).
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of Aesthetics would he shown to he unreal, due to verbal 
muddles, while the remaining ones would be clarified and 
rendered open to scientific solution.
Let us now try to analyse the pivotal terms of
the list:
SYlNh^BSTHESIS
Fully aware of the linguistic snares that beset 
the unwary, Richards took care not to commit any of "the 
antics of the Fundamentalists".^ He decided to avail 
himself of the terms coined by Watson and "to describe 
and explain all human behaviour entirely in terms of
2
interaction between stimulus-situation and response." 
Regarding Behaviourism, replacing observable phenomena 
for dubiously introspectable states of mind, as a radical 
departure from traditional Psychology, and trying to bring 
about the same radical departure from traditional 
Aesthetics, Richards adopted the new terminology as a 
means to this end. But pending the satisfactory develop­
ment of behaviouristic technique, he decided to continue 
using such vague and ambiguous words as 'consciousness* 
and 'experience* for lack of better terms, while assuming 
that 'consciousness *, 'experience *, or 'awareness* could 
be taken to mean some unspecified happenings in, and 
modifications of, the nervous system. Richards is not
1, 2JkCriterion 1925-26. Richards on "Behaviourism"^ by
John Watson.
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altogether happy about this situation for we find him 
reproaching Watson for trying "to persuade people that 
they have no consciousness. Nevertheless Richards 
wishes to treat such expressions as 'thoughts', 'feelings' 
and 'experiences' as freely interchangeable with 'reactions 
to stimuli' and 'adaptations of the organism'.
If all human behaviour and hence all human 
experience could be explained as a series of stimulus- 
response situations, and all responses described in terms 
of homogeneous neurological events or impulses, the only 
difference between experiences would have to be in terms 
of the quantity of these events, and not in the quality 
of the experience. Quantity of impulses would then become 
the new unit of aesthetic measure. It is obviously very 
important to know what Richards means by 'impulse'. The 
best help he gives us to understanding this is as follov/s:
"The process in the course of which a mental 
event may occur, a process apparently beginning in a 
stimulus and ending in an act, is what we have called 
an impulse. In actual experience single impulses of 
course never occur. Even the simplest human reflexes 
are very intricate bundles of mutually dependent 
impulses, and in any actual human behaviour the number 
of simultaneous and connected impulses occurring is 
beyond estimation. The simple impulse in fact is a 
limit, and the only impulses psychology is concerned 
with are complex. It is often convenient to speak as 
though simple impulses were in question, as when we 
speak of an impulse of hunger, or an impulse to laugh, 
but we must not forget how intricate all our activities 
are.
Prom this it is clear only that we are left with the vaguest
1
l.iliCriterion 1925-26. Richards on "Behaviourism"^ by J.Watson.
2. P.B.C., p.86.
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possible definition of our key notion,viz., "a process
apparently beginning in a stimulus and ending in an act."
On the basis of this scientific account of our responses
to stimuli of any kind,Richards wants to deny the existence
of a specific "aesthetic experience", which had been
taken for granted by most aestheticians, and also to
assert the continuity of artistic and all other human
activities and their qualitative similarity; "V/hen we
look at a picture, or read a poem, or listen to music,
we are not doing something quite unlike we were doing on
our way to the Gallery or when we dressed in the morning.
Only in so far as looking at the picture, or reading a
poem, or listening to music,yields a more finally satisfying
experience (= more highly valued experience) than the
other activities, can it be distinguished from them. Thus,
in Aesthetics, we must henceforth refrain from using such
misleading terms as 'beauty* and 'aesthetic experience',
and replace them in 'stimulus-response' terminology by,
for example, "'having properties such that it arouses,
under suitable conditions, tendencies to self-completion
in the mind.'" Richards rejects 'Beauty' itself as an
aesthetic concept for the simple reason that beautiful
things“have nothing in common beyond this purely abstract
2property of'being such as to arouse,ete'"
1. R.B.C., p.16.
2. P.O., p.359. (author's italics)
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But Richards wants to do away not only with the 
concept of 'beauty*, he even wants to play dov/n the 
stimulus, that property of things by virtue of which we 
experience beauty. Thus he says that "Stimuli are only 
received if they serve some need of the organism and the 
form which the lesponse to them takes depends only in 
part upon the nature of the stimulus, and much more upon 
what the organism 'wants *, i.e. the state of equilibrium 
of its multifarious activities."^. Of course, "Tendencies 
to self-completion in the mind'.' as an adequate substitute 
for the value-term 'Beauty' is simply meaningless unless 
\ further explained, and as Richards never does so more 
clearly than in his references to 'equilibrium' etc.,it 
can be interpreted in as many ways as there are different 
types of people, different minds, and different conceptions 
of the self and self-completion.
• This notion of Synaesthesis as 'an experience of
self-completion' raises two questions:
1. Can and does Richards give a description of 
it by which it can be recognized independently of what 
stimulates it?
If not, the whole project of investigating the 
psychological effects produced on us by certain stimuli, 
becomes vacuous until pinned down by reference to aesthetic
1. P.B.C., p.87.
\
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objects.
2. If he does, can this experience be associated 
with other than aesthetic stimuli? If not, why not?
If it can, how is his study of Synaesthesis relevant to 
aesthetics in particular?
Richards' initial position can be summarised
as follows; "There is Beauty", just means "Here is
Synaesthesis" and the ultimate value of Synaesthesis is
in the experience itself and not in the thing experienced.
Later however, when Richards comes to describe the
distinctive features of this aesthetic experience (whose
occurrence he had earlier denied) without any reference
to the special conditions or context of the experience,
i.e. without any reference to the objects v/hich evoke it,
he is forced to use terms like ' immediacy ', 'compMity*,
'richness ' of response, terms v/hich are vacuous until we
are clear as to the immediacy, complexity, richness of
what is involved. We are told that when we experience
Synaesthesis "the inhibitions which normally canalise our
responses are removed" and we feel "a sense of satisfaction
and repose^"^and that Synaesthesis itself is such a
complete systématisation and intensification of impulses
"as will preserve free play to every impulse, v/ith entire
avoidance of frustration. In any equilibrium of this kind,
2
however momentary, we are experiencing Beauty."
1 and 2. The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.75.
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We all know what "a sense of satisfaction and 
respose" is, hut even if we accept Richards* definition 
of the "systématisation and intensification of impulses" 
in terms of it, we must object that many non-aesthetic 
situations also give satisfaction and repose, and far 
from all valuable aesthetic experiences give it. In 
default of an account of what is to count as *an impulse *, 
and what is the type of systématisation and intensification 
of non-frustrated impulses envisaged, this notion is 
useless as a clarification of our concept of beauty.
For Richards’ general notion of equilibrium 
is neither new nor original. In fact, it is indistinguishable 
(except in its terminology) from a well-established 
traditional notion with a long and respectable history.
d) Richards and earlier accounts of aesthetic equilibrium
In The Foundations of Aesthetics, Oh.?,^ Richards 
refers to Kant's Critique of" Aesthetic Judgment as the 
work in which the notion of harmonious activity as the 
characteristic of aesthetic experience is first put 
forward. This is Kant's description of it:
1. All the quotations are from Richards* Foundations of
Aesthetics, Chapter ?•
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"The quickening of both faculties (imagination and 
understanding) to an indefinite, but yet, thanks to the 
given representation, harmonious activity, such as 
belongs to cognition generally, is the sensation whose 
universal communieability is postulated by the judgment 
of taste," (Critique of Aesthetic Judgment).I
Richards explicitly objects to the above formulat­
ion because of the ambiguity of terms like imagination 
and understanding (though it might be held that Kant has 
made his use of them moderately clear and unambiguous), 
and because 'harmonious activity' can and sometimes does 
characterise an ordinary balanced mind, "or some form of 
self-contained and controlled sensibility ", v/hich may be 
not specifically aesthetic. His main objection then is 
that Kant did not here provide a criterion differentiating 
between aesthetic and non-aesthetic experience. We saw 
that Richards' account of Synaesthesis is open to the 
same objections. But is Kant's? Richards seems to overlook 
the crucial proviso in Kant's definition, namely, that 
this activity must be grounded in "the given representation" 
if it is to be correctly the subject of the judgment of 
taste. When expanded in the light of Kant's terminology 
this might provide the criterion Richards looked for in vain. 
But we shall see in the sequel how Richards systematically 
tries to minimise the importance of the aesthetic object 
as the ground of the aesthetic experience and judgment.
According to Richards, 3chiller in his "Briefe 
ueber die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen" further 
elaborated the theory of balance or equipoise. According
1. Immanuel Kant: The Critique of Judgment, translated by
J.C.Meredith, (O.U.P., 1952; J" p.60.
92
to him, Beauty is experienced when the two opposing 
impulses, the sense-impulse and the form-impulse, whose 
objects are life and shape, are united "in the most 
perfect equipoise". This theory is clearly much vaguer 
than Kant's. Richards' objections are the same as those 
he had against Kant. He points out that an oversimplified 
view of the balance required might lead to its being 
adopted as a recipe for the production of v/orks of art.
He suggests indeed that Goethe might very well have 
adopted Schiller's 'recipe' when he wrote "Wilhelm Keister".
The poet and critic to whom Richards admits being 
most deeply indebted for his description of the 
synaesthetic experience is Coleridge, who also derived 
his theory from Kant. In Coleridge's description of 
Imagination Richards finds "the essential characteristic 
of poetic as of all valuable experience". Imagination, 
says Coleridge, is "that synthetic and magical power", 
which "reveals itself in the balance or reconciliation 
of opposite or discordant qualities, the sense of novelty 
and freshness, with old and familiar objects ... a more than 
usual state of emotion, with more than usual order; ..." 
(Biographia Literaria II, p.12). This is the most important 
source for Richards' theory of equilibrium of opposed 
impulses as the distinctive' feature of all valuable 
experiences. We shall examine Richards' theory in detail 
in Chapter 3. Here we shall only notice that if an impulse
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is a behaviouristic response it would seem that an
equilibrium of opposed impulses amounts to a cancellation
of them; Coleridge's impulses cannot therefore be such
simple responses; yet Richards' should be if his theory
is to be a scientific neurological one.
Passing to more modern views on the subject,
Richards finds in Ethel Puffer, an American psychologist
and student of Munsterberg, the only exponent of a similar
account of the aesthetic experience. In her The Psychology
of Beauty she describes "the beautiful object as possessing
those qualities which bring the personality into a state
of unity and self-completeness."^
Here again, just as in Kant's definition, we
find the same emphasis on the aesthetic object as possessing
those qualities which give rise to the state of aesthetic
repose, and at the same time of "enhanced life". She then
describes the aesthetic experience as "... the condition
of equilibrium, or balance of forces - wherein by hypothesis
we are given complete arrest, but tension, aliveness to
2
the nth degree."
She later tries to relate the experience to the 
objects which brought it about and she finds in "this 
concept of equilibrium, of excursion from the center, 
and return, a principle for explanation of the details
1 and 2. op.cit. p.49, in M.M.Rader, A Modern Book of 
Esthetics (New York, Henry Hold" & Co.,- 1951),
.pi 36Ô.
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of the elements of picture, poem, drama, symphony, which, 
each in its own way, leads us on an excursion of experience, 
and brings us back, stimulated to unity and self-complete­
ness.
We see that the main assumption in Miss Puffer's 
description of aesthetic experience is the existence of a 
correlation between the nature of an aesthetic object 
and the nature of our organism, so that, given certain 
qualities in the object, "a state of unity and self­
completeness" in the personality results. For example:
"The symmetrical picture calls out a set of motor 
impulses which 'balance* ... the sonnet takes us out 
on one wave of rhythm and of thought, to bring us 
back on another to the same point; the sonata does 
the same in melody."2
Again we must notice that the elements of such 
responses must clearly be much more complex unities than 
the mere undifferentiated motor-responses in terms of 
which neurology must work.
It seems that Miss Puffer did not give a name 
to the experience she was describing, but that Richards, 
after eliminating from it those features he objected to, 
termed it *Synaesthesis *. His main criticism of the 
former as a criterion of aesthetic worh was, what seems 
clearly to be its saving merit as an account of specifically
1, Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of 
Philosophy, p.460 (Author's italics).
2. E.Puffer: op.cit., p.377*-
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aesthetic worth, namely, the attempt "to find the cause 
of balance in the construction of the work of art." 
Although he admits that the objective 'balance* may 
predispose a spectator to equilibrium, this does not 
necessarily happen and he proceeds to give examples to 
show this :
There are cases where attention to the formal 
characteristics of the object is follov/ed by synaesthesis 
(in Richards?), for example Bridges* "The passer-by".
But there are also cases of formal balance in the object, 
attention to v/hich is not followed by synaesthesis (at 
least in Richards !), for example in another poem by 
Bridges;
"Thou, careless, awake!
Thou peacemaker, fight !
Stand England for honour .
And God guard the Right." etc,.
If then the formal characteristics of the object are not 
a sure indication of the occurrence or non-occurrence 
of synaesthesis, and hence of aesthetic value, we are 
left with the only alternative which Richards is intent 
to provide, i.e.,to find in the structure of the experience 
itself, the ground of value.
Richards compares tvo groups of poems, one of 
which he holds to be passably good, the other to be "the 
greatest kind of poetry". He finds that the difference
1. Foundations of Aesthetics; p.87.
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between, for example, Tennyson's "Break, break, break" 
and Keats' "Ode to the Nightingale" is "not one of subject 
but of the relations inter se of the several impulses 
active in the experience."^ In the first case the impulses 
are parallel and homogeneous, in the second case they 
are opposed and heterogeneous. It is just in the resolution 
and reconciliation of the many distinguishable impulses, 
and the ensuing state of balance and composure, in the 
experiencing of impulses together, that Synaesthesis 
consists.
Remembering that Richards is taking the occurrence 
of Synaesthesis as the criterion of aesthetic value, we 
can see that, though Richards thinks that he has proved 
his point against Miss Puffer's theory, he has also left 
his own theory open to criticism, as follows:
Whose experience is it that provides the criterion 
of psychological value-positive in the first case, negative 
in the second? Presumably Richards' own. But we can well 
imagine another reader who responds in exactly the 
opposite way and proceeds to the contrary judgment,viz.: 
"The passer-by" induces no synaesthesis and isvalueless, 
but the second poem induces synaesthesis and is valuable. 
And another reader may respond to both poems with 
synaesthesis, and could say that Richards was simply
1. P.B.C., p.250.
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insensitive to formal beauty. Richards would then be 
forced back on a purely subjective theory.
We have examined in this chapter Richards' 
criticism and justified rejection of the Metaphysical 
theory of Beauty on logical grounds; we have examined his 
quest for a Science of Aesthetics and rejected it for two 
reasons :
1. Synaesthesis, as a psychological phenomenon, 
is not behaviouristically verifiable, and hence does not 
qualify as a scientific phenomenon. (Introspection as the 
only evidence for the occurrence of synaesthesis is not a 
scientific method, according to Richards, who would reject 
it in favour of neurological evidence if possible. )
We examined Dr.Eysenck's procedure in apparently 
carrying out Richards' programme for a scientific aesthetics 
based on a naturalistic definition of beauty and have 
pointed out its limitations and its insufficiency as a 
theory of value.
2. Y/e found that no factual study, even when the 
facts are psychological ones, can be a system of Aesthetics, 
viewed as a normative science, i.e., a study of aesthetic 
values. (V/hat this involves we shall see in Chapter 6.)
We have examined the similarities and differences 
between Richards' account of Synaesthesis and earlier 
accounts of 'balance', and have indicated that Richards' 
attempt to discount the aesthetic object raises many 
difficulties, both theoretical and practical.
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Chapter 3
CRITICISM OP THE PSYCHOLOGIOAI THEORY 01? VALUE
a) Criticism of the theory of Synaesthesis
It v/ill he remembered that Richards had defined 
Synaesthesis as 'M complete systématisation (which) must 
take the form of such an adjustment as v/ill preserve free 
play to every impulse, with entire avoidance of frustration.”  ^
Before proceeding to a detailed analysis and 
criticism of the notion of Synaesthesis, I should like 
to quote H.Osborne, who in his Theory of Beauty says the 
following about it:
”Equally certainly the presence of a large number of 
emotions and impulses balanced in equipoise among 
themselves like a donkey surrounded by a ring of 
equidistant carrots, has never been noticed by anyone 
in aesthetic contemplation, nor ever can be”
and later on he concludes that "the theory of synaesthesis
is one of the most blatant examples of modern scientific 
2
mystagogy.”
Let us now inquire whether this sweeping criticism
is justified.
Eirst of all we should admit one point in favour 
of Richards' theory of synaesthesis: If Richards could
1. The Foundations of Aesthetics,
2, TT.ÔSborne: Theory of beauty TRoutledge and Eegan Paul, ,
p.72. I
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give us an explanation which allows us to identify actual 
occurrences of synaesthesis in our experience, he would 
have replaced an hypostatisable empty notion (i.e. the 
universal quality Beauty) with an empirical one. But if 
this apparently empirical notion of Synaesthesis is an 
advance when compared to the metaphysical one, it 
raises problems of its ov/n. In the first place it brings 
any attempt to define 'beautiful* in terms of "inducing 
Synaesthesis" within the scope of the "Naturalistic 
• Ballacy".
Secondly, if Synaesthesis is an introspectible 
experience of equilibrium and balance, there is nothing 
to link it necessarily with works of art and to distinguish 
it from certain forms of religious experience, mystical 
states, or pathological states induced by drugs and 
narcotics.
Thirdly, "Systématisation of impulses" is, at the 
least, as vague a term as 'a profound aesthetic experience' 
which Richards wants to oust at all costs from his 
scientific account. At all events the term so vehemently 
rejected by him is inoffensive enough because understood 
to be vague, while the former leads us to expect some 
new discovery about the workings of our minds. Instead, 
it gives us merely scientific double talk, or rather 
words without any definite meaning. What counts as an 
impulse? Y/hat as a systématisation of impulses? Can it
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be merely the coordination of desires with minimum frustrat­
ion? But any kind of successful activity, the satisfaction 
of different desires and the pursuit of instinctive 
tendencies, brings with it an intensification of v/ell-being 
and perhaps of awareness (rather than of impulses) and 
its corollary of 'lack of frustration'. In parenthesis, 
on the usual view of an impulse as 'a desire to'
'intensification of impulses* would seem to describe 
exactly the contrary state to that described by 'satisfact­
ion of impulses'. Richards himself distinguishes between 
a work of art which is 'stimulative* i.e. one which 
induces an intensification of impulses resulting in overt 
action, and a work of art which is 'beautiful' i.e. which 
induces satisfaction of impulses and yet also the 
activation and rejuvenation of the whole personality.^
Fourthly, "Free play to every impulse" evidently 
means that the satisfaction of every impulse is equally 
necessary to the occurrence of synaesthesis, and since 
Richards allows no qualitative distinction between 
impulses, the only means by which-we can decide whether 
one experience is better or more valuable than another is 
by the number of impulses satisfied. As Richards candidly
puts it, "to compare different experiences in respect
2
of their value ... is a quantitative matter."
1. Richards: The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.77*
2. Richards: P.L.C., Appendix A. "On Value", p.288.
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But Richards' whole conception of 'impulse' 
and their quantitative measurement raises the difficulty 
of “personification". For Richards talks of the impulse 
as if it were the whole person and assumes that "X is 
frustrated" = "Most of X's impulses are frustrated".
Though we can say that impulses are frustrated or satisfied, 
what is important is that the frustration or satisfaction 
of an impulse (or even of most impulses) does not entail 
the frustration or satisfaction of the person whose 
impulse it is: the satisfaction on the instant of every 
whim of a millionaire's spoilt child may result in his 
overall utter dissatisfaction and frustration.
In fact, as Richards admits, the neurological ‘ 
impulse cannot he a unit of measurement, and different 
experiences cannot be evaluated by counting the impulses 
they involve. Naturally, Richards never attempts to 
differentiate quantitatively in this way between experiences 
of works of art. He himself admits that "... in any 
actual human behaviour the number of simultaneous and 
connected impulses occurring is beyond estimation.If 
therefore, even the simplest 'impulses', e.g. the impulse 
to eat or to laugh, are really complex processes not 
amenable to measurement, then the measurement of an 
aesthetic experience where "we have to gather millions of 
fleeting semi-independent impulses into a momentary
1. P.L.C., p.86.
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structure of fabulous complexity,is naturally out of 
the question.
Richards is therefore forced to introduce a 
new criterion for the differentiation of experiences 
and this criterion is no longer quantitative. He now 
asserts that the comparative values of our experiences
are estimated "inevitably in terms of that order or disorder
2
among impulses..."
But whereas an impulse looks like a single, 
observable, countable thing, and therefore a number of 
impulses satisfied looks like a descriptive criterion, 
any disposition of things can be seen as ordered (e.g. 
can be subsumed under a general description) or can be 
rejected as chaotic or trivially repetitive, that is, the 
criterion of degree of order involves a value-judgment and 
is circular as an 'empirical* criterion of aesthetic value.
Let us relent a little, and try to see what can 
be said in the defence of such a view. It could be argued, 
for example, that although any collection of units can 
be subsumed under a formula^this is more obvious and 
simpler in some cases than in others. (It is not of course 
at all clear intuitively that this is a criterion of aesthetic 
merit. ) Richards is then perhaps simply combining here
1. P.C., p.317»
2. The Criterion, October 1932. "The literary mind, its 
place in an age of science" by klax Eastman, reviewed 
by Richards. (My italics).
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multiplicity and obvious order. Thus the experience valued 
of the experience of synaesthesis is said to be
1. a large variety of impulses satisfied
2. the systematic satisfaction of a large variety
3. the simplest systematic satisfaction of the largest 
possible variety.
But the notions of impulses, interests, 
systématisation, intensification, order, etc., are all 
so vague that our criticism of them as inadequate terms 
for a scientific (i.e. precise) description of aesthetic 
value still holds.
And Richards did not remain satisfied with his 
requirement of order among impulses; another description 
of aesthetic value is vaguer still, though perhaps more 
attractive ;
"As we realize beauty we become more fully ourselves.
Our interest is not canalized in one direction rather 
than another. It becomes ready instead to take any 
direction we choose."1
Now what is the force of "realizing 'beauty'" in this 
passage? Does it mean just perceiving its sensuous 
manifestations, or undergoing synaesthesis, or becoming 
more self-conscious about it, or recognizing more occasions 
which should induce it? Or perhaps it means what Richards 
says elsewhere, that as we undergo synaesthesis progressively 
we become more aware of the possible relevant impulses 
stimulated by any object, and thus have more scope for
1. The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.78
104
developing them. This interpretation of Richards' meaning
seems to be correct, as can be seen from the following:
"The equilibrium of opposed impulses, which we suspect 
to be the ground-plan of the most valuable aesthetic 
responses, brings into play far more of our personality 
than is possible in experiences of a more defined 
emotion. We cease to be orientated in one definite 
direction; more facets of the mind are exposed and, 
what is the same thing, more aspects of things are able 
to affect us... At the same time since more of our 
personality is engaged the independence and individuality 
of other things becomes greater."1
This description of the ideal and complete
aesthetic experience would be acceptable, though this
would not allow the response to bad art to be an aesthetic
experience. This is an untoward doctrine for Richards to
maintain, for he wants to admit that "this same facilitation
of response is also ... the explanation of the peculiarly
2
pernicious effect of bad but competent art."
It seems, therefore, that if the direction of our 
interests and attention is to be the right direction, if 
it is to be synaesthetic, this must be determined by the 
aesthetic object, to the extent that if the object is bad 
art, our interests and attention will be misdirected and, 
pace Mr.Richards, there i^ a causal relation between the 
pattern of the stimulus and the pattern of our response.^
I think that in the presence of a work of art, 
we are first of all concerned to find out what 'is there' 
and not what is going to happen to us as a consequence.
To make the avoidance of frustration of impulses the cause 
of our direction of interest is to put the cart before the
l.P.I.C.,pp.251-252. 2.P.L.C.,p.249. 3-of.P.L.C.,p.248.
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horse. It is only because of the direction of my interests 
and the quality of the work of art that I experience 
frustrated or satisfied impulses in considering it. And 
these do not provide an automatic index of the aesthetic 
value of the work of art. The satisfaction or the frustration 
may have different causes. For example I may know that a 
certain poem is considered a good one, and if I fail to 
appreciate it, I may feel dissatisfied and hence frustrated. 
This v/ould be because I believed the poem to be beautiful, 
and would not lead me to deny its beauty. Or I may know that 
the poem is bad, and still find it satisfying because it 
accords with my general state of mind at the moment. (If I 
was aware of this, I should not report my satisfaction in 
an aesthetic judgment.) Or I may be neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied but indifferent because exhausted; but again 
I should not make this the ground of an aesthetic judgment. 
Thus neither the satisfaction nor the frustration of 
impulses nor of the person whose impulses they are, can be 
in themselves the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
aesthetic value.
But again, this criterion too is abandoned ! Some­
thing wider is needed, capable of accounting for those 
experiences called aesthetic: "The ultimate value of 
equilibrium is that it is better to be fully than partially 
a l i v e . .
Y/e have come a long way from our first definition 
of beauty as that which produces the maximum number of
1. The Foundations of Aesthetics. Conclusion.
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satisfied impulses. Now synaesthesis itself is only of
value as constituting *a full life*. Although we should
expect Richards to say that *a full life' was simply a
life of permanent synaesthesis he does nothing of the
sort: a full life, he tells us, is possible only if "the
full richness and complexity of our environment can be
r e a l i z e d . I n  fact this is a new non-psychological version
of synaesthesisI
Artistic creation and enjoyment of works of art
are the means to this realisation. But in view of the new,
vacuous character of 'synaesthesis' this amounts to the
common view, which most critics, aestheticians and
philosophers have held in the past and still hold:
"Poetry expresses most adequately the universal element
2
in human nature and in life," said Aristotle long ago, 
and in our own time Eliot says: "It is ultimately the 
function of art, in imposiicg a credible order upon 
ordinary reality, and thereby eliciting some perception 
of an order ^  reality, to bring us to a condition of 
serenity, stillness and reconciliation..•
Richards the revolutionary critic has tuorned out 
to be a radical in not much more than his terminology.
1. ibid.
2. S.H.Butcher: Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Pine Art 
(Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1935;, p.163.
3. T.S.Eliot: On Poetry and Poets, p.87, (Paber & Paber 
Ltd., 1957).
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b ) The fallacy of Richards' Theory of Value
Richards' notion of Synaesthesis is closely 
connected with his psychological theory of value, which 
we shall consider presently. In Chapter 6, where we 
shall develop a different theory of aesthetic value we 
shall follow some of J.O.Urmson's suggestions on the 
subject as put forth in his article "On Grading".^ Here 
it suffices to summarise the main points:
1. That a theory of value (as against a theory 
of psychological processes accompanying evaluation), be 
it moral or aesthetic, implies the acceptance of certain 
norms or standards.
2. That value-judgments are valid if they are 
in accordance with the relevant norms.
3. That the difference between the statement
that the norms implied by the value-judgment are fulfilled, 
and the actual value-judgment, lies in their difference 
of function, the one descriptive and the other evaluative 
(perhaps prescriptive or commendatory). ^
4. That the meaning of value-terms like 'good' 
and 'beautiful', is not identical with that of the 
descriptive terms whose applications form the criteria 
on which they are applied. ____ , .
1. op.cit.Mind^ lix, (1950). ^
''C' ' ' ' ‘
\
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Keeping these points in mind, we will now
analyse Richards* theory of value, its implications, and
the consequences which would follow if it wei*e true.
Richards* definition of value, or rather of
•is valuable *, is: "Anything is valuable which will
satisfy an appetency without involving the frustration of
1
some equal or more important appetency."
Now Richards openly admits that his view has
2
"close connections with Utilitarianism," and as such, 
it seems to fall into the same logical fallacy as Ivlill 
has been accused of, viz. the Naturalistic Fallacy. Let 
us see how far there is an analogy between their theories:
1. Mill rather clearly is not defining anything 
more than he can help. He does define "A desires X" as 
"A finds X pleasant", but this is a familiar technical
3
philosophical stretched use of 'pleasant* or 'pleasui*e'.
He also says the only relevant evidence (not proof) that 
anything is desirable is that it is actually desired.^To 
deny this would be to assert either that it would not be 
flying in the face of evidence to hold that X was desirable 
although nobody ever had, ever does, or ever will desire 
X, or that there is other evidence, relevant independently 
of that as to what people do desire, which is relevant 
in deciding what they ought to desire. Both of these
1 '. P.L.C., p.48.
2. ibid. Footnote 2.
3. J.S.Mill: Utilitarianism, Introd.by A.D.Lindsay (livery­
man's Library, J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd.,1954), p.36.
4. ibid, p.32.
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assertions seem, at least to a non—religious mind, 
obscurantist. In any case he certainly did not define 
•desirable* as 'desired*.
Richards on the other hand goes a long way 
towards defining 'valuable' as equivalent to 'valued
p
where this is equivalent to 'inducing synaesthesis'.
He can thus be taken to commit the Naturalistic Fallacy, 
in that he seems to agree that "X is beautiful" at least 
implies "X induces a valuable experience". Then, in so 
far as synaesthesis is a specific introspectible experience, 
"X induces synaesthesis" cannot imply "X is a valuable 
experience" (some may value being shattered or excited 
more highly) and cannot be a definition of "X is beautiful"; 
or, if "X induces synaesthesis" ^  an adequate definition, 
it must imply "X is a valuable experience", and cannot 
merely report the occurrence of the introspectible experience 
of the type described.
Later,, when Richards comes to deal with 'stock 
responses', he has immediately to modify his definition 
of 'valuable* as 'synaesthesis-inducing*, and is forced 
to admit that the identification of what people usually 
value with what is really valuable does not hold, at all 
events in the case of the aesthetic judgment. This creates 
a tension between his 'scientific' account of synaesthesis 
as the experience which we value, and his literary account
of synaesthesis as the experience in which v/e fully
1.P.L.C., Ch.7.
2.see p.106.
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respond to a work of art.
2. The parallel between iviill's notion of measurable 
quantities of pleasure and Richards' notion of a measurable 
number and degree of organisation of impulses is again
to the latter's disadvantage. In the case of Mill, we can 
reduce his quantitative measure to a felt scale of 
preferences, at least in the case of one person, without 
rendering it vacuous, though the extension to interpersonal 
relations must be vague and of a rule-of-thumb lack of 
precision. But we saw that Richards himself admits the 
impossibility of measuring the number of impulses involved 
in even the simplest mental process, so that their estim­
ation must therefore be derived from some feeling of 
satisfaction, i.e. his view could be restated as: "Those 
objects (especially works of art) are most highly valued 
which give us the most satisfaction." And this is no more 
informative than the tautology: "Those objects are most 
highly valued which are most highly valued". Thus what 
he offers as a definition of value is merely a description 
which is either vacuous or perhaps equivalent to the 
common sense 'feeling of satisfaction', presumably the 
variety of physio-psychological accompaniments to what is 
called aesthetic experience.
3. Richards is satisfied with his definition 
of 'what is valuable' because he thinks it scientific
Ill
and because "no special ethical idea is introduced.
Let us now examine whether this is really the case.
?
As R.M.Hare (in his The Language of Morals 
and elsewhere) has pointed out, in any definition of a 
non-naturalistic expression in what purport to be 
naturalistic terms there "will nearly always be found some
p
word in the definiens which is itself a value-v/ord, " 
which goes to show that such a definition is impossible.
In the above case words like 'satisfy', 'equal' 
and 'more important' are not merely descriptive, but are 
themselves value-words. Now Richards clearly intends to 
commend valued objects (and especially poetry and the 
other arts), for effecting a satisfaction of impulses, and 
for causing order and organisation in the personality as 
a whole. But his definition of 'valuable' in these very 
terms would make such a commendation impossible because 
it amounts to claiming that to value an object is 
equivalent to attributing to it, and therefore does 
no more than attribute to it, these effects. He would 
probably agree that "what'produces synaesthesis is 
valuable" is a tautology in which "produces synaesthesis" 
merely elucidates 'valuable'. On the other hand it seems
1.P.L.C., p.51.
2.Mind Ix, 1951, p.432. Review by R.M.Hare of Value, a 
Cooperative enquiry, ed.Ray npley (Columbia University Press, 
1949.)"If you are looking for a 'referent ' for à value-word, 
you may think you have found one when you have given a 
definition of it in which the definiens appears to consist
of words having unambiguous descriptive meaning. But...unless
the definition is obviously inadequate, there, v/ill nearly^ 
always be found some word in tne aeimiens which is itself
a value-word."
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impossible to give the descriptive account of synaesthesis 
that he needs if this is to be an elucidation. He is then 
forced to give subsequent explanation for the terms he 
uses, such as 'more important impulse', which he describes 
as depending on "the extent of the disturbance of other 
impulses in the individual's activities which the thwarting 
of the impulse involves.
Objections to this definition are many, including: 
a) Hov/ do we identify and count the impulses 
disturbed?
b ) How else can v/e measure their frustration-value? 
c) At a level where 'impulses' are recognisably 
'to do or feel X' is there really no difference of value 
between wholly integrated organisations of an equal number 
of impulses each, but different sets of impulses?
Since the answer to this last question is 
definitely that there a difference of value, our 
criticism of Richards' Synaesthesis, even as a criterion, 
let alone a definition of value, is justified.
So.far we have examined the logical fallacy of 
Richards' psychological or naturalistic definition of 
value. Let us now examine the consequences if we held 
him to be offering a true and comprehensible criterion 
of value.
1. P.L.C., p.51.
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1. It leads to aesthetic subjectivism. The view 
that values cannot be attributed to objects except as 
causing actual states of mind means, since these are 
measurable only by introspection, that every individual 
is capable of knowing only his own more or less valuable 
states of mind, no matter what objects caused them. In 
Richards* defence it must be admitted that this kind of 
aesthetic subjectivism is widely accepted by modern 
critics, as can be corroborated by themselves. Thus 
Kenneth Tynan, the dramatic critic of The Observer, writes:
"...I see myself predominantly as a lock. If the 
key, which is the work of art, fits smugly into my 
mechanism of bias and preference, I click and rejoice; 
if not, I am helpless."1
But The Observer must consider Tynan's mechanism more 
discriminating than most or they would not pay him to 
tell other people about it.
2. The individual becomes the only and the 
ultimate authority and judge of values for himself. But 
since states of mind are continually changing and what seemed 
valuable yesterday will not seem so today, even to the same 
individual, this aesthetic subjectivism inevitably leads
to an almost Heraclitean flux. You logically cannot 
experience numerically the same state of mind twice, and 
even while you experience it, it is already changing.
1. quoted in Universities and Left Review, No.l, 1957* 
in an article by Lindsay Anderson.
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Not only is it true that "You cannot step into the same 
river twice," but here "You cannot step into the same 
river once," since even Richards admits that "...the order 
and precedence of our needs incessantly changes for better 
or worse.
The state of mind is, in short, the most elusive, 
transient, and unstable of standards.
4* If so, comparative value-judgments become
meaningless. Thus he says, "when our interests are
developing in opposed directions we cannot agree in our
2
ultimate valuations and choices."
Suppose two critics ' make contrary judgments 
about a work of art, for example Leonardo da Vinci's 
Self-portrait.
A says: "This portrait is a good painting."
B says: "This portrait is a bad painting."
They are not making (if Richards is right) contradictory 
statements, but may be making equally true statements 
about their respective experiences. A does experience 
synaesthesis, B does not experience it. A cannot convince 
B, or be convinced by him as to the value of the picture; 
they can only compare subjective states. The result is 
that one who makes his value-judgments depend on the
1. P.O., p.349
2. P.O., p.347
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assertion of a subjective state cannot infer from it 
anything beyond itself. Thus
5' There is no logical relation between the 
analysis of the characteristics of the subjective state 
of balanced and harmonious impulses and the objects which 
give rise to them,^ and as the objective balance attributed 
to the work of art is, (according to Richards), merely 
inferred from the subjective balance and therefore cannot 
be independently ascertained, criticism is reduced to 
introspective self-description and loses its normative 
function.
Now let us see how (and whether) Richards confines
himself to such a subjectively relevant ascription of value
in his practical criticism. We shall see that when he
undertakes to test his theories by practical application,
we get, in Practical Criticism, a series of case-histories
and Richards sets up not as "a judge of values" of the
twelve poems which form the subject of the protocols,
but as a judge of the comparative values of the responses
aroused by the poems in the students criticising them.
He does not judge the poems as good or bad, but he judges
the reasons adduced in support of the respective judgments.
But the only reason which Richards' theory admits as
relevant is the effect a poem has as a means of ordering 
2
our minds. We therefore find that:
1. Richards' theory prevents his judging the
1.of.P.L.0.,p.248, "The balance is not in the structure of 
the stimulating object, it is in the response."
2.cSP.C.p.348
116
poems as distinct from the responses they evoke, so that 
to judge a poem one has to wait for the reader's response. 
(And there is no sense to 'the poem's value'; it has as 
many different values as it has readers whose responses 
differ.)
2. But Richards gives a differing value to these 
responses, labelling some as 'correct' and others as 
inadequate 'stock-responses'. To do this on his own theory 
he would have to operate with a measure of degree of 
organisation and quantity of impulses applicable not 
merely to the states of mind of one person, but to the 
states of mind of different persons. This he has never 
provided, nor is it clear why a stock-response should 
invariably be composed of fewer or less highly organised 
impulses than a novel but perhaps not comprehensive 
response.
3. In any case even if he can evaluate responses 
in this way, how can he leave room in his theory for 
appreciating the 'wrong* poem for the 'right' (i.e. 
synaesthesis-inducing) reasons? (For, he says, "It is 
quite possible to like the 'wrong' poems and dislike the 
'right' ones for reasons which are excellent"!)^ Either 
the poem does or it does.not in any one reader evoke 
synaesthesis. Hov/ can this fact ('This poem induces
1. P.O., p.349.
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synaesthesis*) he 'wrong*? Richards is assuming that some 
poems properly evoke synaesthesis and others improperly 
evoke a para-synaesthesis based on 'stock-attitudes '.
As all the protocol-writers (who presumably 
belong to the upper 5^ in respect of intelligence and 
education) show a lack of adequate response to the right 
poetry, i.e. fail to respond with synaesthesis to those 
of which Richards approves, Richards labels their responses 
'stock-responses', i.e., responses impoverished by 
conventional conditioning, thereby coining a new aesthetic 
negative value-word. But, as I think that very few people, 
probably only highly-trained literary critics, could 
have brought off the experiment of the protocols 'well'
(in Richards' view), there remains only one conclusion to 
be drawn from his exercise here:
1. Most of our responses to poetry are stock- 
responses and therefore worthless.
2. We thereby forego "the most serviceable means 
to artificially strengthen our minds' capacity to order 
themselves."^ Hence,
3. We are doomed to pass our lives "in consonance 
with bad poetry. And, in fact, the idle hours of most.
2
lives are filled with reveries that are simply bad poetry."
But there is nothing in Richards' general theory 
to warrant the above statement. If the private poetry _
1 and 2. P.O., p.320.
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of our dreams effects the satisfaction of most of our 
impulses, then according to Richards' theory of Synaesthesis, 
it is good and.valuable. If Richards says that it is bad 
poetry, on his ov/n theory he mus't he asserting that it 
disorganises our impulses, neither a very relevant nor a 
very plausible claim. In practice he is of course judging 
it without reference to any independent standard of 
impulse-ordering; with reference ind.e_ed^jbp^ external 
standard derived from the poem itself.
It is just this unconscious intrusion of an 
external standard, a norm, by reference to which a response 
is judged good or bad, correct or incorrect, adequate or 
inadequate, that Richard invalidates his own theory. The 
only possible role for his theory would be a really 
descriptive psychological account of the state of mind 
(in terms of whatever concepts psychologists use to 
analyse states of mind), which is characteristically 
occurring on the utterance of a sincere value-judgment.
The validity of the said judgment could never be affected 
by the applicability or non-applicability of this descript­
ion.
By his ov/n practice Richards shows the failure 
of Synaesthesis as a criterion of aesthetic value. As 
long as the psychological theory of value is kept within 
its limits as a theory of the psychological accompaniment
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of evaluation, it can perhaps be justified provided
we can accept its unexplained concepts as comprehensible
(impulses, synaesthesis, degree of order, etc.). But
as soon as the theory is used as a value-theory and
has to be translated into practice, as soon as its
validity as such is to be tested by experience, its
epistemological failures and logical fallacies become
clear. What better proof of this do we need than Richards'
ovm practice! When he forgets this theory, when he
judges the value of contemporary poetry and poets,
like Eliot, Hopkins, Lawrence, then we-know what he
is talking about - i.e. the actual work of art, the
poem under consideration. And in judging it, we find
that Richards applies standards which he never explicitly
states. We must try in the sequel to discover what
his implicit standards are. And we shall find, to our
surprise, that they are not very different from those
used by most traditional critics, e.g. that poetry
should treat ofthe most incomprehensible and
]_
inexhaustible objects for meditation," e.g. of those 
topics which are permanently and universally relevant.
1. P.O., p.291; and see Chapter 5> p.187*
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We quoted earlier from Aristotle and Eliot to. show that
Richards' criteria,when stripped of their pseudo-scientific
appearance of precision,are not very different from those
used by other critics. From the earliest day when man
first began to think seriously about the reasons governing
his preference of this rather than that poem, critics
have expressed these reasons in different ways, but their
underlying similarity is unmistakable. From Longinus'
"Poetry is chiefly conversant about general truth"^ -
to Matthew Arnold's dictum that poetry is "A criticism
of life," "the aim being to know ourselves and the world"
by means of knowing "the best which has been thought and
2
said in this world," philosophers and critics seem to 
agree that in major works of (literary) art it is with 
reference to the universal problems of life and death, 
and the relevance of the work of art to them, that it 
ought to be judged. So, as we saw earlier, with Richards.
In this he follows in the footsteps of the greatest critics 
from Aristotle, Longinus, Arnold to Eliot, and like them, 
his theory of the place of poetry is not independent of 
his view of life in general.
But whereas the traditional critics could support 
the criterion of important subject-matter by reference, for 
example, to a theory involving art as statement of universal
1. P.L.C., p.6.
2. Matthew Arnold; Discourses in America, (1885).
The Works of Mattnew Arnold, Y6L IV. (Iviacmillan & Co.Ltd.,
1903), p.322.
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truths, Richards could only explain this on his psychological 
theory, if he had left room for such a criterion of 
'correctly' as against 'incorrectly' occurring synaesthesis.
As against earlier critics who held definite 
views about the nature and value of art which formed the 
ground of their aesthetic theories, and whose critical 
practice followed from their theoretical premises, we 
find in Richards a dualism of theory and practice, in 
which these are unrelated and unrelatable. A purely 
psychological theory of value can, in short, not become 
a guide to critical practice. I shall therefore let 
Richards' practice speak for itself, or rather, for those 
of his implied criteria of artistic excellence, some of 
which Richards never explicitly states.
We have examined and criticised in this chapter 
Richards' theory of Synaesthesis; we have indicated that 
the, notion of synaesthesis is really a conflation of two 
different concepts - psychological and aesthetic; that it 
is consequently an incoherent notion, being sometimes 
viewed by Richards as merely a certain introspectible 
and valued experience of equilibrium due to the balancing 
of a large number of neurological impulses; and sometimes 
as a complex, aesthetic attitude which should but may not 
be induced in a reader by great poetry, involving an
12 2
adequate^ "balanced, practical, directed response to a 
many-sided situation in, and experience of, life. And 
we have suggested that in his practical criticism 
Richards is not concerned with the occur*rence of synaesthesis 
as an actual phenomenon, "but as an attitude which certain 
works of art ought to induce, or would induce in a 
qualified spectator, owing to their aesthetic value.
We have examined Richards' psychological theory 
of value; we have compared and contrasted it with Mill's 
theory of pleasure; we have pointed out the logical 
fallacy of Richards* theory of value and its practical 
inapplica"bility.
We shall now proceed to examine Richards* 
theoretical standard of poetic value as implied "by his 
view of the nature of poetry; and finally, we shall examine 
Richards* practice with the viev/ to discovering his actual 
value-judgments and his actual criteria of value.
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CHAPTER 4 
RICHARES * THEORY OR POETRY
a) The nature of poetry
In accordance with his psychological theory of 
value, we find Richards defining a poem (presumably a valuable 
work of literature), as a class of experiences: "a 
class of experiences which do not differ in any character 
more than a certain amount, varying for each character, 
from a standard experience", which is "the relevant experience 
of the poet.when contemplating the completed composition."^ 
Later (in Practical Criticism) the poem is again defined 
as "Roughly the collection of impulses which shaped the 
poem originally, to which it gave expression, and to which, 
in an ideally susceptible reader, it would again give 
rise.
Now, although Richards does not give us a 
definition of experience, that most elusive and ambiguous 
of all psychological and aesthetic terms, he does tell us 
about some of its constituents. We find once again his 
odd sense of ’impulse’: "Impulses are the essential 
and fundamental things in any ecperience. This implies 
either that there are other less important things in it, 
or that some less fundamental elements, constructs out of
1. P.L.C., pp.226-7
2. P.O., p.204.
3. P.L.C., p.124.
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impulses, will be more convenient to handle in analysis.
Soon, in fact, mention of the impulses in or of the
experience is superseded by mention of such further
elements, or perhaps constructs out of anonymous impulses,
viz. "the attitudes evoked which are the all-important
part of any e x p e r i e n c e . - Thus we only think that we are
talking about this poem, we are actually talking either
of impulse-experiences, or of attitude-experiences.
These have the inconvenient feature of varying from individual
to individual: "What is good for one mind may not be
good for another in a different condition - with different
2
needs and in a different situation." Moreover, these 
experiences vary in the same individual as well: "What 
will be thought or felt next year seems uncertain, for 
what seemed fundamental last year seems today hardly 
worth notice. It is not clear what this is which could 
seem fundamental last year and hardly worth notice today, 
except an idea, a suggestion as to a truth, a belief. Not, 
at all events, an ordinary experience of impulses. But 
this change in our attitude, or change in the value of 
our states of mind of whatever sort,- need not worry us 
too much, for we still have a supposedly fixed standard
1. P.L.C. , p.,132 
2 and 3. P.O., p.348.
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of comparison, "the experience of the poet when contemplating 
the completed composition". To take a concrete example:
' 1. My experiences of "The 'Waste Land" in 1956
are near enough to the poet’s to count as the poem, and
I value them highly, i.e. synaesthesis takes place.
2. My experiences of "The Waste Land" in 1957
are also near enough to the poet’s to count as the poem,
hut I do not value them highly, i.e. synaesthesis does not 
take place. But how can my experiences of 1956 and the 
poet’s involve s^maesthesis, and my experiences of 1957 
not, v/hile all being the same .poem? Or is this enough to 
show that my experiences of 1957 do not approximate near 
enough to the poet’s and so are not the poem I approved 
of in 1956? There is of course also the usual difficulty 
with such theories, i.e. we are justified in asking, how 
can we know what the poet’s experience was? Yet Richards 
warns us "we shall miss in many cases much that is essential 
unless we are able to react with similar impulses.
' ilnd since the poet himself is only a fallible 
human being, whose experiences and values change 
continually, it is to be assumed that even ^  does not 
have an available, fixed, standard experience. On this 
point we could take the word of T.S.Eliot, who writes
1. Richards: The Poundations of Aesthetics, p.31.
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both from the poet's and the critic's standpoint :
..."in one sense, but a very limited one, he (the
poet) knows better what his poems 'mean' than can anyone 
else ; he may know the history of their composition, 
the material which has gone in and come out in an 
unrecognisable form, and he knows what he was trying 
to do and what he was meaning to do. But what a poem 
means is as much what it means to others as what it 
means to the author; and indeed, in the course of time 
a poet may become merely a reader in respect to his
own. works, forgetting his original meaning - or without
forgetting, merely changing."
Moreover, poets often judge the v alue of their 
poems differently from us. Thus, whereas we think, highly
of it, Coleridge thought "Kubla Khan" merely "a psychological
2 ' curiosity" , without poetic merits. It seems we cannot
use his experiences as the poem if we wish to keep "Kubla
IQian" in our anthologies.
Other poets might think highly of works we do 
not prize highly. Landor's poem, "I strove with none, for 
none was worth my strife", probably recorded what was a 
valuable experience to him and he probably thought it a 
good poem. But if to us it is a slightly comical .piece, 
we are presumably not reading the same poem. We are left 
therefore in an evaluative void and even in a position 
which could be called aesthetic solipsism, with nothing 
to rely- on but "the need of the moment"  ^not merely to 
inform us of the worth of a literary work but to constitute 
it. And our need of the moment has of course no relation
1. T.S.Eliot: The Use, of Poetry and The Use of Criticism,
p.130 Imy italics). (Faber & Faber, 1933 ).
2. P.L.C., p.227.
3. P.O., p.349.
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or relevance to the needs of others.
We must reject such a negative, relativistic and
subjective view of the nature and value of poetry and the
other arts. We may conclude with T.S.Eliot and commonsense
"that the feeling, or emotion, or vision, resulting from
the poem is something different from the feeling or emotion
or vision in the mind of the p o e t , a n d  with Philip
^Yheelv/right and commonsense that "The object of literary
criticism is the poem under consideration, and not either
the poet's supposed feelings or the reader's expected 
2
benefits." We must recognise that 'the poem' is first of 
all an existing, created object, made of words, manifested 
in print or sound, and not a 'class of experiences' as 
Richards defined it. An experience, however valuable for 
the poet or the audience, must first of all be embodied 
in some form in v/hich it can be generally manifested 
before it is a work of art. We can say that certain 
experiences have led to or arisen from a poem, but not 
that they are the poem. If it v/ere otherwise, intelligible 
discourse about 'this poem' would become impossible.
We should be reduced to talking about our impulses, our 
appetencies and withdrawals, to merely describing actual 
states of mind, which, in themselves without a relevant
1. T.S.Eliot: The Sacred Wood, Preface, p.x.(Methuen,1928))my
2. Philip Wheelwright : "On the Semantics of Poetry", )ital-
The Kenyon! Review, Summer- 1940. ics.
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context or situation, can be called neither good nor bad,
neither valuable nor valueless. "A state, in itself, is
1
nothing whatever." In fine, if our discourse in Aesthetics 
is to have meaning, we must refrain from talking about 
those mystical entities 'Beauty', 'Truth', 'Goodness', 
but also about their modern counterparts 'valuable states 
of mind', appetencies, coherence and ordering of impulses.
If we want to be understood (and v;e do), if we want to be 
able to communicate intelligibly with one another, we 
should rather talk of this poem or that picture and not 
of Poetry or Painting in general. When we discuss a 
particular poem, we find no difficulty, we see that we 
are in fact talking about one and the same thing, whether 
we agree about it or not ; but on Richards' theory (unless 
we take the poet's experience as the poem in which case 
neither of us is able to talk about it}, you are talking 
about your feelings and I about mine; no question of 
agreement or disagreement can arise. But it does, and once 
again practice, or everyday usage, (not least his own} 
disproves Richards' theory. (See Appendix A on Defining a 
poem).
1. T.S.Eliot: The Sacred V/ood, p.170
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b ) Poetry and Life
Given Richards' view that poetry experience, 
he is naturally led to identify the elements of poetic
experience with the elements of non-poetic experience.
There is, says Richards, no gulf between "the material 
of poetry" and life;
"There is no gap between our everyday emotional life
and the material of poetry. The verbal expression of
this life, at its finest, is forced to use the teclinique 
of poetry, that is the one essential difference. We 
cannot avoid the material of poetry. If we do not live 
in consonance v/ith good poetry, we must live in 
consonance with bad poetry. And, in fact, the idle 
hours of most lives are filled with reveries that are 
simply bad private poetry.
This assertion of the continuity of life and 
art was a justified reaction against the view of the 
Formalists, and is justified even now, when the gulf between
y  life and art seems to be deepening, e.g. in vmrks like
Joyce's Finnegan's Wake, much modern poetry, abstract art, 
.Action painting, Constructivism. The question "V/hat relation 
is there between, say, an action painting and 'life', 
what comments - if any - is the painter making by means
of it, and how are we to understand and interpret his v/ork, "
simply cannot arise, because much modern ai-t is just not 
intended as a comment on, or expression of, noh-artistic
4
experience. 'Art for Art's sake' enjoys a new lease of 
life. Thus Richards' assertion that there is not, or rather
1. P.O., pp.317, 318.
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should not he, a gap between the material- dealt with in 
art and life is still relevant.
When Richards asserted this over 30 years ago, it 
was put forward against the Formalists' postulation of a 
unique aesthetic value peculiar to works of art alone, 
(rather than any claim to special artistic material,) an 
aesthetic value "different in kind and cut off from the 
other values of ordinary experience."^ Clive Bell had 
formulated his Aesthetic Hypothesis as follows:
"To appreciate a work of art v/e need bring with us 
nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and 
affairs, no familiarity with its emotions."2
This Formalist view probably has two sources; one in 
historical conditioning, the other a personal one. 
Historically it might well have developed from a quite 
justified impatience with pre-Raphaelite message-pictures 
and Tolstoy's theory of art as the propagator of 
Christian morality; it was also, however, understandably 
a generalisation from its author's specific response 
to the formal elements in paintings. Richards rightly 
criticises the Formalists' unproved assumptions, but, as 
usual, falls into the opposite extreme.
Y/hat exactly does Richards mean by "the material 
of poetry"? He clearly does not mean the terms which
1. P.L.C., p.17.
2. Clive Bell; Art (Chatto and Windus, 1914), p.25.
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poetry must use. This would he uninteresting, since poetry 
must consist of words and in so far as we express our 
everyday emotional life in language, the words will he 
those v/hich poets also must use. Does he mean the topic 
of poetry? This is a more promising interpretation 
in view of the assertion that a fine life is somehow 
'consonant with' good poetry and that a not-fine (poor?) 
life is ' consonant v/ith' bad poetry. The view that 'fine ' 
real life experience can only be (adequately) expressed 
in poetry, and that bad poetry would express a poor 
(aesthetically?) real-life-experience, or the imaginative 
reverie of one whose experience of real life is poor, 
suggests that Richards is treating life as aesthetically 
judgeable, and as the inevitable.subject matter of poetry. 
And this ethico-aesthetic evaluation of life is quite 
consistent with Richards' division of men into two classes : 
on the one hand, the uncultured majority, victims of stock 
attitudes, who, whether they know it or not, simply 
"inhabit chaos" (and I think he would put most well- 
educated people and literary critics in the same class), 
and on the other hand, the very small élite v/ho can 
understand and enjoy 'good poetry' simply because it is 
a reflection of their inner life. Richards of course 
cannot prove this view of the correspondence between 1 .r
1. P.O., p.325.
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the appreciation of good poetry and a fine life or bad 
poetry and a poor life, and I take it to be a characteristic 
sample of emotive language. We have T.S.Eliot's word for 
it that "Impressions and experiences which are important 
for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those 
which become important in the poetry may play quite a 
negligible part in the man, the personality."
However in asserting the continuity between 
our everyday emotional life and poetry, Richards was 
probably really concerned to assert the - continuity of 
everyday and aesthetic experiences in general:
"When we look at a picture, or read a poem, or listen 
to music, we are not doing something quite unlike we 
were doing on our way to the Gallery or when we 
dressed in the morning."2
Although Richards does not make it clear here in what 
the 'unlikeness' or qualitative difference which he is 
denying v/ould consist, he reduces the difference between 
the two activities and their concomitant experiences to 
one of complexity, unity and order within the experiences. 
Thus, in admitting that aesthetic experiences can be 
distinguished from ordinary experiences, Richards holds 
that
1. T.S.Eliot: The Sacred Wood, p.56.
2. P.L.C., p.i f: ”
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W r  ^y  "... they differ chiefly in the connections between 
\) y i their constituents, and that they are only a further 
/ ;  ^ development, a finer organisation of ordinary
; experiences... "1
V/e will examine this statement at some length because it 
forms the basic proposition of Richards’ theory of art 
and literary criticism.
The first objection to Richards' criterion of an 
aesthetic experience is that it will not work - i.e. 
the difference between an aesthetic experience of looking 
at a picture and a non-aesthetic experience is not a matter 
of the quality of the experience, of whether it is complex, 
ordered or unified. There are many experiences which are 
' complex, ordered and unified but are not aesthetic, and 
vice versa. The primary aesthetic experience is that of 
understanding a work, not of evaluating it. In the primary 
aesthetic experience of looking at a picture, any activity 
involved (e.g. posture of the body, movement of the head 
and eyes, etc.), is an active preliminary to understanding. 
The end of the activity is not the feeling to which the 
activity may give rise, but getting to know the picture.
In striving to understand it, I bring to bear on it 
everything relevant in what I have learnt of other pictures, 
my general knowledge of the historical situation and
1. P.L.C., p.16.
134
outlook of its presumed painter, his technical means and 
methods, his subject-matter and treatment, the formed 
content presented by his picture. Hov/ is this experience 
different from that of a scientist examining a new specimen? 
Not necessarily in its ordered complexity. If it results 
in some such ordered complex feeling, I may indeed pass 
a favourable judgment on the work, but seeing all there 
is to be seei; in a picture is itself an aesthetic experience 
which does not include passing a judgment on the picture's 
worth; and in any case such a judgment would be 
a judgment as to the value of the picture, not a 
judgment about my experience. Otherwise, such critical 
statements as "I have a blind spot for this kind of work 
but I know this is a good example of it" would be impossible. 
The fact that they are made and understood and therefore 
possible, shows that there is a difference between a 
personal judgment about one's experience of, or reaction
I
to, a work of art and a judgment of its aesthetic value.
Aesthetic experiences then, are not to be y
identified with highly valued experiences, nor is it clear p
Â !
whether 'ordered complexity' is the invariable character- 
istic of such experiences. ^
If we try to apply Richards' no-gap theory to V 
the theatre, the result would be disastrous. Richards 
would be the first to upbraid the innocent spectator who, 
carried away by a performance of Othello, shouted at the
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hero : "You great black fool, can't you see it's all right?"^ 
Yet we must experience Othello's situation in a certain 
v/ay (a way distinctly aesthetic ) if we are to understand 
the play ; and this distinction is not to he explained 
in Richards' terms. Perhaps all Richards means by his no­
gap theory is: "Do not work yourself up into a holy
religious attitude, do not regard aesthetic experience
as a kind of mystical experience, possible only to the
\
few experts", we can agree with him. But I think he meant
more than this, and in his refutation of the 'specific
aesthetic experience' theory,he put forward the contrary
theory of the total indistinguishability of experience
of life and of art. We shall see in the sequel that his
theory is divorced from his practice, and what he says of
A.C.Bradley is also true of himself: "His is that welcome
and not unfamiliar case of the critic whose practice is a
2refutation of his theory."
c) Poetry and Science 
We saw that Richards regarded poetry sometimes 
as experience, sometimes as a method of expressing 
experience. The latter view is more consistent with 
Richards' general theories and followed from his
1. P.L.Lucas: Tragedy,i%i- relation to Aristotle's Poetics,p.50
2. P.L.C., p.79. (The Hogarth Press 1953)
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distinction between the emotive and the referential uses 
of language. So let us now examine Richards' distinction 
between poetry and science:
first, with regard to the character of what they express; 
secondly, with regard to the method with which they 
express it ;
thirdly, with regard to the function of such expressions. 
Throughout Richards ' v/ritings his fundamental 
preoccupation is the gulf between science and art, between 
our investigation of facts and our expression of what we 
value. He tried hard to bridge this gulf, to use the methods 
of science in the investigation of values. Even in his 
latest book. Speculative Instruments (1955)? he still 
has not given up the belief that "... we have ... to seek 
a way by which values might unrestrictedly come into the 
care of science. But in our world, where science is 
making enormous strides, these are not in the direction 
of settling value-questions scientifically; and nevertheless 
the arts seem to be relegated into a corner. In such a 
time of 'transvaluation of values', Richards, deeply 
convinced of the importance still of the arts for man, is 
trying to prove this to a sceptical, practical and scientific- 
ally-minded audience.
In fact he seems himself t o be unclear how science
1.Richards: Speculative Instruments, p.145*
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could ever settle value-questions, and at times we find
him assuring us that not science, but only art expresses and
embodies values. The values embodied in art are not
mysterious, abstract entities; they are not unknowable
"denizens of a world of b e i n g " t h e y  can be understood
but not within the context of science itself, because
"Science can tell us nothing about the nature of things in
2
any ultimate sense." It can tell us that certain facts 
are the case and how they came about but it "cannot tell
us what we are or what this v/orld is. If we want to
find out that and if we v/ant to find out about the 
relative importance and value of these 'facts' for us, we 
must turn to art : the arts are "our storehouse of recorded 
values. And of all the arts, poetry is, "at least, the
5
most important repository of our standards."
Of great literature, because of his theory of
the continuity of poetry and life, he is led to say that
it enables us to see "more clearly what our world is and 
what we are who are building it to live in"^; "The inmiortal
7
pages are the great exercisers of the spirit," and their 
value is in their "inexhaustible fertility". They are
1. M.M., p.154.
2. Science and Poetry, p.52.
3. ibid, p.53.
4. P.L.C., p.32.
5. P.O., p.249.
6. How to read a page, p.13.
7. ibid, p.11.
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"the most constant sources of reasonable moments,
"when we know more completely what we are and why we are
so" and thus "see into the life of things more deeply
2
than in our e/eryday routine of existence." Thus "good 
poetry owes its value in a large measure to the closeness 
of its contact with reality...
I think that all these sayings express our common 
view of the nature and value of art, at least of great 
works of literary and poetic art, though they conflict 
with his hope that values can be brought into the care 
of science rather than art. But there is also a near­
contradiction between this view and the other view of 
Richards', repeated throughout his writings, namely, that 
art in general, and poetry in particular, do not and should 
not make statements about life and men and the world which 
are true in the sense of being in accordance v/ith facts.
If indeed (as Richards thinks) there were no such thing 
as poetic truth, poetry and literature could never tell 
us anything about ourselves or other men or this our 
world, and we should not be able, thanks to it, to see 
more deeply into the life of things. But is truth irrelevant 
to the value of poetry? Let us consider John Glare's 
description of the primrose, taken by Richards to illustrate
1. Richards: How to read a page, p. 11
2. Richards: How to read a page, p.15.
3. Richards, F.C., p.25Ï
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the difference bet v/e en scientific and emotive language :
"With its crimp and curdled leaf 
And its little brimming eye"b....
Is this just emotive language? The description tells us
more about what 'the' primrose means to us in our non-
botanical lives than any scientific statement of its
exact size and colour and weight and botanical family
connections ever could; and therefore it at least implies
true statements about real primroses. To call such a
description a 'pseudo-statement' i.e. "a form of v/ords.
which looks like a statement but should not be taken as 
2one," though permissible in a treatise on logic, is quite 
misleading in a discussion of poetry and cannot explain 
the value of poetry in our eyes, but will have the 
opposite effect. One of the main reasons why men read 
and WT'ite poetry is that by using language just in this 
way they can reveal more than was ever dreamt of in 
science and in philosophy.
To revert to Richards' more plausible view, the 
arts, and especially poetry, can fulfil this function 
because, says Richards, great works of art are created 
by men who are "the masters of life. I think Richards
1. "Between Truth and Truth"'The Symposium * April 1931.
2. "Between Truth and Truth""The Symposium April 1931.
3. P.O., p.325.
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means here what we all mean by calling a poet great, i.e.
not that he necessarily ^  a great man in his own particular
life, but that he sees life steadily and sees it whole,
/ and that he communicates his vision by means of his art.
But as D.G.James remarks, "the view of poetry as the
expression of imaginative prehension is a sufficiently
ordinary one, and is certainly not n e w . H e r e  Richards
is in traditional company, and he has not succeeded in
making the doctrine much clearer.
We call a work of art great when it "is concerned
more extensively, more profoundly and more subtly with
2
the main tendencies in human nature and in things" 
says the metaphysician S.Alexander. And the same view of 
what makes a work of art great comes from a writer with 
a completely different - indeed ïto*xist - outlook, who is 
by training and profession a scientist. Prof.Hyman Levy 
says :
"those writers who have continued to have value for 
succeeding generations of readers are those who have 
expressed the highest truths of their time with the 
most impassioned imagination."3
We must agree that poetry and literature are 
concerned with the world of men and of things as recreated 
or created by the poet's imagination, and that their
1. B.G.James: Scepticism and Poetry, An Essay on the Poetic 
Imagination! (G.Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1937)? p.52.
2. S.Alexander: Beauty and Other Forms of Value, (Macmillan 
& Co.Ltd., 1933), pTT?B!
3. H.Levy and H.Spalding: Literature for an Age of Science, 
(Methuen & Co., 1952), p.247• -
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greatness and permanent value depend on the measure of 
their contribution to our understanding of ourselves and 
other people, of human actions and experience.
If then "the arts are our storehouse of recorded 
values", we must regard e.g. the Bible, Aeschylus’ and 
Shakespeare’s Tragedies as embodying these values. And 
Richards rightly asserts that "Value cannot be demonstrated 
except by the communication of what is valuable.Just 
as beauty and goodness cannot be ’demonstrated’ except 
by pointing out beautiful objects, or persons or actions 
which are good, we cannot demonstrate or point to the 
’value' of objects, except by presenting the valuable 
object. This is v/hat great literature does, as Richards 
says. Perhaps Richards meant this to be taken more 
specifically in accordance with his theory, as meaning 
that value cannot be demonstrated because communicating 
it consists in the transmitting of synaesthesis which 
can only be experienced, but he clearly takes 'great 
literary works' to be those which in his opinion should 
transmit synaesthesis and will do so to a properly 
qualified audience.
Now just as we grade human actions according to 
their degree,, of goodness or moral value, just as we grade 
material objects according to their usefulness for certain
1. P.O., p.12.
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purposes, we may also grade works of.art according to the 
sort of values embodied and revealed in them. But in talking 
of the value of art, we must not try to find one, all- 
embracing, universal characteristic of Value, unchanging 
and unchangeable. Firstly, there are different bases of 
assessment e.g. a work might 'embody' very 'high' (generally 
important) truths but if these are only vaguely or 
unconvincingly presented, we will not appraise it as 'a 
great work of art', though we might appraise it as 'a 
work of great moral worth'. Secondly, there are different 
arts each capable of expressing a different content 
according to its special medium. We must not commit the 
critical mistake of condemning a certain piece of music 
because it does not express an attitude to life, or omit 
to take this consideration into account in praising a 
poem. Yet in our scale of values as applied to works of 
art, there may be a series of requirements increasing from 
those indicating the lowest or minimum aesthetic value 
perhaps : satisfying the technical criteria differentiating 
a piece of literature from a piece of writing), to a value 
which all 'good' works of art in a given medium or genre 
possess. And this 'goodness' of works of art must be, in 
general terms, their capacity to "heighten awareness, deepen 
and intensify experience, broaden and sharpen understanding
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of the world around us.
Every work of art, taken in isolation, obviously 
cannot fulfil so vast a function, but if t aken as a whole 
and living process, art as well as science, though by a 
different method, has this function to fulfil. To regard 
science and art as two completely different spheres, as 
Richards, in his more theoretical moments, does, using 
different methods for the attainment of different ends 
(i.e.factual truth on the one hand and the emotional 
reorganization of experience by means of pseudo-statements 
or emotive utterance on the other), is only to deepen the 
already existing gulf between fact and the creative imagin­
ation, between science and art. As against Richards, E.G.
James insists that "a process of imaginative construction"
2
is necessary to both science and poetry; and to H.Levy 
it has seemed worth noting that "Both literature and 
science are instruments of discovery and instruments of 
change."^
But there is of course a great difference of 
method between them:
"a primary distinction between a science and an art 
is that while the former deliberately excludes judgments 
and values as far as possible and is directed towards 
communicating facts and their relations, the arts 
deliberately set out to communicate values and judgments
1. H.Levy: op.cit., p.83*
2. n.G.James: Scepticism and Poetry, Ch.3*
3. H.Levy: op.cit., p.2l8.
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and their associated feelings, using facts and 
imagination to this end."1
We must admit of course that there is a certain disparity 
between scientific and artistic accounts of 'reality' 
just as there is a certain disparity between both of 
them and our everyday experience. But if we hold that both 
science and art aim at truth, and that the basis of 
assessment for art and for science is their content and 
its truth, then we must agree that they are not totally 
different in aim (as Richards thinks), but complementary 
activities of the human mind. It always takes some time 
for newly discovered scientific facts to be absorbed into 
the integral vision of life presented in the arts. Moreover, 
because of the immense extension of our scientific 
knowledge, this integration is by far more difficult for 
modern poets than it was for poets in the past.
But this - the partial dispai'ity between scientific 
knowledge and artistic vision - is not really what Richards 
is concerned with. When Richards speaks of the gulf between 
science and art, he really means the present disparity 
between current works of art and men's current beliefs.
And this is his problem: Poetry reflects - directly or 
indirectly - men's beliefs about the world, metaphysical, 
philosophical, ethical, psychological, religious. What,
\ '
1. H.Levy, op cit., p.133.
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asks Richards, is poetry to reflect now, in our time, when
"all the answers which have for ages been regarded as the
keys of wisdom are dissolving together"
"All the answers" means all the answers given
by religion and philosophy to the eternal questions: what
is man’s place in the universe, what is the role he is to
play, and what is the purpose of his life? Richards thinks
the answer religion gave to these questions outdated. But
he also thinks the answers of philosophy outdated and
finds that "At present it is becoming increasingly difficult
for anyone, who is not linguistically naive, to hold any
2
philosophical position" ... on such questions. And if this 
is so, what is there left for poetry to reflect, since 
it was supposed to reflect men’s 'beliefs' and now both 
his religious and his metaphysical beliefs "are dissolving 
together"? Richards attempts to answer this crucial 
question by introducing his new notion of: "beliefs which 
are objectless, which are not about anything or in anything; 
beliefs which cannot be s t a t e d . B u t  as this notion of 
'objectless beliefs' seems to be not even clear to him, 
he cannot make it clear to us and I take him to mean 
that poetry will simply have to shift without any beliefs. 
Moreover its task will be far more exacting than it was
1. Richards: Science and Poetry, p.54.
2. Richards: "Belief ''"!'The Sy“mposium ‘ Oct. 1930.
3. P.L.C., p.280.
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before, since it will nevertheless have to save us from
the "mental chaos" created by the crumbling away of
traditional beliefs. For although Richards envisaged the
future as "a mental chaos such as nan has never experienced,"
yet he hoped that Poetry is capable of saving us 
1
from this.
Thus Richards' attitude to this question of the
relation of science and poetry is very pessimistic indeed.
He is convinced that the advance of science has destroyed
not only the 'magical' view of nature, but also the basis
of all later traditional beliefs ; and although he admits
that "science can tell us about man's place in the
universe and his chances", he immediately adds the warning
not to be too hopeful since "the place is precarious,
2 ' 'and the chances problematical." In the meantime, however,
we can go on immersing ourselves in poetry and like the
child, the primitive man and the peasant indulge "in this
happy condition of real intellectual disconnection.
»
In short,. "Poetry is good for you.
V/ould it be rash to conclude from the foregoing 
that Richards wanted poetry to be the opium of the people?
1. Richards: Science and Poetry, pp.82-83•
2. Richards: Science and Poetry, p.53
3. Richards: PlC., p.275*
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d) The method of poetry
■Richards' view of the nature, method and function 
of art in general and of poetry in particular is a direct 
outcome of his behaviouristic theory of meaning, and of 
his psychological theory of value. These enable him to 
give a unified account of art.
Having defined a poem not as an object but as an 
experience, Richards has to give some concent to this 
experience. Hut he tells us “A poem ... has no concern 
with limited and directed reference. It tells us, or should
tell us no t h i n g . It s  only function is "to induce a
2 3fitting attitude to experience" and to attune us to existence.
This he thinks it can do, though he also holds even that
"Poetry may be almost devoid of mere sense, let alone
thought, or almost without sensory or formal structure,
and yet reach the point than which no poem goes further."^'
Let us examine the above statements, for they raise more
problems than they solve. First of all: Which experience
have we to have a fitting attitude towards? Those of which
the poem speaks or experience in general? And how, when we
have identified the experience in question, do we decide
on a 'fitting attitude'? e.g. do we have to be French
1, and 2. M.M., p.270.
3. P.L.C., p.282.
4. P.L.G., p.130.
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revolutionaries to approve aesthetically of the Marseillaise?
Or does the poem itself indicate the 'fitting attitude'; is
the poem the evocation of certain experiences plus value-
tone, is it simply a question of exjperiences-viewed-vvith-
a-certain-attitude? Richards never explains his notion of
a "fitting attitude to experience's and we are left to
interpret it as we please. But it would seem that he did
not take fittingness too seriously. For, according to him,
the method of poetry is "to use an evocative term in
connection v/ith an evocative matter" and "It is not
necessary to know what things are in order to take up
fitting attitudes towards them, and the peculiarity of
the greatest attitudes which art can evoke is their
1
extraordinary width."
This expressly repudiates the aesthetic adoption
of an attitude and, as M.Black las pointed out, "the puzzle
is to know how a poem that 'tells nothing' can induce a
2fitting, or valuable attitude." If we do not know what 
things are how can we decide whether an attitude towards 
them is fitting? What is a 'great ' attitude? Y/hat is a 
little one? It seems that Richards- uses all these terms 
as emotive words, in order to emphasize his belief as to 
what in poetry is important and valuable. Because he thinks
1. M.M., pp.270-1.
2. Max Black: Language and Philosophy, p.207.
149
that literary critics and teachers of literature have 
over-emphasized the importance of meaning in poetry as 
against feeling, he vérités to tip the balance in the 
opposite direction. Unfortunately he tips it so violently, 
that he seems to throw off sense, thought, or meaning from 
poetry altogether. When he says that a poem may almost be 
devoid of sense, of thought, of sensory and formal structure 
and yet be a good poem, he must support such a statement 
by illustration if we are to believe him. The very fact 
that he does not do so, leads us to suspect that such 
a poem does not exist, and that if it did, it would be a 
bad poem: at best it would be a kind of primitive ritual 
chant(which, of course must have sensory structure), 
made to arouse an emotional frenzy but surely not 
synaesthesis. Perhaps all he wanted to say is that sense, 
thought, meaning, sensory and formal structure are not ^  
sufficient conditions for making a poem good. But at least 
some combination of them is a necessary condition. As 
to the "extraordinary width" of attitudes evoked by art,
I think Richards perhaps refers to the multivalence in 
time and place of every great work of art, i.e. its 
capacity to mean many things or one eternally valid thing to 
many people at different periods, (though of course he has 
denied the necessity of meaningfulness at all).
. "The extraordinary fact is that works of art do have 
'that potency of life in them which makes them of
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continual, if of differing interest to men. Our Shylock 
is not Shakespeare’s, our Phaedra not Racine's - nor 
was Racine's Euripides's"...1
If we agree with this we might conclude that Shylock and 
Phaedra, Hamlet and La Gioconda are great artistic creations 
not because they are "means of ordering our minds", but 
because they are inexhaustible sources of discovery of 
new relations and new truths. "A thing of beauty is a joy 
for ever." - Richards might be taken to mean this if it 
were not so thoroughly inconsistent with his other dicta.
Every literary critic - from the writer of 
literary reviews in the daily press and magazines to the 
aesthetician bent on developing a consistent body of 
philosophy of art, continually differentiates betv/een 
the good and bad, the beautiful and ugly, even the right 
and v/rong in art, and may also try to enunciate rules or 
principles of correctness in assigning aesthetic merit.
On this major point, as we have seen, Richards himself 
says: "it is possible to like the 'wrong' poems and
2
dislike the 'right' ones for reasons which are excellent" , 
though he also says that all that really matters is that 
we should be "able to use them both as a means of ordering 
our minds.
1. G.Boas: Wingless Pegasus, p.63 
2 and 3. P.O., p.349.
- U
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But we are justified in asking, what, in the 
context of such a theory as Richards’ makes a poem good or 
had, right or wrong? If our only means of judging and 
evaluating it >is "through its power over us" every work of 
art which has power over us will he good, and that which 
has no pov/er over us will be bad. But we should usually 
wish to distinguish between art aimed at popular appeal 
and effect and art created for its own sake. Richards is 
very conscious of the need for a definite distinction 
between the two if the second kind of art is to have a 
chance of survival. But according to my last quotation, 
Richards commits himself to taking all art to be good or 
bad according to its popular effect, so why should (and 
how can) he distinguish? Hence he is led to such extremes 
as holding that;
"Keats, ... is a more efficient poet than Wilcox, 
and that is the same thing as saying that his works 
are more valuable."1
Although Richards took strong exception to Eliot's
definition of his view, it seems very apposite; "Good is
Efficiency, a perfectly working mental Roneo Steel Cabinet
2System"!or the organization of impulses. And indeed, 
when Richards describes the ideal reader who has "developed
1. P.I.e., p.206
2. I.S.Eliot .-"Literature, science and dogma". The Dial 
March 192?.
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clearing-houses by which the varying claims of different 
impulses are adjusted"^, and whose "... completed mind 
would be that perfect mind ... in which no disorder, no 
mutual frustration of impulses remained" ... we have the 
impression that he does not speak of a human being, but 
of a machine. Such an ideal, together with Richards's 
definition of synaesthesis as the equilibrium of impulses 
and as the experience of beauty and value generally, 
echoes the views of the Oriental thinkers whose influence 
on Richards is apparent ; S. Motokiyo (Practical Criticism), 
Mencius (Mencius on the Mind) and the Chung Yung of 
Confucious (The Doctrine of the Mean)(The Foundations of 
Aesthetics ). The state of mind of the ideal reader as 
envisaged by Richards would seem to be a kind of Nirvana, 
a mystic union between a perfect mind and a perfect 
universe, a petrified equilibrium. There would be no 
need and no possibility of further experience, no need 
■for further search. How far this experience matches those 
we actually have in reading great poetry, and how far the 
latter are all of one single type, we must each decide 
for ourselves. But since Richards holds that this balanced 
poise "...can be given by a carpet or a pot or by a gesture 
as unmistakably as by the Parthenon, it may come about 
through an epigram as clearly as through a Sonata^
1. P.B.C., p.53.
2. P.O., p.283.
3. P.B.C., p.248.
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then it follows that for him our division between, and 
our differentiation of arts according to their medium, 
and the different kinds of responses required by the 
different arts, are really immaterial to the beauty, 
goodness and value of their products. If the Kreuzer 
Sonata, a Persian carpet, an Etruscan pot arouse an 
equally valuable response and hence are equally valuable, 
they are for Richards arousing indistinguishable 
approximations to synaesthesis. Then how do we differentiate 
between them, assigning to the one its valued musical 
qualities, to the others their valued qualities of 
design, structure and texture? It may be that we do 
not call these objects good or beautiful or valuable in 
different senses of good, beautiful or valuable, but we 
certainly do so on the basis of different features in 
each case.
\
When Clive Bell asks :
"What quality is common to St.Sophia and the windows 
at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chinese 
carpets, Giotto's frescoes at Padua, and ,the masterpieces 
of Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and C é z a n n e?"T
he goes on to his categorical but unsupported statement :
"Only one answer seems possible - significant form - 
... and 'Significant Form' is the only quality common 
to all works of visual a r t ."2
1 and 2. Clive Bell: Art, p.8. (% italics)
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Richards asks the same question and offers just 
as categorical and unsupported an answer as Bell's: the 
only common quality is their inducing synaesthesis in 
the ideal spectator.
In both cases (Bell's and Richards') the single 
answer had to follow from the single question, and it 
is the wrongness of the question which brings with it 
the wrong type of answer.
'
e) The function of poetry
We saw that Richards held synaesthesis, or 
valuable emotional effect, to be the one cotimon quality 
shared by the most different objects in virtue of which 
we called them beautiful. From this it followed that 
the ultimate aim and function of art is remedial. As 
long as the effect of a work of art is conducive to 
mental health and efficiency, the approach to synaesthesis, 
the question of its quality, its goodness or badness, 
is settled, because its goodness its therapeutic 
effect.
'Poetry is the most serviceable means to 
"artificially strengthen our minds' capacity to order
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themselves.
But how are we to know v/hat will prove to
strengthen or weaken "the form and order" of our
whole personality? Probably the only way is to suspend
judgment until we find out, to break away from all
particular, restricted, personal "presuppositions and
critical preconceptions", and so empty our mind for
the isolated act of intuitive union with the poem.
(Though what leads a mind emptied of all previous
judgments to selective union with certain poems, I
cannot imagine). Then, in this supreme moment "a sheer
choice ‘has to be made without the support of any
2arguments, principles, or general rules." But.how can 
this be a choice? Either synaesthesis supervenes or it 
does not, and if it were really a matter of personal 
choice, we should all, and always, choose to experience 
synaesthesis and feel happy. Moreover, how can we or 
Richards himself (as he does in Practical Criticism), 
check on these choices as to whether they are right or 
wrong, due to genuine or spurious intuitions, if no 
reasons can be used to support them? Here we must 
distinguish between, on the one hand, finding the
1. P.O., p.320.)My italics)
2. P.O., p.302. .
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reasons for a choice made 'intuitively' (i.e. not 
determined by reasoning), and on the other hand arriving 
at a choice determined by reasoning, simply by bringing 
general principles to bear.
Richards is right in rejecting the latter,
but wrong in rejecting the former. If no reasons for
making this rather than that choice can be given, all
choices are equally right. But in fact they are not,
even for Richards.; therefore in judging a choice as right
or wrong, we are evaluating the reasons for making it.
Perhaps Richards is merely warning us not to allow logical
considerations to distract this act of untrammelled
choice: "Judgment in these matters is not a refinement
upon choice but a degradation.But he does not seem
clear as to vfnat could determine the choice, for even
to his insistence upon an act of choice which is
undetermined byieasoring, he adds the warning: "It is not
the intensity of the* conscious experience, its tlxrill,
its pleasure or its poignancy which gives it value,"
since "There are plenty of ecstatic moments which are 
2
valueless..." -
1. P.O., p.301.
2. P.B.C., p.132.
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It is much easier, it seems, to describe what 
is not valuable, than what is..# Even in his much later 
book, Coleridge on Imagination, we find again Richards* 
description of poetry which is not valuable, or of only 
minor value. Thus,
"Poems which have a destination, a final solution - 
whether it be the enunciation of a supposed truth, 
or suasion to a policy, or the attainment of an end- 
state of consciousness, or some temporary or permanent 
exclusive attitude to the world, to society, or to 
the self, have only a subordinate value."1
And again,
"The poem is a quest, and its virtue is not in 
anything said by it, or in the way in which it is 
being said, or in a meaning which is found, or even 
in what is passed by in the search."2
In poetry then, "The journey is its own end, ..."  ^
yet this journey determines the direction of future 
development of the whole person.
I
"...Critical certainties, convictions as to the value, 
and kinds of value, of kinds of poetry, might safely 
and with advantage decay, provided there remained a 
firm sense of the importance of the critical act of 
choice, its difficulty, and the supreme exercise of 
all our faculties that it imposes."4
This is an odd description of the intuitive union of an
1. p.213.
2. p.217.
3. p.213.
4. P.C., p.305- (Author's italics)
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empty mind with a poem. One difficulty would seem to be 
the logical one of finding a fit exercise for all our f
faculties in such a reasonless 'choice'. But there is !
- \ ■
also the aesthetic difficulty that since "we have nothing
to rely upon in making our choices but ourselves,"
those who are modest enough to doubt their infallibility
must conclude that only to few is it granted to immerse in
poetry and come out renewed and reorganized, though
2such favoured ones will then "need nothing more. But 
unless we are allowed to make a gap between art and life, 
the experience given us by the poem and our experience 
of life generally, we always need something else and 
something more, for life, both biologically and mentally, 
goes on, involving an unceasing overcoming of.internal 
stresses and external pressures, a surmounting of 
conflicting needs and desires. The attainment of a state 
of more than momentary perfect synaesthesis is impossible. 
Richards’ ideal might be a critic’s Heaven, but it would 
surely be a reader’s Hell to have to read every work 
under such a. threat for the future. It is not on the 
effect the poem has on our future development that our 
interest in and valuation of it depend, but on the quality 
and intensity of the mental and emotional activity aroused
1 and 2. P.O., p.351.
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in us when grappling with the poem itself - its meaning, 
content, structure, form, and message (if any). The 
particular satisfaction - we can call it aesthetic or 
contemplative or disinterested satisfaction if we please 
lies in the activity itself and not in the effect of 
the activity on our future development. Bome poems it is 
true, and those perhaps the greatest, though possibly 
not the most nearly perfect, may entail such a 
reorganization of our mental and emotional outlook.
But certainly not every good new poem or new picture 
does so. Indeed there are well-integrated individuals 
who find value in art, (and how could they if Richards 
were right?) just as there are people whose concern
is with art, who know what great poets have written, and
yet never attain such internal order and organization 
which is for Richards the only valuable experience.
Although on Richards' view of the nature, 
method, and function of the arts, criticism would lose 
its raison d'etre, he is perfectly aware of the need 
for sound criticism and disturbed by the lack of a 
body of reliable critical opinion. In discussing the 
"qualifications of a good critic"^, he does not use
the language of mysticism, but that of common-sense, and
1. P.L.C., p.114.
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goes so far as to set down rules. However these turn out
to he tautological. His statement that the critic "must
1be a sound judge of values" is plainly analytic. And - 
in view of Richards' equation of understanding and 
experiencing, - that the critic must "be an adept at 
experiencing",^that he must be capable of distinguishing 
between experiences, of passing judgments on them, decidingI
which is good, bad or neutral, simply means that he must 
be able to evaluate works of art and justify his value- 
judgments. While the meaning of "a sound judge of values" 
is quite clear, the question left unanswered by Richards 
is: what are the criteria or distinguishing marks of a 
sound judge? Twenty years in the English Literature 
school in Cambridge? Agreement with Dr.Richards?
In his practical criticism, Richards quite 
naturally adopts the role of a judge of values. We shall 
have to discover his standards indirectly because he 
never states them in so many terms, lest he seem to commit 
the inconsistency of setting up rules, canons or principles 
of criticism, which he so strongly condemned in other 
critics. In complete consistency, as he holds that "Value 
cannot be demonstrated except through the communication 
of what is valuable," we should expect him to present us
1 and 2. P.L.C., p.114.
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with his chosen poems and withdraw into the background 
so that the communication of the valuable can take place 
directly between the poem and us. But, happily, he accepts 
the task of mediating the communication and not only 
passes comparative value-judgments on the poems and their 
authors, but also explicates his judgments by other-than- 
literary standards. He does in fact what every serious 
critic does, namely, not only passes "a just judgment but 
a constructive and satisfying statement of the reasons 
intellectually justifying a judgment.
And now I shall let Richards the practical 
critic speak for himself and we shall find that a false 
theory is not necessarily fatal to practical appreciation;
I shall also try to extract from his practical criticism 
some guide to a more acceptable theory.
2
"The theatre is not a hospital," purgation is not 
the point of tragedy; equally, pace Richards, "Poetry is 
not a method of psycho-therapy."
We have examined in this chapter Richards' 
theory of poetry. We saw that Richards defines poetry 
sometimes as experience, sometimes as a method of 
expressing experience; and that he identified its elements 
with the elements of non-poetic experience. We saw that 
he contrasts poetry and science with regard to the
1. Rt.Hon.J.M.Robertson: "On .Criticism" The Criterion 1925-6.
2. P.L.Lucas: Tra^'edv in relation to Aristotle's Poetics, ^-----------------------------------------
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character of what they express and their method and 
function of expressing it. We agreed with Richards that 
poetry must deal with real-life experiences, but we denied 
that it is the organisation and multiplicity of the 
experience expressed that gives the expression its sole 
worth as poetry. We pointed out that this implies a criterion 
of poetic worth in the truth of the poem's expression of 
experience as corresponding to the experience.
We agreed that there is a difference between 
science and poetry, but denied that it can be drawn in
the simple terms Richards uses ; and we pointed out that 
Richards is thus led to maintain two contradictory theses 
about poetry and truth;
Thesis I That poetry neither makes nor
implies statements whose truth is relevant to its merits
{
as poetry; that the 'fittingness' of the attitudes it j 
evokes is not conditioned by the truth of the expression ^
of experience on which they are based. (It is not clear 1
what does make an attitude fit what.)
Thesis 2 That great poetry is great because it
evokes fitting attitudes towards experience in general (in
an appropriately responsive reader), by conveying general ly 
valid truths and correct value-j udgment s. Thesis 2 contra­
dicts Thesis I.
Richards also has a subsidiary and unclear notion 
that a scientific approach can be made via Behaviourism
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to identifying experiences valued (i.e. experiences of 
synaesthesis), and hence to checking the correctness of 
value judgments. This is not worked out owing to the 
impossibility of measuring the behaviouristic units 
involved, and is ignored in his practical criticism.
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Chapter 5
RICHARDS AS A PRACTICAL LITERARY CRITIC
It is a significant fact that Richards* most 
valuable and revealing criticism of poetry and of poets 
appeared not in book-form but in literary reviews like 
The Criterion and The Dial, or in the Appendices to his 
books. Prom this I draw the conclusion that it is when 
he is comparatively free from his theoretical preconceptions 
and dealing with particular works, that he can most easily 
write literary criticism. Although this seems to accord 
with Richards' ov/n view, viz., that the good literary 
critic should be free from any theoretical preconceptions 
and canons of criticism, we yet find him referring to his 
own theories even if it seems irrelevant to the point at 
issue. The follov/ing analysis of his literary criticism 
is based on his articles;
1. "A background for contemporary poetry"(The Criterion,
1924-5)
2. "The poetry of T.S.Eliot" (Principles of Literary
Criticism, Appendix B, 1926, second edition)
\
3. "On Gerard Hopkins" (The Dial, September 1926).
In his short review of "The poetry of T.S.Eliot", 
Richards sets himself a double task: First, to defend 
Eliot against adverse criticism, and secondly, to show 
his importance as a modern poet.
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Eliot's poetry was attacked in the twenties, 
(today, when his reputation as one of the great modern 
poets is firmly established these criticisms are silenced) 
for being over-intellectual, i.e. for making use of so 
many and varied literary allusions as to make his poetry 
obscure to all but the literary scholar. Middleton Murray- 
found his poetry ambiguous and therefore falling short 
of the canon of good poetry. Others were bewildered by 
his yoking together of opposite feelings, which, as the 
poem develops, change places or even are fused together. 
Even some of the best critics could not tell v/hat the 
poetry was all about. The poet, as has often happened in 
the past, and will no doubt happen again in the future, 
(for it is one of the typical features of poetry) had to 
create a new poetic language adequate to the expression 
of his time and his generation in its own characteristic 
predicament. He used a language of new symbols in a new 
poetic technique. Today it has become familiar, part and 
parcel of the literary scene. Disciples and imitators 
have arisen, for the Eliot manner has come to represent 
the literary aspect of "The Establishment".
In the twenties however things were different, 
and Richards with his "new criticism" came to the defence 
of the new poetry. He countered the attack against Eliot's 
over-intellectualism by,an extraordinary denial of the
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importance of "any coherent intellectual thread" in poetry:
"These things" (i.e. Eliot's literary quotations and
allusions) "come in for the sake of the emotional aura
which they bring and the attitudes they incite. Now
this type of defence comes straight from Richards'
synaesthesis-theory, and so far there is no conflict
between his theoretical assumptions and his practical
comments. He goes on to say that only those will be able
to react adequately, with a "unified response" (i.e. with
a synaesthetic response) to Eliot's poetry "who still loiow
to give their feelings precedence over their thoughts,
who can accept and unify an experience without trying
to catch it in an intellectual net or to squeeze out a 
2
doctrine." In short, as long as you feel, it does not
matter whether or not you understand the poetic images
and the metaphoric language used to evoke these feelings.
If, as Richards says, Eliot's poetry is a "music of ideas",
you can passively immerse yourself in the music, which,
in due course, will result in your experiencing "a
peculiar liberation of the will".'" Poetry is "there to
4be responded to,' not to be pondered or worked out." 
Nevertheless, Richards provides a long reading list 
compulsory for anyone wishing to respond even without 
intellectual understanding to 'The Waste Land'.
The obvious difficulty in such a kind of critical
1. P.L.C., p.290. 2. P.L.C., p.292. 3 & 4. P.L.C.,p.293
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approach is, that if you try to play a "music of. ideas" 
with v/ords significant of ideas only to a reader who has 
had an extended classical and general education and has 
remembered it all, you will be v/riting a code-notation of 
no more general significance than an unreadable archaic 
script. It is not a matter of putting feelings before 
comprehension, but of never having heard of half the 
expressions in the relevant context and therefore having 
no feelings at all to put before comprehension.
Notwithstanding his critical advice, which is 
clearly based on his theory of value and must have been 
a comfort to all those who found Eliot's poetry meaningless, 
Richards quietly proceeds to throw doubt upon his own 
acceptance of it by giving his ovm interpretation of 
"A Cooking Egg" and even of "The Waste Land" (as a 
comprehensive treatment of the problem of sex). Indeed, 
the former he explains section by section. Why should he 
feel it necessary to do so, after stating the supreme 
importance of response independent of grasped meaning?
For the simple reason that he never escapes his initial 
dichotomy of theory and practice, of declared and implicit 
criteria.
Richards tells the reader whose attitude is one 
of intellectual suspicion to relinquish it, and offers 
him the comfort that "The poem as a whole may elude us
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while every fragment, as a fragment, comes victoriously
h o m e . T h i s  contrasts oddly with his earlier advice not
to judge a poem by its details, but its details in the
2
light of the whole. He saves himself, however, by 
attributing a fault here to us rather than to Eliot. Our 
lack of synaesthetic response simply shows up poorly here 
as a criterion of value, probably because "we have been 
trying to put the fragments together on a wrong principle.
Richards* implicit criteria of poetic excellence 
emerge in his summing up of Eliot * s importance as a poet:
"... some readers find in his poetry not only a 
clearer, fuller realisation of their plight, the 
plight of a whole generation, than they find elsewhere, 
but also through the very energies set free in that 
realisation a return of the saving passion."4
Thus in spite of, and in contradiction to his 
earlier suggestion that feeling, not thought, unified 
response, not understanding, are primary in poetry,
Richards now finds that Eliot's importance as a contemporary 
poet is in his understanding of our current predicament 
and in his success in giving us the same understanding 
of ourselves and our world. According t o Richards, Eliot 
has created in his poetry in general, and in "The Waste 
Land" in particular, an imaginative 'objective correlative'
1. P.L.C., p.294.
2. of. "It is never what a poem says which matters, but what 
it is.""Science and Poetry", p.^5, and also P.O., p.303.
3. P.I7C., p.294.
4. ibid., p.295.
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(Eliot's own term)^ to our actual human situation. By 
our recognition of our real Waste Land in Eliot's fictional 
Waste Land, by our discovery in it of unsuspected aspects 
of our real situation, and by oui- sudden realisation
p
that "this is us, and this is our world," we may hope to 
find a way out of "The Waste Land" itself.
If we try to connect Richards* theory of emotive 
language with his present critical comments we could 
perhaps make out a case for him, viz., that poetry, even 
if it uses only pseudo-statement to do so, is valuable 
in so far as it leaves us with a certain belief or beliefs 
about the world. Although, in his theory, Richards holds 
that poets do not make assertions, nor should they leave 
us with limited stateable beliefs^, at most with some 
'objectless beliefs' or 'imaginative assents', as a practical 
critic he is forced to evaluate poetry by reference to the 
truth of its implicit or explicit objects of belief. And 
as we saw in the case of Eliot, Richards agrees with Eliot's 
beliefs about our contemporary situation as embodied in his 
poetry. I am tempted to say that Richards's belief in 
the possibility of 'objectless beliefs' is merely an 
'objectless belief' or rather a feeling of conviction or a
1. T.S.Eliot: The Sacred Wood, p.100."The only way of 
expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 
'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, 
a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula 
of that particular emotion; such that when the external 
facts, wnich must terminate in sensory experience, are given, 
the emotion is immediately evoked."
2. A Background for contemporary Poetry.
3. cf. P.L.C., Ch.33:
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belief without any actual referent.
Finally, Richards regards "The Waste Land" not only 
as a vivid and convincing presentation of our situation 
in a fitting light, but, because of this, also as a practical 
guide to action; "it has shown the way to the only solution 
of these" (i.e. our) "difficulties."^
These then are Richards' standards of poetic 
value as they emerge from his analysis of Eliot's poetry:
1. That poetry is important for what it makes us 
feel independently of v/hether we understand it. Hence it
does not matter whether or not there is a coherent intellectual 
thread through his poetry in general, because we must 
feel, not think.
2. That Eliot's importance is due to his relevance 
to the current social problems, to his correct portrayal
of them, his correct diagnosis of their origin, and his
suggestion of their correct practical solution.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that
these two standards contradict each other.
In discussing Hardy's importance as a modern
poet, Richards compares him to the great tragic poets in
that "only the greatest tragic poets have achieved an
equally self-reliant and immitigable acceptance"of death
2
and the "indifferent universe."
1. "A background for contemporary poetry".
2. "A background for contemporary poetry.
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Richards here implies (I think rightly) that 
the great tragic poets are not only great poets hut also 
great men, at least in so far as their personalities emerge 
from their work, and it is this that makes them "great 
tragic poets". But, since we are well aware that there are 
also great poets who are not great men, the distinction 
between a 'writing self and the historical man himself, 
is relevant at this point; the self which is important 
for the value of a nan's books is his writing self, and 
what we judge are the values he gets into his books, not 
his life.
The great tragic poets, says Richards, have looked 
on human life, on the world of men and the world of nature, 
and have become convinced of its inexorable laws. They 
know life and accept it as it is, they do not count on 
any divine will and salvation, (Aeschylus? Racine in 
Athalie?) but rely on themselves alone; and through their 
tragedies they make others feel and accept as well that 
man lives, plays his part, and dies, and that in the 'indiff­
erent universe' the drama of man's life can leave no 
mark.
To sum up, Richards' standard of the value of 
the great tragic poets (and Hardy) is again their capacity 
to evoke synaesthesis (or catharsis?) by having the 
correct view of life, successfully embodying this view in 
their work.
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In passing from Hardy to poets who had a less 
'tragic* attitude to life - Yeats and Lawrence - Richards 
praises both as being "very serious poets": "neither 
seems to have envisaged the possibility of a poetry which 
was independent of all beliefs, probably because, however 
much they differ, both are very serious poets.
Now in his critical evaluation of Lawrence, • 
Richards really examines the value of his beliefs as 
embodied in his poetry rather than his poetry itself. He 
regards Lawrence*s emotional revulsion from conventional 
morality as valuable, but thinks that as soon as he tried 
to formulate the logical grounds of his attitude "he
2deprived his revolt of the greatest part of its value." ' 
He admits that a modern poet must adopt some attitude 
to the problem of the relation of thought and feeling. 
Indeed, says Richards, "A poet today ... is inevitably 
plagued by the problem of thought and feeling... iïr. 
Lawrence is probably not the last poet who will go astray 
through mistakes as to their natural relation.
Richards thus ascribes the failure of Lawrence 
as a poet to his failure as a thinker and psychologist I 
Throughout, he judges his poetry not by its qualities 
as poetry, but as a system of mistaken beliefs, and thus
1. "A background for contemporary poetry". (My italics)
2 and 3* ibid
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commits the very critical fallacy he repeatedly warned 
against: that of taking poetic utterance as if it were 
scientific statement. Richards says something like this: 
"These are the connections between thought and feeling 
expressed or postulated in Lawrence's work, and they are 
shown by psychological research to be not so simple as, 
or quite different from the view of them we get from 
Lawrence." And then he proceeds to treat Lawrence's 
poetic portrayal of a given situation as if it were a 
statement about it, and hence as either true or false; 
and criticises his poetry as poetry because it is false.
There is probably another reason for Richards' 
regarding Lawrence's poetry as minor poetry. Already in 
The Principles of Literary Criticism, Richards had 
indicated what he took to be the main difference between 
minor and major poetry, between "specialist and universal 
poets", viz. that the sensibility of the former is 
inconsistent with the general development of their 
contemporaries, whereas the sensibility of the latter 
is consistent with it. And he summed up his v/hole view 
of the modern Irish school and of "the exquisite poetry 
of Mr. de la i^ are" as being specialist or minor poetry 
because "its sensibility is a development out of the main 
t r a c k . O n  the other hand he regarded Hardy's and Eliot's 
work as major poetry, because their sensibility was in
1. P.L.C., p.197.
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consonance with that of their contemporaries.
These then are Richards*standards of poetic 
value as they emerge from his analysis of Hardy, Yeats 
and Lawrence:
1. That major poetry must be consistent with the 
general development of 'sensibility'.
2. That major and serious poetry must be based 
on some beliefs, whether religious or philosophic, and 
that in judging the poetry we inevitably take account 
of the beliefs to which it is related. Again this is 
hard to reconcile with the injunction to feel rather than 
think in responding to poetry.
Richards' analysis of G-erard I/Ianley Hopkins' 
poetry (in The Dial, 1926) is most revealing,and discloses 
several value-judgments which are fundamentally different 
from those we could derive from his theory of v a i m .
Lefending Hopkins against the charge of obscurity 
in his poetry, he says:
"There are arguments for some slight obscurity 
in its own right," since "the effort, the heightened 
attention, may brace the reader, and that peculiar intellect­
ual thrill which celebrates the step-by-step conquest of 
understanding may irradiate and awaken other mental 
activities more essential to poetry." This seems an 
Unjustified minimising of the essential character of
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understanding in appreciating the poem, as we can see 
from Richards' usually placing feeling before understanding 
in reading poetry. Even here, where he explicitly allows 
for an intellectual thrill differentiated as such by 
its accompanying an intellectual effort, he explicitly 
says that this is not (very) essential to the poetic 
value of the poem. Its true value is its capacity to awaken 
other "more essential" activities, presumably arising 
from the equilibrium of our impulses.
In his critical assessment of Hopkins Richards
explains that Hopkins' "poetry was for the ear, not for
1 2 the eye " and that "he uses words always as tools" (a
saying strangely reminiscent of Wittgenstein's later
views), and he then goes on:
"I have to confess that The Windhover only became all 
right for me, in the sense of perfectly clear and 
explicit, intellectually satisfying as v/ell as emotionally 
moving, after many readings and several"days of 
reflection."3
This is an explicit account of what gives a poem its 
due value (makes it "all right for me") i.e. its capacity 
to be both intellectually and emotionally satisfying.
The interest of this passage is the unconscious confession 
that the value of the poem was in the poem the whole time, 
when Richards had not yet discovered it, and was not 
changed by his discovery,’ and also that its value depends
1-3. The Dial, September 1926.
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on the possibility that attentive and perceptive readers, 
like Richards, should be able to find something intellectually 
satisfying, etc., in it. This does indeed refer to states 
of mind, but to appropriate states of mind, not actual 
ones. And the actuality of which value is predicated, is 
the poem and not the states of mind.
Richards himself admits this when, pointing to 
"the marvellous third and fourth l i n e s o f  "Spelt from 
SibylTLeaves",
"Her fond yellow hornlight wound to the west, her wild hollow 
hoarlight hung to the height ^
Waste ; her earliest stars, ear1-stars, stars principal, over 
bend us, 2
Fire-featuring heaven."
he calls them "the supreme example" of synaesthesis.^ This 
must mean that the -harmony and equilibrium pertain 
to the words and rhythm and meaning of the lines, and 
not to any actual reader’s state of mind, although 
this should be dependent on the lines read.
Again v/ith Hopkins, Richards finds that the
lines
"Of a rack
Where, selfwrung, selfstrung,' sheathe-and shelterless,
 ^  ^ . thoughts
against thoughts in groans grind."
are good poetry not only because of their technical 
excellence, but because they are a good statement of 
modern man’s and the modern poet's predicament. Again
1-4. The Dial, September 1926.
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we find the poet required to make statements, and true 
ones and Richards praises Hopkins for the directness 
and candidness of his handling experience, which implies 
truth to life as a criterion of poetic value. Finally 
Richards concludes with some interesting remarks concerning 
’beliefs'. We find, for example, that Hopkins' "stature 
as a poet will not be recognized until the importance of 
the Relief problem from which his poetry sprang has been 
noticed." And later that "like the rest of us, whatever 
our beliefs, (Hopkins) needed a change in belief, the 
mental attitude, itself.
But why Hopkins needed a change in his mental 
attitudes , and why this need should be relevant to his 
stature as a poet cannot be understood except when we 
recognize that Richards regards the value and importance 
of a poet as depending upon the truth and importance of 
his beliefs.
In his general critical assessment of contemporary 
poetry, Richards takes the view that it "must have sprung 
from the contemporary situation. It must correspond to 
the needs, impulses, attitudes, which did not arise in 
the same fashion in the past", and moreover, in judging 
the value of this poetry "criticism also must take notice 
of the contemporary situation"; "We cannot leave these
1. Richards: "On Gerard Hopkins", The Dial, Sept.1926.
177
changes out of account in judging modern poetry". The 
job of the modern poet, says Richards, is faithfully to 
portray our attitudes, rather than our opinions; "V/hat 
we have to consider is not men's current opinions but 
their attitudes - how they feel about this or that as 
part of the world." And Richards goes on to explain that 
by men's attitudes he means "what they are prepared to 
sacrifice for what, what they trust, what they are 
frightened by, what they desire. To discover these things 
we must go to the poets".^
This seems to show that Richards was aware 
of the near-inconsistency of his views about poetry and 
thinks he can evade it by distinguishing between expressing 
attitudes which cannot be true or false and expressing 
opinions and views as to facts which can be true or false. 
But this distinction is not helpful if any standard of 
fittingness is to be applied to attitudes because this 
v/ould refer directly to the truth or falsehood of the 
supposed facts towards which the attitudes are adopted. 
(There more to fittingness but there is at least this.) 
Richards'final judgment of the value of contemporary 
poetry and poets is pragmatic and utilitarian, viz. 
they are valuable according to the amount of change they 
produce or fail to produce in us by means of their poetry: 
"The poets are failing us, or we them, if after reading
1. "A background for contemporary poetry" (i^ly italics)
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them we do not find ourselves changed". But does Richards 
consider the direction of the change sufficiently?
We shall now try to summarize Richards* actual 
standards of poetic value as used in his assessment of 
some modern and contemporary poets:
1. That in poetry, feeling is primary and 
thought is secondary; that we must respond to it without 
first trying to think what the poet is saying and thus to 
rationalise our response.
2. That therefore the value of the poem is not 
in its * doctrine' or any logical scheme hut in the 
"unified response" it accords to the right kind of 
reader.
3. That nevertheless, the poem must spring from 
and reflect the contemporary situation.
4. That therefore the value of the poem lies 
in its correct presentation of the human situation and 
its presentation or suggestion of the correct solution
T
of its difficulties.
5. That the kind of beliefs held by the poet 
determine the value of his poetry (thus Lawrence's 
mistaken beliefs weakened his poetry whereas Hardy's 
was enhanced by his correct beliefs about nan's fate
and place in the universe).
1. ibid.
2. P.L.C., p.290.
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6. That major or universal poetry reflects the 
main trends of the development of 'sensibility'.
7* And that on the other hand, minor or specialist 
poetry only reflects the particular sensibility of the 
poet or of a minority.
8. And one point which is never explicitly 
stated but is implicit in all Richards' judgments on 
contemporary poetry - that the 'content' of the poem is 
both aesthetically and morally relevant for our value- 
judgment.
9. Finally that good poetry must have a 
practical, ascertainable effect, and that the value of 
the poetry will vary with the value of the effect.
So far I have not commented in detail on the 
above views. I shall now do so, at the same time comparing 
(and contrastixg ) them with Richards' other views ; first 
those based on his theory of poetic language as emotive, 
and secondly those based on his psychological theory of 
value, or theory of synaesthesis.
The first two considerations listed above derive 
directly from Richards' theory of the two uses of language, 
viz. referential and emotive, with the corollary that in 
poetry the language used is essentially emotive. It will 
be remembered that Richards had asserted that "A poem
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has no concern with limited and directed reference. It 
tells us, or should tell us nothing.Thus for Richards, 
"The V/aste land" was a godsend, since it seemed to justify 
his theory that a poet is making (or ought to make) no 
particular references (i.e. to a particular primrose or 
a particular office-girl) or ordinary limited statements; 
that at most he is making (or ought to be making) only 
general references by means of his vivid and convincing 
presentation of a situation. And that if the poet is
successful he must leave us in a state of "imaginative
2  ^assent" or "objectless belief" so that the question of
its truth or falsehood does not or ought not to arise.
Richards* practical judgment on the primacy of feeling
in Eliot's poetry was in consonance with his theory that
"A direction of the will and a development of feeling
often seem to me in reading poetry to come before any
sufficient cognitive apprehension of an object upon which
this will and feeling are directed.
But we may find it difficult to understand how 
volition and fe’eling can take place in a vacuum, without 
an object towards which our will is directed or by which 
our feelings are aroused. Moreover, the remaining 
considerations listed above, embodying Richards' assumption
1. M.M. , p.270.
2. Richards :’Belief, The Symposium, October 1930.
3. P.L.C., p.280 and of. Chapter i, p.145-
4. Richards :"Belief", The Symposium, October 1930.
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that what a poem does, "or should do, is to induce a 
fitting attitude to experience"^, prove hy reference to 
Richards himself that this cannot be done merely by means 
of pseudo-statements which refer to no particular objects 
of experience. His practical critical criterion that a 
poem must spring from and reflect the contemporary 
situation, the emotions and attitudes of people, the 
things they value, their desires, hopes and fears, 
requires some correspondence between the poem and life, 
some implied statements about life which must be true.
Secondly, if the value of a poem depends on its 
correct presentation of the human situation and its 
capacity to evoke the fitting attitudes towards it, the 
attitudes involved cannot simply depend on the synaesthetic 
ordering of undirected (objectless) impulses. Therefore 
the occurrence or non-occurrence of synaesthesis in the 
right (or any other kind of) reader, cannot in itself be 
a criterion of aesthetic value; and we saw that in the 
case of Hopkins,Richards actually, perhaps in desperation, 
attributed the value of the poem to the synaesthesis 
somehow present in the poem, and not to his own response 
to it. Finally, we have seen also that his declared 
criterion of psychological value, i.e. the maximum order 
and coordination among maximum unfrustrated impulses,
1. M.M., p.270.
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could never become a guide to practical critical judgment 
and appreciation, and was, in fact, never used even by 
Richards himself.
How then do Richards' practical standards or 
criteria of value contrast with his theoretical ones?
He uses, I believe, a double criterion of 
aesthetic and ethical value, i.e. his implicit questions 
are two :
1. Is this a good poem? i.e. does it give an 
imaginatively adequate expression of the poet's meaning? 
(aesthetic criterion;.
2. Is this poem valuable for our generation?
i.e. does it give us an adequate statement of our crisis 
of beliefs, both religious, intellectual, and emotional, 
and could it thus become a means to its solution? (ethical 
criterion).
If this is a fair comment, we see that far from 
judging the value of a poem by totting up the number 
of satisfied or frustrated impulses, Richards actually 
makes a single ultimate value-judgment comparable to that 
made by any philosopher propounding a teleological system 
of ethics. And in fact we find him stating this in so 
many words. In the Appendix A "On Value" in The Principles 
of Literary Criticism he says : That the most worth-while 
achievement and that by reference to which all other valuable
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achievements are valuable is an attitude to life combining 
the maximum response to the maximum variety of its desired 
aspects co-ordinated so as to afford the minimum frustration 
of any other such responses*
But such a kind of aesthetic Utilitarianism (if 
1 may call it so) has no determinate meaning unless 
a basis for measuring response-quantities against scope- 
of response-quantities is provided. It has of course a 
rule-of-thumb meaning (in which it is fairly traditional 
as the measure of the appeal of great literature - of 
general relevance, illuminating interest and intense 
emotional effect) which Richards uses in his own literary 
criticism,. But he has attempted to make it scientifically 
determinate by talk of homogeneous atomic impulses v/hich 
could be quantitatively measured if we could isolate them, 
and in terms of which the scope-of-response value would 
reappear in quantitative terms. We have seen that he 
has to abandon this attempt almost immediately as based 
on an ideal abstraction. Moreover, though he never 
acknowledges this clearly, his theory of value in terms 
of synasthesis is not a scientific descriptive account 
of what people ^  value but his own judgment as to what 
they ought to value. Hence the oddity of combining an 
apparently scientific descriptive synaesthesis-theory 
with a condemnation of stock-responses.
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Also he has in fact further value-judgments in 
the background, limiting the 'desirable' aspects of life: 
he would probably reject the work of a Imrquis de Sade, 
even if it did produce synaesthesis, as valueless, because 
it arises from a distorted view of life and because it 
portrays as desirable its 'undesirable* aspects. On the 
other hand, since as I have shown Richards usually judges 
literature by a double standard of aesthetic and ethical 
value, he would probably accept a book like Henri Alleg's 
"La Question" as valuable because, although it describes 
man's bestial cruelty to man, its intention is essentially 
moral - as a protest on behalf of the dignity of man.
V/e see, in fact, that Richards, in his practical 
judgments never applies his psychological theory of value.
He never judges the poem as good or bad by considering 
the quantity and organisation of his impulses, but, like 
all of us, by considering the kind and range of values 
the poem embodies - aesthetic or formal values and 
ethical or life-values. As a literary critic, Richards 
has left (consciously or unconsciously) his psychological 
theory of value, and has returned to a "hierarchical 
organization of choices",^  though perhaps not metaphysically 
based, of the good and true and beautiful.
Richards' practical criticism and his constant 
preoccupation with the problems of "Poetry versus Science"
1. Richards: Speculative Instruments, p.142.
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and "Poetry versus Belief" reveal, as Eliot puts it, 
that Richards "is engaged in a rear-guard religious action" 
("Somewhat in the spirit of 'religion without revelation'.")^ 
Whether we agree or disagree with Eliot's interpretation, 
it is clear, I think, that Richards is really much more 
concerned with the function of poetry in the crisis of 
beliefs and the crisis of Western culture in general, 
than with their specific expression by different modern 
poets. He believed that the underlying cause of this 
crisis was "the Neutralisation of Nature, the transfer 
from the Magical View of the world, to the scientific."
He believed "that Poetry, together with the other Arts 
arose with this Alagical View" and he was naturally led
to the conclusion which he dreaded most, namely, "that
2
Poetry may pass away with it."
(In his Autobiography Lions and Shadows,
Christopher Isherwood describes the consternation of the 
students during a Literature lecture at Cambridge, when 
Richards announced: "According to me, it's quite possible 
that in fifty years' time, people will have stopped writing 
poetry altogether.
After all, Richards might well be right!)
1. T.S.Eliot: The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, 
p.135.
2. Richards: A Background for Contemporary Poetry.
3. op.cit., p.l2l.
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This fear, the fear that exact knowledge and a
scientific viev/ of the world were about to oust poetry
and would make poetic inspiration irrelevant, seems to
have been the mainspring of Richards' long struggle to
prove by all means at his disposal - both theoretical
and practical - that we could still change the course of
events. His whole attitude towards poetry was one of
"intense religious seriousness"^ and he probably
thought of himself as a Crusader, albeit for a cause
v/hose success was doubtful; and he self-consciously
reminds us that he is writing on poetry "in an age v/hen,
in the majority of social circles, to be seriously
2
interested in art is to be thought an oddity."
Still, if he could help in the rehabilitation 
of Poetry, being thought an oddity (by the Philistines 
presumably) seemed to Richards not too high a price to 
pay. He v/as deeply convinced of the need man has for 
poetry; he knew that throughout the ages poetry had given 
voice to man's deepest hopes and fears, his dreams, his 
mortal and immortal longings. Therefore he expects great 
poetry to treat of man's age-long (if not necessarily 
eternal) problems :
1. Eliot: op.cit., p.132.
2. Richards : P.L.C., p.287*
187
"1. Man'8 loneliness (the isolation of the 
human situation).
2. The facts of hirth and of death, in their 
inexplicable oddity.
3. The inconceivable immensity of the Universe.
4* Man's place in the perspective of time.
,5* The enormity of his ignorance.
These then are the life-values Richards demands 
of poetry, and probably of great literature as well.
This is indeed very far from judging a poem "according 
to the need of the moment," or in terms of order and 
interdependence of impulses evoked or satisfied by it.
As they stand, these criteria of value might 
have universal and eternal relevance only because they 
are so general as to be vacuous. As Eliot asks: "In what 
sense is ¥ian in general isolated, and from what? What 
is the 'human situation'?" And on the second point he 
ironically comments* "I’cannot see why the facts of birth - 
and of death should appear odd in themselves, unless we 
have a conception of some other way of coming into the 
world and of leaving it, which strikes us as more natural. 
But my main criticism of these five points is that they 
clearly do not involve any values of an aesthetic nature. 
Although many great poets have, in fact, treated some of 
these general problems, many mediocre poets have done the 
same. It is surely the content and the way it is handled,
1. P.O., p.290.
2. do p.290.
3. T.S.Eliot, op.cit.,pp.132,133.
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the formed content, that makes us distinguish the 
aesthetically good in poetry as in the other .arts. And 
if Richards intended to provide us v/ith "a technique or 
ritual for heightening sincerity,he seems to have 
overlooked the fact that we can be just as sincere 
(in the ordinary non-technical sense) in our appreciation 
of the second-rate as of the best poetry.
I should like to summarise now Richards' view 
of poetry as a practical literary critic: It is that the 
function of poetry is both to present 'the human situation' 
and by its emotively forceful presentation to work on 
people's attitudes towards it so that they improve it.
2And in his credo that Poetry is capable of saving us 
from "mental chaos", he aligns himself with Ivlatthew 
Arnold and all those who regarded poetry as a means to 
moral regeneration.
On the analogy of a famous saying, I should 
venture to say that Richards believes that poets have 
usually only interpreted the v/orld but the point is to 
change it.
In an age like ours where many artists disclaim 
moral responsibility for their work because it expresses 
their own unconscious or the 'collective unconscious';
1. P.O., p.290.
2. Richards :"Science and Poetry", p.83.
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in an age where every day some nev/ movement in art is 
initiated, to die as rapidly away; where conformism to the 
latest fashion in 'advanced* taste demands the rejection 
of standards in art (since art as an expression of pure, 
irrational emotion admits of no standards^) - in such an 
age Richards' doctrine of poetry embodies a positive and 
progressive view. It is only to be regretted that his 
subjective, pseudo-scientific theory of value and its 
terminology obscured what was best in him.
Richards' theoretical views have no actual or 
possible connection with his critical practice, and our 
refutation of the former was only a logically necessary 
step to our acceptance of the latter.
1. For example: "An American called Corso, who has written 
verses in praise of nuclear weapons, stated in a recent 
interview: "Our poetry is V/liam-bam, whatever comes into 
our mind. That's our message." Quoted by R.Reynolds in 
The New Statesman, 5th July, 1958.
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Summary of Richards' theory of value and of poetry, 
as expounded in the foregoing five chapters.
1) A value judgment is a report of a valued experience.
2) A valued experience is a unified attitude to life's 
demands - synaesthesis.
3) This is physiologically due to the organisation of 
our impulses, i.e. the maximum order among maximum 
unfrustrated responses to stimuli.
4) This experience is so far only identifiable by 
introspection.
5) But upon it can be based a descriptive psycho- 
physiological theory of value.
6) Only so will we free our literary criticism from 
metaphysical vacuity.
7 ) To do so we must 1r*eat works of art as sets of 
experiences occasioned by what we commonly call the v/ork 
of art. These experiences can then be measured psycho- 
physiologically to give them merit-rating.
Objection; This wDuld be a purely personal,
^  singular judgment of the experiences occasioned by one
/ reading of a poem in one person. No other value-judgments wcuLd
be possible, except generalisations of these.
Further objection; In particular there would be no
sense to the question:"Am I reading as much into the poem
as, and not more than, should be read into it?"Nor coOd the
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answer to the question "Is the (unified) attitude occasioned 
in me by the poem based on an apprehension of true beliefs 
about the world?", matter, in assessing the value of the 
attitude. Yet the notion of synaesthesis is so developed 
that the most valuable experience would be a coherent 
unified :attitude towards all the truths there are. (Hence 
Richardsdemand for a poetry with themes of perennial 
interest. )
8) That such an attitude based on the whole of reality 
is the only measure of value, all other valuable things 
being such either according as they approximate to it, or 
according as they have the general effect of disposing 
us to approximate to it. (Here Richards is like any other 
teleological philosopher.)
9) That what we in fact value"is an attitude like this \ /
^    * (
in being unified, but prone to be unified only in respect
of a partial grasp of reality and a large element of
I
false or short-sighted beliefs; (hence his condemnation 
of stock-attitudes); that ideally the scope and intensity 
of various actual attitudes is a matter of psychological
fact and provides a scientific descriptive theory of value,
whereby to evaluate objects evoking such attitudes.
Objections ; 1. Are all attitudes equally valuable
providing they are equally broadly based and equally 
unified?
2. Is all art valuable only by reference
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to its evoking this kind of response?
I ■>'
V 10) That therefore we can derive a theory of poetry
from its aim; a poem is good in so far as it evokes an 
attitude approximating to that of the unified acceptance 
and (or) understanding of the whole of reality. The 
criteria of valuable poetry are therefore: 
i. powerful effect,
ii. scope of truths assimilated and truth of these, 
iii. direction of unified attitude towards
acceptance and (or) control of 'reality'.
11) That this powerful effect (10(i)) depends on the 
emotive effect of the mere presentation of certain aspects 
of life in such a way that we are led to refer them 
generally to reality and adopt a unified attitude (10(iii)) 
towards it in consequence. (Hence Richards' requirement 
that modern poetry should be currently relevant.) But 
with the advance of science and the scientific approach 
to sociology and psychology this emotive (magical) effect 
may fall into disrepute and fail. Richards has an ambivalent 
attitude on whether this is good or bad for poetry and 
for the people who read and enjoy it.
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The moralist: "He wants to know what is good in
what is good that makes it good; and the whole wretched 
difficulty is that one is forced to reply either that 
what is good in what is good makes the good in what 
is good good, or that it is, in fact, made good by things 
which are not in the least good at all. " (William H. Grass: 
"The Case of the Obliging Stranger". Philosophical Review, 
July 1957.)
And beautiful?
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Chapter 6 
A THEORY 0? A3STHSTIC VALUE
a) The aesthetic judgment - a judgment of value
In our examination of Richards* theory of aesthetics 
we saw that it originated with an unreal dichotomy to 
which Richards' theory of language committed him, viz. 
that *X is beautiful* must be either an ordinary statement 
of fact or an emotive noise. Richards chose the former and 
argued that the aesthetic judgment is a judgment of 
psychological fact rather than of metaphysical fact. We 
saw that Richards substituted for the original judgment 
*X is beautiful * what he takes to be its expanded synonym 
- *X induces synaesthesis* (where this is a psychological 
fact), and made it the basis for his descriptive scientific 
theory of value. Granting his equations, this science 
v/ould still only be a science of what people in fact 
value, not of what is valuable. The development of linguistic 
analysis has shown that the logic of a value-term like 
'beautiful* is far more complex than Richards and other 
defenders of 'emotivism* realised. Let us therefore 
consider some of those specific features of 'beautiful* 
as a value-term and the features of the value-judgments 
where it is used.
Ever since the time of Socrates the quest for
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Truth, Goodness, and Beauty has been regarded as the 
special field of the philosopher. The quest for the proper 
understanding of these notions has been long and tortuous 
and not altogether as barren as those modern thinkers 
who decry Metaphysics believe. Even if some of the problems 
of the philosopher have turned out to be pseudo-problems, 
and we no longer ask “What is Truth?" but rather “What 
do we accomplish in various contexts by saying 'this is 
true* or 'this is beautiful'?", we still continue our 
quest, though our method has become more down-to-earth 
and our object of inquiry more limited.
In this respect. Logic and Ethics have fared 
better than Aesthetics, probably because of their greater 
impact on practical thinking and on conduct. Beauty was 
the last of these three great terms to be brought dov/n 
from its pinnacle, and even in our time idealist aestheticians 
like Groce, Carritt and Collingwood pursue their quest 
for the essential nature of Beauty or Art.
I shall pose our initial question in another way 
and shall probably arrive at different conclusions. I 
shall not look for a universal property, Beauty, common 
and peculiar to all those objects in which it supposedly 
inheres, nor shall I assert categorically (as do the 
naturalists ) .that 'beauty' is merely a shorthand term 
for a list of observable characteristics. I shall stai-t 
from a concrete example of an aesthetic judgment and shall
igrj
try to work out its implications, and shall, I hope, 
justify the assumption that it does fairly represent all 
judgments of its kind. My question, then, is: “What makes 
any judgment an aesthetic one?"
When I say: “'St.Agnes' Eve' is a beautiful poem"
I am making an aesthetic judgment. How do I know? Let us 
suppose that my ansv/er is: “Because it is a judgment about 
a poem, i.e. a work of art, which is the special object 
of which any judgment is an aesthetic judgment." But then 
what kind of judgment is “This poem is written in Greek" 
and what kind of judgments are: “This mountain is beautiful", 
“This child is beautiful", “This jet air-liner is beautiful", 
“This mathematical solution is a beautiful one"., etc.?
Here v;e surely have a non-aesthetic judgment on a poem, 
and judgments on non-aesthetic objects about which the 
same thing is said as was said about 'St.Agnes', Eve'; 
judgments we- should assume to be aesthetic, since the 
same word, 'beautiful ', is used. Nor need v/e assume that 
these are 'loose' or ' stretched ' uses of the word.. In 
all these cases 'beautiful' could clearly and unambiguously 
mean at least 'not ugly and not neutral in aesthetic 
appeal'. It is, therefore, not the special object of 
judgment by reference to which we can distinguish the 
aesthetic from other types of judgment.
If there is no special object of aesthetic 
judgment, perhaps there is a special quality or characteristic
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common to all the different objects of which aesthetic 
judgments are made; that characteristic in virtue of which 
they are called beautiful? But if we ask, “What is the 
common and peculiar feature possessed by a mountain, a 
child, an air-liner and a mathematical solution in virtue 
of which all are called 'beautiful'“, we find that there 
is no possible ansv/er to such a question. They are called 
beautiful for possessing different features. The word 
'beautiful' cannot serve either to summarize or to 
classify these features.
Then perhaps the differentia of the aesthetic 
judgment lies in the special kind of emotion, which forms 
the ground of the judgment. Richards' theory seems to 
favour this account. Perhaps when I say '“St.Agnes' Eve' 
is a beautiful poem" I simply assert: .“Synaesthesis has 
occurred". But if this is the distinguishing feature of 
aesthetic judgments, 'synaesthesis' must be a suitable 
name for the very different emotions which, for example, 
a symphony, an epigram and a gesture (all 'beautiful' 
in their way) may cause us; moreover, since the judgment 
that a poem is a bad one is as typically aesthetic as its 
contrary, we should have to find a 'negative synaesthesis' 
to supplement this positive emotion-based account. And 
since the typical emotional result of great works of art, 
if it can indeed be isolated, seems to be paralleled by 
that produced sometimes by mystical experience, hot to say
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drugs, it would seen impossible to regard 'synaesthesis' 
both as a straight!drvmrd description of a certain range 
of emotional responses and as the distinguishing feature 
by reference to which aesthetic judgments are to be 
defined.
V/hen in fact are we likely to have to distinguish 
a judgment as an aesthetic one? Surely when we have to 
justify it. When I say: "'St.Agnes' Eve' is a beautiful 
poem" and am asked, "%y?", I may ansv/er: "Because it 
encourages young lovers to escape from home"; but it can 
logically be retorted: "But you said it was beautiful, not 
that it would have a morally desirable effect 1"
If, however, my answer is; "'St.Agnes' Eve' 
is a beautiful poem because by means of his language the 
poet makes us feel and see (or experience) a special 
atmosphere, transports us to a certain time, a certain 
place, a certain season; because the old nurse, the 
beadsman, the maiden and her lover, as well as the back­
ground of the medieval castle against which they move, 
fit perfectly together, seem perfectly right; therefore 
I call it a beautiful poem", then, although it is possible 
to disagree with the reasons given for my evaluation, 
one would concede, I think, that they are the type of 
reasons or refer to the type of criteria relevant to the 
aesthetic judgment and irrelevant to the moral, social.
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historical, psychological judgments which can also he 
passed on the poem. It is to he observed that the type 
of reasons offered for a judgment give often the best 
means of identifying the experience on which.the judgment 
is grounded. These being my reasons for my judgment, it 
is plainly aesthetic and not moral satisfaction I derived 
from the poem.
If it is the type of reasons offered in explanation 
of a judgment of the type 'X is beautiful' that show it 
to be aesthetic, then Aesthetics becomes, not, as Richards 
hoped, a branch of psychology but the clarification of 
"the principles on v/hich v/e select the special set of 
criteria of value that are properly to be counted as 
relevant to aesthetic judgment or appraisal". This is 
J.O.Urmson's view, and it might appear dry and prosaic 
when compared with the emotive language of many aestheticians, 
including Richards. But Urmson makes it clear that his 
account of the logical analysis of the aesthetic judgment 
must not be taken as excluding emotions as a necessary 
if not sufficient ground for this judgment (in a sense 
which allows us to say that if emotions are absent we can 
adjudge an object as 'aesthetically indifferent'), or as
1. J.O.Urmson; "What makes a situation aesthetic?" The 
Aristotelian Society S.V.1957, p.83.
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implying that our usual aesthetic judgments are, as a
matter of fact, of such pure aesthetic type.We can and 
we do evaluate the same object from many different points 
of view, very often in a single but complex judgment, and 
the type of reasons we adduce to support our judgments 
of an object are the best indication of the point or 
points of view from which we judge it.
If we can now take it that we know at least in 
principle how to distinguish an aesthetic judgment, can 
we go on to consider what my judgment meant? Does the 
judgment *X is beautiful* mean no more than 'From the 
aesthetic point of view, X appeals to me"? Obviously it 
means more. The very fact that we formulate our aesthetic 
judgments by saying 'X beautiful' and not 'X is beautiful 
to me' or 'X appeals to me aesthetically' indicates that 
not purely personally valid standards of judgment are 
presupposed. Vvliat v/ould constitute the validity of such 
standards is a difficult question, but is certainly not 
settled by their general acceptance. That there are or 
are not generally accepted standards is irrelevant to the 
propriety of a use of 'beautiful', though general acceptance 
of such standards as between participants in a discussion
1. "... There is clearly nothing to prevent our satisfaction 
from being multiply-grounded and thus simultaneously 
aesthetic and moral, aesthetic and economic, and so on.". 
ibid., p.79.
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is important for its (derivative) informative effect, 
and for profitable discussion, instead of an interchange 
of claim and counterclaim which gets us nowhere.
This characteristic of presupposing without 
mentioning the use of generally valid descriptive criteria 
shows a use of the word 'beautiful* like a use of the word 
'good' to be evaluative rather than purely descriptive.
The descrip-cive function of such words is minimal; they 
are primarily used to do a different job from the 
descriptive one. Roughly speaking, to describe is primai’ily 
to classify as conveniently as possible for informative 
purposes. To evaluate is not primarily to aim at information 
But evaluation, like description, is a job which can be 
properly and improperly done (as all linguistic jobs can).
The criteria by which a value-word like 'beautiful' 
or 'good' is being used can be set out as descriptions 
to be fulfilled by objects which are to be called 
'beautiful ' or 'good'. But these criteria may v/ell differ 
for different types of objects; they may therefore tell 
us whax is meant by calling X beautiful, (that, for 
example, it, (being an apple) is red, round, and shiny), 
but not what 'beautiful ' means. V/e may say, perhaps, 
'beautiful ' means ’good from the aesthetic point of viev/', 
or simply 'aesthetically good', though there are uses of 
'beautiful' which are more restricted than this, as is 
shown by our tendency to distinguish between, for example.
201
the sublime, or the vividly expressive, and the beautiful.
In any case to call an object 'aesthetically good' 
instead of 'beautiful', does not get us very far, since 
it is the replacement of a specifically aesthetic value- 
term by an even more general evaluative word. But though 
not enlightening when stated in general terms, this 
replacement helps by directing our attention to the relevant 
features of particular uses. For, only the context of use 
(the explanations or justifications offered) can tell us 
in any given use what jobs other than evaluative the 
words 'good' or 'beautiful' are doing there. Of evaluative 
jobs, only such contextual investigation can make clear 
which sort of evaluation is being done.
Thus, "That poem would be good" (for encouraging 
the men) would be moral.
"That man would be good" (for a model for 'Youth 
and Strength*) would be aesthetic.
"That was a good/beautiful stroke" (because it 
scored 4 runs) is probably a sporting evaluation, but if 
the reason given were "Because it was made effortlessly 
with a fine smooth movement and a perfect control and
timing", it would be aesthetic.
R.G.Collingwood's 'beautiful' mutton^ may not have
1.The Principles of Art (0.U.P.194?),pp.38-39* cf."The words 
'beauty', 'beautiful*, as actually used, have no aesthetic 
implication’.'.. "We speak of things as beautiful, with no 
less frequency and no less accuracy, when their excellence 
is one that appeals only to our senses: a beautiful saddle
of mutton or a beautiful claret."...
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had aesthetic appeal, though if it hadn't (e.g. if it 
hadn't looked good as well as tasted good) it is not clear 
why it v/as beautiful rather than good ; but the test v/hether 
a use of the word is aesthetic or not is neither the 
class of objects to which it is applied, nor the quality 
of the object, nor the special emotion evoked by it, but 
the type of reasons or criteria offered in explanation.
I should like to recall here what I said earlier about 
the aesthetic experience of looking at a picture (Chapter 
4b). We notice that many of the judgments which entered 
into (or expressed or were grounded on) this experience 
were not concerned with evaluation but were concerned 
with noticing and understanding the relevance of facts, 
observable or remembered. These would surely count as 
aesthetic judgments but not evaluations, and would be 
formulated as descriptions; but would constitute descriptions 
made relevant to a final evaluative judgment by reference 
to the general criteria on which the judgment depended; 
hence their aesthetic character is again derived from the 
special type of evaluation to which they are relevant. 
Probably most of our comments on works of art (aesthetic 
remarks) are in forms v/hich combine description and 
evaluation in a single predicate - balance, brilliance, 
masterly performance, rhythm, organic unity, academic.
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amateurish, imaginative, conformist, original, repetitive, 
stolid, hesitant, etc.
Now let us try to apply Richards' theory of 
value - or rather theories of value - to an example of a 
value-judgment. According to Richards' original, neurological 
theory of value, when I say "This stroke is beautiful"
I mean "This stroke causes in me certain effects in the 
organisation of my impulses". Thus I cannot be conveying 
any information about 'it', but only about myself, and 
moreover, even the evaluation is not of the object or 
activity, but of my_ states of mind, because these are for 
me the only valuable things. We have here no clear 
indication as to how to differentiate the many possible 
value-judgments some of which were differentiated above. 
According to Richards' later, aesthetic theory of value, 
when I say "This stroke is beautiful" I mean "This stroke 
ought to induce synaesthesis in a sufficiently responsive 
spectator"; yet this judgment can only be justified by 
redirecting attention to 'this stroke ', and is no cleai^er 
(even with the ordinary-impulse explanation of 'synaesthesis') 
than "This stroke is beautiful" except in special cases.
Where Richards clearly goes wrong is in thinking that 
states of mind are identifiable independently of the 
objects and situations evoking them, and hence in thinking 
we can evaluate them independently of these objects and 
situations.
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On Richards' psychological theory of value, 
aesthetic judgment would he reduced to a detailed exchange 
of information about psycho-physiological effects in the 
makers of the judgments. Deprived of its function of 
evaluating objects and perhaps commending them to others, 
the aesthetic judgment v/ould become a simple statement 
or report of psychological fact. My statement "This poem 
is beautiful" becomes "upon my reading this poem the 
effect X has occurred", a statement which could not be 
significantly contradicted by another's statement "Upon 
my reading this poem the effect X has not occurred" 
because both effects X and not-X could be the case.
But such a judgment as the above is of no interest 
to the aesthetician, v/ho must try to find which, if any, 
are the relevant criteria of merit in the aesthetic judgment 
in general, and perhaps give some indication of the criteria 
proper to certain judgments in limited contexts. But to 
say that the aesthetician must set dovm criteria of 
aesthetic merit does not mean that he must set down 
precise defining characteristics p,q,r, such that any 
object which has them must be graded accordingly. For, 
even if we can formulate our reasons for saying of a 
given object, "This is beautiful", this does not commit 
us to any generalised application of such reasons (as 
perhaps is the case with ethical judgments). I might
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say, "H.Moore's sculptures are made beautiful by the 
distortions he employs", where this is recognisably a 
reason for my judgment, yet it does not imply "Any work 
employing distortions (or ’distortions involving holes 
through the middle’) would be beautiful." Admittedly 
this leaves the question as to how it can be a reason 
for the above judgment unanswered. The solution must no 
doubt lie in the extraordinary complexity and precision 
of the complete grounds for any aesthetic judgment on 
any object; a salient feature may be picked out for notice
4-
as especially relevant to this view but by itself it 
will probably be useless as a general criterion.
To sum up the above :
1. "X is beautiful" by itself never entails or 
is entailed by any special description, though in a loose 
sense it implies that there is some special description 
which fits X and which serves as the ground for its 
aesthetic assessment as beautiful.
2. The reasons for grading a given object X 
high aesthetically can be set out as descriptions,
3. But these descriptions cannot be^neralised 
into generally applicable standards so that every object 
which exhibits them must, and no object which does not 
may, be equally evaluated.
There are different criteria regulating our
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judgments that L e Mi s ant hr ope is good and that King Lear 
is good, although we evaluate both of them as good. Our 
emotional response to then is only one of our reasons 
for commending them, the one as being good comedy, the 
other as being good tragedy. And if we compare Le Misanthrope 
v/ith À Mdsummer Night's Dream as being good comedy, 
we must further subdivide our criteria so that we can 
commend the one for different features from those relevant 
in the case of the other.
If then there are no sets of precise and generally 
applicable criteria of v/hat is beautiful, whence do we 
derive our standard of aesthetic value in tragedy, in 
comedy or any other form of literature? Is it just 
something in fact public and commonly accepted, fixed and 
eternal, as we presuppose in expressing the impersonal 
form of an aesthetic judgment, or is it on the contrary 
for ever "suffering a sea-change", here today and gone 
tomorrow, so that our use of this form is misleadingly 
impersonal? In the light of the history of art-appreciation 
we can see that neither the one nor the other is the 
case. Aesthetic, just like ethical criteria, are neither 
absolutely immutable, nor continuously fluctuating. They 
have a relative permanence: at a certain time, at a certain 
stage of cultural and moral development, there are certain 
accepted criteria with reference to which moral conduct
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and works of art are judged. That does not mean that the 
accepted standards of judgment are necessarily the right 
standards. Every moral reformer and every innovator or 
genius in art sets out to change the existing ethical or 
aesthetic standards and to try to establish others in 
their place.
Let us take some examples from the history of 
art-criticism and art-appreciation which corroborate the 
foregoing. My examples come from the different fields of 
music, painting, and poetry.
In the field of the aesthetics of music (and hence 
of music-criticism and appreciation), a revolutionary 
change began with E.Hanslick's book "Vom Ivlfusikalisch- 
Schonen" published in 1854. He was out to overthrow the 
emotive-content theory of music and to prove its autonomy 
as an art-form. It had, he declared, no meaning, no 
reference beyond itself; the only ideas music could express 
were musical ideas: "The theme of a musical composition 
is its proper content." And again: "In the art of music 
there is no content opposed to form, because music has 
no form over and above its cont e n t . I n  view of this 
revolutionary aesthetic it was natural for Hanslick to 
reject programme music or Wagner's musical imitation and 
representation of emotions, as aiming at quite the wrong
l.EHanslick: Vom Musikalisch-Schonen, pp.136, 133 (quoted 
by S.K.Langer in "Philosophy in a New Key", O.U.P.,
1951, pp.237, 225).
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features for musical merit. Whole bodies of music criticism 
now presuppose Hanslick*s view, though it has never totally 
displaced its rival. To understand the descriptive force 
of evaluations of musical works therefore, one must know 
which view of music and therefore which criteria they 
presuppose.
In the early 20th century, Clive Bell and Roger 
Fry brought about a similar revolution in the criticism 
and appreciation of painting, by the establishment of 
new standards of value. They rejected the view that the 
representative element was either important or relevant 
to the value of a painting; and they suggested that its 
value lay in the aesthetic emotion aroused by the 
contemplation of the spatial relations of plastic volumes. 
Art-critics, they held, should not be concerned with 
anything but "with lines and colours, their relations and 
quantities and qualities";^ and in their own criticism of 
different paintings and painters, their actual critical 
judgments and evaluations were (explicitly or implicitly) 
made with reference to these standards.
To turn to another field - poetry. Just as Hanslick 
declared the autonomy of musical significance and Bell and 
Fry declared the autonomy of the significance of visual form, 
Bradley declared the autonomy of poetry. Poetry, he said,
1. Clive Bell, Art, Section 1, Chapter I.
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is for Poetry's sake, "For its nature is to be not a
part, nor yet a copy, of the real world ... but to be a
world by itself, independent, complete, autonomous; and
to possess it fully you must enter that world, conform
to its laws, and ignore for the time the beliefs, aims,
and particular conditions which belong to you in the other
world of reality.
The belief shared by these aestheticians is the
autonomy of the world of art, the separateness of music,
painting and poetry from the ordinary world. Their standard
of aesthetic merit in music, painting and poetry was
formal or non-representative, and their specific judgments
on this or that piece of music, painting, or poetry,
naturally presupposed these standards.
We see therefore that specific critical judgments
are fully intelligible only if they derive from, and
refer back to certain critical standards. How do we
acquire such standards? One answer might be that of
B.C.Heyl: "They are working hypotheses or codified
principles which critics formulate as they study and
appreciate works of art." These critical principles
form "a specific frame of reference towards which specific
2
evaluations are directed."
1. A. C. Bradley: Oxford Lectures on Poetry, p. 5* (Macmillan, 1939)
2. B.C.Heyl: "Relativism again", Journal of Aesthetics and 
Art Criticism Y (1946), pp.54-61.
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The view that v/e derive our standards from the 
study and appreciation of v/orks of art gets the blessing 
of authority from Aristotle's procedure in the Boetics, 
where he was seeking to establish standards of judgment 
for tragedy for the first time. Aristotle's view of 
tragedy is closely related to his general philosophy of
the 'good' life and the means necessary to its attainment.
Yet he insists that a work of art should be judged by
artistic standards, which, in the case of tragedy, he
derived empirically from a detailed study of the 
characteristics of past and current Greek plays. Aristotle's 
specific judgments on different tragedies are made by 
reference to these standards of tragedy.
Yet as is well-known, these standards, or a 
mistaken viev/ of them,were taken to be not empirically 
discovered and applicable to one period but authoritative 
and universally applicable to all tragedy. In the Classical 
period of the 17th century (especially in France), critical 
judgments as to the relative merits of different tragedies 
were of the form: does it or does, it not conform to the 
principles of Aristotle, and in particular does it or 
does it not conform to the famous unities of time, place 
and action? (the first two of which were of course 
mistakenly attributed to him).
At least at such a period there was an accepted
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standard of aesthetic judgment (in this case in tragedy) 
and the critical problem was to apply it in particular 
instances. But whether in fact this simplified the 
critical problem, i.e., whether critical judgments really 
operated in this way, rather than being first made directly 
and then so formulated as to use the Aristotelian framework, 
is perhaps a questionable matter. In any case since 
Aristotle's standards had been derived from Greek plays 
which could only have been written at that particular 
historical time, in that particular socio-political period 
of the Greek city-state, the attempt to uphold them as 
eternally valid, unless supplemented with a gift for 
stretching their application by interpretation, was doomed 
to failure. Revolution built up; other critical standards 
were perforce established because new types of tragedy 
were being written. V/ith the first performance of Victor 
Hugo's Hernani in 1830, the conflict between the Classicists 
and the Romantics was brought into the open. Although 
their controversy was ostensibly about the formal aspects 
of the drama, the adherence to the three unities hallowed 
by Aristotle's authority and the tradition of the French 
Classical tragedy, the true controversy was much deeper; 
it was about the new content the Romantics were trying 
to express, and it was this that determined their new 
dramatic techniques.
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"V/hen Victor Hugo, in the opening lines of ^
Hernani, ventured to refer to an 'escalier dérobe', and 
to put 'escalier' at the end of one line, and'dérobé' 
at the end of the next, he was assailed with the kind 
of virulence which is usually reserved for the vilest 
of criminals. And the abuse had a meaning to it: it 
was abuse of a revolutionary. For in truth, by the 
disposition of those tv/o v/ords Victor Hugo inaugurated 
a revolution. The whole theory of 'rules' in literature 
- the whole conception that there were certain traditional 
forms in existence which were, absolutely and inevitably, 
the best - was shattered for ever. The new doctrine 
was triumphantly vindicated - that the form of express­
ion must depend ultimately, not upon tradition nor yet 
upon a priori reasonings, but simply and solely on the 
thing expressed."T
In contrast to French dramatic literature, the 
Elisabethan dramatists do not seem to have been troubled by 
Aristotelian standards, perhaps for the simple reason 
that they were quite obviously writing different kinds of 
plays. As Lytton Strachey puts it, Racine's tragedy of 
crisis is one of 'concentration' for which the unities 
are perfectly adapted; but the Elisabethan drama in general, 
and Shakespeare's in particular, is one of 'comprehension' 
of varied characters and complex plots, for which the 
unities simply won't do.
In this sense, every genius in his work truly 
creates the standards by which his work and that of 
his followers is judged, by creating new forms, new 
techniques, new effects, and hence different kinds of 
excellence.
1. Lytton Strachey: Landmarks in French Literature, p.149.
(O.U.P.1955)
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Was there a standard for a discussion-play until 
Shaw's plays? No. Was there a standard for the psychological 
drama until The Cherry Orchard by Chekov? No. Was there 
a standard for a modern epic play until Brecht's Caucasian 
Chalk Circle? No. And in our own time were there standards 
for plays like Claudel's l'art age de Midi, not to mention the 
plays of Ugo Betti, Osborne, Beckett, etc. But now there 
are standards of excellence, established by these works, 
and our judgment of this or that play is usually not 
simply; "Is this a good or not a good play?" but: "Is 
this a good or not a good play of its kind?" And in 
adding 'of its kind' we implicitly refer to some standard 
or principle or criteria of a general kind of play by 
which we are judging this one. Thus when I say "'The 
Summer of the Seventeenth Doll' is a good play" I do not 
judge it according to some standard of 'goodness' in plays 
in general, valid for all plays everywhere, nor do I 
judge it as 'good' only according to my own private 
principles, valid only for me here and now. When I unpack 
my judgment it becomes more specific, e.g. "It is a good 
modern serious play", in that it presents dramatically a 
real situation in which the characters convincingly 
conflict, develop, and change ; it asks the important 
question "Must man either live in self-delusion, or in 
loneliness, or is there another possibility?" and it 
presents the answer as evolving out of the play itself.
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Are these then my standards in judging modern serious 
plays?
Yes, these are somë of the standards implied in 
my critical judgments of such plays, and in my discussions 
with others as to the merit of a play, I suppose that they 
too use some such standards. This of course is sometimes 
proved to be a false assumption. It seems indeed that one 
of the current fashions in criticism, especially of 
painting and sculpture, is the replacement of judgments 
purporting to be based on critical standards by more 
•candid* statements of personal like or dislike as the 
sufficient criterion of ?good* and 'bad*. I shall quote 
again Kenneth Tynan's 'credo' as a literary critic:
"I see myself predominantly as a lock. If the key, 
which is the work of art, fits smugly into my mechanism 
of bias and preference, I click and rejoice; if not,
I am helpless. *'
The only accepted principle of reasoning is 'having no 
principles'. Perhaps it is merely making a virtue of 
necessity for, tells us Eric Newton, the art critic of 
the Manchester Guardian,
"The truth is that no adequate vocabulary exists which 
could evaluate the precise quality or talent or genius 
on which abstract art depends. The critic must therefore 
fall back on adjectives that express little more than 
enthusiasm, apathy, or disgust, and leave it to the 
visitor to react in his ovm way. Most of us have a 
personal yardstick for judging a conception of a 
goddess, but there is no expressible standard of
/
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judgment for the excellence of a marbled surface or 
a linear organisation". (Author's italics ).T
To say that there is no expressible standard of 
judgment means that it is impossible to formulate a ground 
for judgment, and that assigning merit to some paintings 
and withholding it from others is impossible too, except 
as a report of a set of personal temperature readings.
V/e have "a personal yardstick for judging a 
conception of a goddess" because we have been familiar 
with goddesses in literature and myth, because we have 
seen them in paintings, etc.; and our personal yardstick 
is such that we can use it for evaluating others' rendering 
of a goddess. But since the abstract painting is represented 
as not representing anything of which we have a concept, 
we have no basis for criticising it except the simple 
one of 'satisfying' or 'unsatisfying'. Thus not only an 
accepted standard for judging abstract painting is 
impossible, but even a personal yardstick is impossible 
as well.
"For example, to transmit the meaning of an 'action 
painting', involving as this does the intrusion of an 
interpreter between what has been called 'utter 
directness' and the spectator, is an anachronism."
V/hat is left to the critic, is to "describe, at length,
1. The Manchester Guardian, 21 May, 1957.
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his pleasurable sensations". In short, "What the critic 
X 'feels', interpreting what the artist has 'felt', is 
in turn registered as a kind of confidential message by 
the 'public'."^ And once we have accepted the view that 
one can express feeling by means of blots and splashes, 
why should we be surprised when the ICA exhibits Congo 
the chimp's 'artistic' experiments?
To sum up; our aesthetic judgments are primarily 
evaluative and derivatively descriptive. To say "X is 
beautiful" means "There are standards or reasons for 
grading X high aesthetically". In so far as these standards 
are generally known and accepted the judgment can be used 
descriptively as true or false. In the past, some aesthetic 
standards were regarded as universally valid (though 
extremely imprecise!) i.e. as objectively correct or 
incorrect. Often these were explained as directly depending 
on a specific philosophy (Plato, Aristotle, Hegel). These 
standards were usually believed to concern (perhaps 
indirectly) observable features of the objects judged. The 
view that standards are derived from and concern reportable 
effects on the person judging, though held in a much more 
subtle form by Hume and Kant, is in its crude form a 
characteristic of our own time. The shift of emphasis 
from the object to the subject, which began with the
1. Peter de Francia, Universities and Left Review, No.l,
1957.
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Romantic writers and critics, has gradually led to a denial 
of the necessity of any hut a personally relevant standard 
in aesthetic judgment. A case in point in this development 
from objective to subjective criteria is the history of 
the judgments passed on Leonardo's "La Gioconda" from 
Vasari to Freud.^ The reasons for regarding the painting 
as valuable or beautiful have been: First, its perfect 
resemblance to a live human being (Vasari); then, its 
incarnation of the eternally feminine (Théophile Gautier 
and Pater saw in it the very symbol of mysterious v/onanhood); 
and lastly, its externalisation of the artist's unconscious 
desires (Freud regarded it as the projection and sublimation 
of the painter's Oedipus complex). It is a remarkable fact 
that the painting is regarded as beautiful by all these 
critics, although the standards they use (verisimilitude, 
adequate symbolisation, embodiment of unconscious desires) 
differ so completely. It might indeed make one wonder C' 
whether we don't think up reasons to fit our judgments ^
(as Kant claims) rather than have reasons which lead us 
to make our judgments. However, so far as logic goes, the, 
fact that reasons are felt to be in place for calling the 
painting beautiful shows that the judgment "X is beautiful" 
presupposes the use of some standard, and in a loose sense 
it implies that there is some special description related
1. G.Boas: Wingless Pegasus, p.211.
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use which fits X. Sometimes we can formulate our 
reasons why X is beautiful; at other times we are unable 
to do so. The judgment "X is beautiful but I cannot say 
why" is not self-contradictory. But even if we can 
formulate the reasons for our judgment, this does not 
commit us to generalising our* judgments. This is perhaps 
the main difference between aesthetic and ethical value- 
judgments. ^
Our ethical and aesthetic standards or principles 
are neither universally and eternally valid nor wholly 
fluctuating and subjective. The aesthetic standards are 
derived from the particular objects^ the works of art. 
in which laymen, critics and artists find qualities which 
they value. These affect us both emotionally and 
intellectually, but our states of mind are not identifiable 
independently of the objects arousing them (as Richards 
seems to think), nor are we directly evaluating them when 
we seem to be or when we are evaluating the objects. Thus 
"X has beautiful structure, tone, design, representational 
content, development of themes, etc." clearly applies to
the object, and not merely to one’s states of mind.
If new arts arise in the future or the existent. 
arts develop techniques for which there is a minimal 
descriptive vocabulary (as in the case of abstract painting)
1. cf. Stuart Hampshire: "Logic and Appreciation" in 
Aesthetics and Language ed. by William Elton.
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and no criterion of judgment except personal like and 
dislike, some sort of critical standard or intelligible 
frame of reference v/ill have to be established. Otherwise 
we shall have to treat all works of this art as equally 
indeterminate in value and all judgments on them will be 
equally purely subjectively valid. This is already 
happening now.
^f this is an accui'ate account of the logic of
an aesthetic judgment let us consider how we come to make
such (logically) complex judgments, \fnat leads us to use
language in a way which presupposes a situation so far
from that which actually obtains?
]_
J.O.Urmson in his analysis of ’good' as our 
most general value-term, has adopted the technical term 
’grading-label’ as being of general application and not 
so emotionally charged as our usual value-terms like 
'good* or 'beautiful'. He showed that in our everyday 
life there are many cases of physical grading (apples, 
cars, shoes) and in most of them our purpose is practical,
i.e. we place these objects in order of some practical
merit, mostly of economic value, i’or illustration he
chooses the case of apples where the purpose of grading
them is their marketing. For this purpose, the Llinistry 
of Agriculture's formula for grading applies (i.e. their
1. J.O.Urmson; "On Grading", I^nd, lix, p.50.
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•grading-laoels* together with the "explicit criteria for 
their employment") must he accepted, because it provides 
the generally applied standards for a specific purpose 
/j (the marketting of apples), shared by all those concerned 
with this business. These are convenient, generally 
accepted standards directed at giving value-words a 
precise descriptive and in that sense informative content. 
If a retailer orders 'Extra Fancy * apples he knows very 
accurately what description of apples he vfill get from 
the producers.
Now in the case of ethical and aesthetic grading, 
the situation is far more complex. In ethical judgments, 
although primarily evaluative and not directed at 
information or description, our pui*pose in making them 
is still usually practical - to guide conduct in certain 
desired ways. But in aesthetic judgments the question 
why we make them at all is difficult to answer. We 
probably make them for various reasons in different 
situations; perhaps just an interest in evaluation, an 
exercise of discriminative appreciation; perhaps to 
express approval or disapproval to others, perhaps for 
encouragement or commendation or the reverse. But what 
is common to ethical and aesthetic judgments is:
1. The impossibility of an ultimate appeal to 
established authority.
2. The absence of generally accepted criteria.
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3* The vagueness of the usual moral and aesthetic 
grading-labels, e.g. 'kind*, 'graceful*.
4. The diversity of aims we have in assigning 
value to actions, to people and to works of art.
There were times when there was an accepted 
authority. The Church in matters of religion and morality, 
Aristotle in philosophy had such authority. Even when 
people rejected them, they did not deny that an authority 
was necessary for establishing and regulating principles 
of conduct and of evaluation. One of the primary conditions 
for the possibility of social communication and cooperation, 
for life in a community, is the acceptance of definite 
criteria for moral judgment within and by that community.
If for example different people in a society held at the 
same time, some that one ought to tell the truth and some 
that one ought not to tell the truth, social life would 
become impossible, for every action of the relevant kind 
could be justified by reference to one of the two contrary 
principles, and blamed by reference to the other.
Only when criteria are accepted can 'grading* 
words be used successfully i.e. can you know not only how 
I evaluate a given object, but what I mean descriptively 
when I use them of it, and can the question as to whether 
they can be applied in a special situation or to a special 
object or feature of it be determinable in the way that an 
empirical question is. (Thus the Ministry of Agriculture
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has set dovm the precise set of criteria for the expression 
'super apple' for those who use its formula.^)
But in aesthetics, the very fact that our aesthetic 
judgments do not have any immediate practical purpose 
and effect, permits different aesthetic criteria to be 
held by different people. Every new aesthetician begins 
by setting up new criteria for the application of the same 
aesthetic value-terms like 'beautiful', 'admirable', 
'impressive*, 'great'. Such criteria are for instance 
concerned with "Significant Form", "aesthetic emotion", 
"empathy","synaesthesis", "symbolic equivalents", "socialist 
realism". Then every work of art which has or produces 
or embodies these significant forms, emotions, movements, 
organization of impulses, symbols, or characters presented 
in a socialist-realistic way (to a greater or lesser 
degree), is graded accordingly as beautiful, indifferent 
or bad. However, in fact, as we have noticed, aestheticians 
and critics, if they are to be any help, must make their 
value-judgments first and then derive a criterion. (They 
may then force and stretch to cover them all so that either 
their taste becomes restricted or their criterion becomes 
vacuous.) Anything at all that Richards finds beautiful, he 
can say produces synaesthesis in him; anything at all that 
Clive Bell feels to be beautiful he can find has significant 
form. But real disagreements about what is beautiful or
1. J.O.Urmson; "On Grading", Blind, lix, 1950. See Section B.
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is not beautiful are nearly always in terms of particular 
qualities of particular works of art whose universal 
relevance to evaluation is not explicitly claimed, and 
not in terms of these vacuous general criteria.
The heterogeneity of aesthetic theories and 
criteria and the multiplicity of self-proclaimed critical 
authorities have been caused by people v/ho feel that they 
have a right to be their own authority ("X is beautiful 
but authoritative critics do not think so" is not 
inconsistent); or by people who are too diffident to 
pronounce any judgment at all, lest it conflict with 
any of the many authorities.("X is beautiful but I do not 
feel it' to be so" and "I do not know whether I ought 
(aesthetically) to like it or not" are current and not 
inconsistent judgments.)
b ) The analysis of an aesthetic judgment
Let us now consider in more detail the jobs 
I may be doing in saying "'St.Agnes' Eve' is a beautiful 
poem."
1. I may be conveying information (perhaps to 
the effect that on my reading of the poem I had a deeply
satisfying experience).
2. I may be expressing approval (in the sense 
that 'beautiful* is usually used to express a favourable
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attitude towards an object).
3. I may be covertly using a standard of 'beautiful' 
poems by which the present poem, in virtue of some
'beautiful-making' descriptive characteristics qualifies 
as beautiful.(If asked for my reasons for calling it 
beautiful, I should enumerate these characteristics 
of the poem as at least the necessary conditions for my 
value-judgment).
4. I may be simply evaluating it, deciding that 
it is better or worse than other poems.
5* I may be commending the poem for those 
beautiful-making characteristics.
This judgment v/ill have certain contextual 
implications^, e.g. implications as to the descriptive 
characteristics of the poem v/hich a person hearing me say 
"'St.Agnes' Eve ' is a beautiful poem", in a situation v/hich 
he takes to approximate to the normal one, would be 
entitled to infer from my statement, on the ground that 
it would be odd of me (not necessarily logically odd) to 
say that, if I were not also prepared to add(p, q, r , etc., ) 
that 'St.Agnes' Eve' had the beautiful-making characteristics 
of a poem of the appropriate sort. (By 'normal situation'
I mean that no special explanations (referring perhaps 
to the peculiarity of my standards or my hearer's or the
1. P.Nowell-Smith: "Ethics", passim. (Pelican, 1956).For an 
explanation of 'contextual implications' see especially 
pp.8O—87•
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shortsightedness of current standards or the difficulty 
of understanding the poem in order to appreciate it etc.) 
are to be understood in the situation.) It would be odd 
of me to say, for example, "’St.Agnes' Eve' is a 
beautiful poem" when I did indeed value it highly but 
because it referred to St.Agnes, my patron saint, and for 
no other reason.
Compared with a more clearly informative judgment, 
for example, "It is a fine day" the greater informativeness 
of this statement is due to there being clearer criteria 
for fine days than for beautiful poems; this in turn 
being due to a more specific and general agreement as to 
preferred weather as against preferred poems.
This difference would be reflected in a difference' 
of status of the two utterances, one making a clearly 
true-or-false statement (in accordance v/ith agreed 
criteria) where 'fine' has a descriptive meaning independent 
of approval, meaning 'not wet', and the other not making 
a clearly true-or-false statement because there are no 
such agreed criteria, but only an evaluative statement.
If the reasons given for making the judgment are proper, 
(aesthetically adequate) reasons, then we are justified 
in concluding that the judgment was right or wrong (i.e. 
with reference to those reasons).
In any situation, given my criteria and the
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object, my judgment necessarily follows from them or is 
inconsistent with them. This is what makes the criteria 
criteria.
This last point brings up an important but 
difficult question, viz., "What is the logical character 
of aesthetic standards? Are they universal or particular, 
or neither?" On this point, as I said in the first part 
of this chapter, an aesthetic judgment presupposes some 
standards as being valid for other judges, though not u
necessarily for other objects; that we must allow different 
criteria for'different kinds of objects, and even for 
different objects; that these criteria will not be univer­
sally and eternally valid’ for all objects (because they 
would then have to be formulated so vaguely as to be 
vacuous), sometimes not even more generally than for the 
one object judged; but they must in some sense be valid 
for everyone judging (or perhaps rather for everyone 
with a similar cultural background), and perhaps relevant 
for objects of a 'kind* (though this may only be definable 
by reference to the one judged ("Plays like this one)); also 
that there are some criteria relevant to, and applicable 
only within, different art-forms; and within the same 
art-forms only to certain artists, genres, schools, and 
cultures, (e.g. we use different criteria for the appraisal 
of Egyptian and Greek sculpture).
It may be held that this presupposition is
•'if-
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unjustified - that there are no standards which can be 
considered valid in any other sense than that the person 
using them in fact uses them, no doubt in virtue of his 
personal preferences. If this were true it would mean 
that by its logic the impersonal form of value-statement 
is always misapplied; is always misleading. This seems 
an unduly pessimistic position to adopt; it seems possible 
to agree that there are various standards for which good 
reasons can be offered which can for various art-forms 
and within various cultural groups be regarded as valid, 
and as properly presupposed by impersonal value-judgments 
in those fields.
This kind of position is I feel the only possible 
one if one tries to avoid the extremes of absolutism on 
the one hand and those of subjectivism in all its guises,
/on the other. An example of the currently popular letter 
type of view, is given by Stuart Hampshire, who holds a 
work of art to be gratuitous, and the question "V/hy is 
this work of art ugly?" to be senseless; he naturally rejects 
aesthetics as non-existent: every work of art must be 
judged individually and there is no possible relation 
between a particular judgment (on a particular work of 
art) and a general formulation of its grounds.^
In his theory Richards holds the same position,
1. Stuart Hampshire: "Logic and Appreciation" in Aesthetics 
and Language, ed. by V/illiam Elton.
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both in his psychological and aesthetic account of 
value-judgments. I have shown that in his theory of value 
Richards* fallacy is the logical fallacy of confounding 
description with evaluation. Richards indeed thought that 
his treating evaluation as psychological description was 
an original discovery as to the correct way to analyse 
evaluation. I have tried to make it clear that though an 
evaluative judgment often in its own way informative, it 
is the primary purpose of the two linguistic jobs which is 
different - the one to describe, the other to evaluate.
If, following Richards, the statement »'*St.Agnes* Eve* 
is a beautiful poem" is merely taken to mean "An aesthetic 
experience has occurred", or even, as Richards does,
"A certain emotional effect in me, which is valuable to me, 
has occurred", we could neither agree nor disagree about 
the truth-value of this judgment. We could take the state­
ment as registering a subjective experience, provided the 
person making the statement does not lie about his 
experience. There is no necessary connection between 
any one subject's mental experience as such and an 
evaluation of a work of art as such.
Against this extreme aesthetic subjectivism, 
which necessarily leads to the rejection of any objective 
standards in art, (although in fact it did not lead 
Richards himself, or anyone else, to reject objective
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standards) I am trying to uphold the contrary position, 
namely, that these standards are not only possible but 
necessary. I do not mean that in order to achieve para- 
scientific reasoning in aesthetics we must agree to 
pretend that there are objective standards, or agree to 
persuade ourselves that generally accepted standards are 
authoritative, (as often happens with moral standards), 
but I mean that there are standards of judgment which 
ought to be generally accepted because they are the right 
ones aesthetically - not morally or socially or metaphysic­
ally or personally. If this is so, then the aesthetician*s 
job is to distinguish (and help to distinguish) the 
proper criteria for aesthetic judgments.
Despite the subjective character of his 
theoretical position, and particularly in his study of 
literary judgment in Practical Criticism, Richards goes 
some way towards doing this in rejecting many of the current 
critical judgments on poetry as aesthetically irrelevant. By 
a painstaking analysis of his students* critical judgments 
on twelve poems, Richards found they exhibited a certain 
number of "fixed conventionalised reactions"^ which he 
called "Stock Responses". Although adduced as reasons 
in support of critical judgments on a poem (or any other 
work of art), they were usually not aesthetically relevant
1 .  P . O . ,  p . 240.
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at all, but depended on, for example, reference to 
personal associations ("This landscape is beautiful - 
it reminds me of the holiday I spent there"), or to 
political and religious preconceptions and prejudices 
("The Hound of Heaven is a bad poem - there is no God"). 
Richards maintains that such stock-responses distort the 
effect of the poem by leading us to read into it what is 
not there, and to fail to appreciate what there 
because we are "setting up an irrelevant external standard".^  
Although we may agree with his justified rejection 
of many critical judgments on poetry as being aesthetically 
irrelevant, this rejection is incompatible with Richards' 
descriptive theory of value. If, when we value X, this 
is because our impulses are coherently organised by 
X, then whether this organisation takes place in virtue 
of a stock-attitude or not, Richards ought on his theory 
to accept it as a fact (since his theory is an 'improvement' 
on the metaphysical theories just because it is based 
on the facts of evaluation). Richards rightly pointed 
out and gave a name to a widely held and mistaken attitude 
towards poetry, but there was nothing in his theory of 
value to entitle him to find fault with "Stock-Responses" 
and stock attitudes, much less to enable him to criticise 
and cure the disease of stock-attitudes. Such a criticism
1. Richards: P.O., p.244.
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and improvement could come about only on a theory which
permits us to point out "within the work of art what makes
it g o o d . W i t h i n  the work - and not within the subject.
(Richards might argue that on his evaluative notion of
synaesthesis, this is by definition an adequately-based
organised response and cannot depend on "stock-attitudes"
which are by definition inadequately based. But then this
notion of synaesthesis is not that of an empirically
determinable state of mind and is incapable of the sort
of scientific treatment Richards envisaged.)
It has been well said that "If the question of
what is good and what is bad in art cannot be authoritatively
answered, if aesthetic judgment is a judgment no less of
the person pronouncing judgment than of the thing judged,
and if there is no quarter to which to look for a final
2
decision between conflicting judgments," the result must 
be chaos in the arts, and the end of intelligible 
discourse about works of art. We can escape this danger 
(which seems near enough), only if we agree that there 
are in fact objective standards within our age and 
cultural environment to which appeal can be made in i
making impersonal value-judgments.
The belief in objective standards does not conflict
1. Morris Weitz: Philosophy of the Arts (Cambridge, Blass. , 
Harvard University Press, 1950), p.l94*
2. L.Buermeyer; Review of D.W.Prall: "Esthetic Judgment",
The Symposium, July 1930.
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in any v;ay with the belief that they are only relatively
stable. Within the specific frame of reference which these
critical standards constitute, specific value-judgments
can be shown to presuppose these standards, and can there-
fore "become universally comprehensible."^ If this is
possible, then aesthetics has no mean job to do. And if
we still find reason to complain that even so, our
aesthetic judgments will neither be scientifically precise
nor universally valid, we must realise that we demand the
impossible. As Ai-istotle said, "Our* discussion will be
adequate if we are content with as much precision as is
appropriate to the subject-matter; for the same degree
of exactitude' ought no more to be expected in all kinds
of reasoning than in all kinds of handicraft... Let
each of the views put forward be accepted in this spirit,-
for it is the mark of an educated mind to seek only so
much exactness in each type of inquiry as may be allowed
2by the nature of the subject-matter."
c) Art and Morality 
If this gives a fair account of the logical 
context in which aesthetic judgments function, we may 
proceed to ask: What is the relation between the aesthetic
1. B.C.Heyl: "Relativism Again" in The Problems of 
Aesthetics, qd.by S.Vivas and M.Krieger, New York 1953).
2. Aristotle :^Nicomachean Ethics, Bk.I, 3, 1094 C.
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and the moral judgment, or, if put into a more general 
form, what is the relation between Art and morality, a 
proolem that has occupied thinkers from the earliest time 
of artistic creation to the present day. The fact that the 
problem has not yet been solved must not daunt us because 
it only suggests that every age and every generation 
must pose it and solve it anew.’..
Morality and art belong to our world, to the 
life of man in society and are the products of human 
activity. By morality I do not mean mere law-abidingness 
but the principles on which people decide on their more 
reflective actions and justify them. Thus a person's j 
morality could be thought of as the general principles 
of conduct he sincerely held to indicate how one ought 
to live. Formulating these principles would be one way 
of describing the Way of Life he approves of (cf.R.M.Hare: 
"The Language of Morals", passim) and morality could 
generally be said to be "how one ought to live" (which, 
without further specification is indeed a descriptively un- 
inf ormative definition). But detailed specification in 
general terms is impossible owing to the infinite variety 
of particular situations, to which such principles have 
to be applied with moral judgment. Hence, though these 
moral principles record how men think they ought to act 
in general, we find that the literature of a given period 
gives a more vivid portrayal of the principles in operation
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in such particular cases, and thus can he the most 
"articulate formulation of life"^ made hy the men of that 
period. In this case I refer not to the whole vast field 
of literature in general, but only to what is called 
'great art'..We commonly distinguish between a good work 
of art and a great one. In the first case our judgment 
is primarily aesthetic, and we usually mean that the work 
is effective, technically finished, well-organized, etc. 
without any reference to the subject-matter and the 
moral values or the "Weltanschauung" presented and 
communicated by it.
But whenever we talk of 'great art' we usually 
refer to the artistic formulation of a certain vision of 
life found in the great works of literature, portraying 
in operation the principles of conduct and the beliefs 
held by men at the time.
The Psalms, the Book of Job, the books of the 
Prophets, are both an expression of a religious vision of 
life and at the same time great works of literature.
Though in fact the Hebrews of that period often deviated 
from the standard of righteousness, their principles of conduct 
had their finest expression in the Bible, just as the 
Bible, by its very formulation of these principles.
1. T.S.Eliot: The Sacred Wood, p.170.
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influenced their conduct. As Susanne Langer says, "In 
an age v/hen art is said to serve religion, religion is 
really feeding art.
The same intimate connection between art and 
morality we can observe in the art of the Greeks, though 
their 'vision of life' was different from the religious 
vision of the Hebrews, and its artistic expression too 
was naturally different. Thus, says Zitto,
"For generations Greek morality, like Greek military 
tactics, had remained severely traditional, based on 
the cardinal virtues of Justice, Courage, Self- 
restraint, and Wisdom. Poet after poet had preached 
almost identical doctrine - the beauty of Justice, the 
dangers of Ambition, the folly of Violence. It was a 
morality which was indeed no more practised by the 
Greeks than Christianity was practised by all Christendom; 
nevertheless, like Christianity, it v/as an accepted 
standard. V/hen a man did wrong, he was known to be 
doing wrong. Here was the foundation, simple and 
strong, on which a common life could be built ; here 
too is the source of the strength and simplicity of 
classical Greek art.
If we agree with Kitto's analysis, we must admit 
that such aesthetic qualities as strength and simplicity, 
as well as the other characteristic features of Greek art 
as intellectual power, seriousness, vividness and economy 
of description and a passionate interest in man, are 
qualities of that art only because they are qualities 
of the Greek mind, of the Greeks' attitude to life and 
the world.
1. Susanne Langer: Peeling and Form, p. 402.poutledge &■. Kegan
2. H.D.P.Kitto : The ureeics, pp. 165-165• . Paul,1953)
— -------------- (Pelican,1957)
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And if, for example, we want to knov/ the Greek 
'vision of life', the principles and beliefs which governed 
the conduct of Greek people, we go to the Iliad. Zitto 
finds that the central thought of the whole legend of the 
Trojan War is the very essence of the Greek vision, viz. 
that
"Beauty, like glory, must be sought, though the price 
be tears and destruction. Is not this thought at the 
very centre of the whole legend of the Trojan War?
For its hero Achilles, the very perfection of Greek 
chivalry, was given precisely this choice by the Gods. 
They offered him a long life with mediocrity, or glory 
with an early death. Whoever first made this myth 
expressed in it the essence not only of Greek thought 
but also of Greek history."T
Thus the cultural products of ancient Israel 
and of Greece embody in different artistic forms different 
visions of life and of man. This does not mean that if 
we approve of the Hebrew 'vision of life' we must disapprove 
of the Greek vision or vice-versa, since what gives a 
'vision of life' aesthetic value is not what gives it 
moral value; and as I pointed out before, we differentiate 
them by using different criteria of judgment. Yet in 
judging or comparing their works of art we also judge 
the outlook, beliefs and principles expressed through 
them. Our admiration for Greek art, its serenity, its 
poise, its control and its balance is probably both
1. H.B.F.Zitto: op.cit., p.62.
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aesthetic and moral and I can see neither need nor 
possibility for trying to separate the one from the other.
In emphasizing the co-operation between art and 
religion at a certain period of history (though this 
period extends as it does over thousands of years, and 
reaches its final flowering in the paintings of the 
Italian Renaissance) we must not forget what is a vital 
point: it is only if art embodies a ’vision of life’ in 
an aesthetically effective way that we come to consider 
it as art at all, and judge it from an aesthetic point 
of view.
In the case of 'great art' then, the aesthetic 
judgment includes a double standard: of purely aesthetic 
or "surface-and-formal values" and of "life-values".^ To 
the first kind, according to John Hospers, belong the 
look, or sound, or sensation of an object; the "formal 
values" refer to the more complex aesthetic qualities of 
balance, symmetry, organic unity, theme and variation, 
recurrence of motifs; the "life-values" refer to the 
content, to what the artist has made of his subject- 
matter. We find in this distinction between "surface- 
values" and "life-values" the traditional distinction 
between "form" and "content", and, no more than the 
latter does the former accurately comprehend the complexity
1. John Hosners: Meaning and Truth in_the A r t s , Chap. 1.
(The University of NOi'Th CAY'01T ria-Tlirg -^T$'4'6).
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of our aesthetic judgments. The work of art is a whole, 
and if we begin to break it up into its constituent 
elements, if we neatly separate off its form from its 
content we are probably no longer actually appreclating 
it aesthetically, but are analysing and accounting for 
our past appreciation. Indeed, when .accounting for our 
aesthetic judgments, we find some works effective because 
of one sort of value and others more effective because 
of the other. But our actual aesthetic experience and 
appreciation is not compartmentalized. It is as if we 
asked a woman in love: "Do you love John for his looks, 
his mind or his character?" and were surprised at her 
answer that she loved him for neither his looks, nor his 
mind, nor his character but for being John. Just as a 
man is not made up of separate bits, labelled ‘looks', 
'mind', 'character ', so in appreciating works of ai't we
are not aware of separate bits labelled 'surface', and 
'content '. We know perfectly v/ell what we mean v/hen 
we call a work of art 'great', we know it by our ov/n 
experience and we know it because we live in a society 
with common cultural traditions.
We cannot set it up as a criterion of aesthetic 
excellence that every work of art should or must possess 
both kinds of excellence - beauty and moral greatness 
(much lyric poetry, carpets, pots, arabesques, and music
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do not embody any specific 'vision of life') - but
experience teaches us that the great masterpieces of
world literature do in fact possess both artistic beauty
and moral greatness (to take widely different examples,
Homer, the 'Prometheus' of Aeschylus, Plato's 'Symposium*,
'Don Quixote' by Cervantes, Till Eulenspiegel).
Moreover the relation between life and art,
between activity, conduct and artistic creation is a
complex relation, and goes in two directions: "That which
distils, preserves and then enlarges the experience of a
people is Literature,"^ says Zitto, and "Life as we see,
act, and feel it is as much a product of the art we have
known as of the language which shaped our thought," says
2
Susanne Langer. And since "the kinds of relations a 
thing can stand in depend largely upon what sort of 
thing it i s , w e  find that great art has the characteristic 
of being able to appeal over long periods of time, to 
different people, taking on different dimensions of 
relevance (though Richards, at least, in Principles of 
Idteiary Criticism, in keeping with his theory of value, 
denies that permanence or wideness of appeal is a criterion 
of aesthetic excellence).^
1. H.D.F.Zitto: op.cit., p.8 (my italics).
2. S.Z.Langer: op.cit., p.399#
3. E.Jordan: "Essays in Criticism", (University of Chicago 
Press), 1952, p.226.
4. of. Ch.29#
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Although in an earlier chapter I have argued that 
aesthetic principles, just like moral principles,embody 
only relatively stable values "largely conditioned by 
and relative to specific cultural groups and periods,"^ 
we must admit that there are a fev/ absolute moral values 
(honesty and kindness) and the many different codes are 
different applications of these in different institutional 
frameworks; similarly, there are a few unformulatable 
aesthetic values which are absolute, though 'Expressiveness' 
'Beauty' and 'Truth' attempt (vacuously) to formulate them.
Most of us would probably agree that the aesthetic 
importance of the 'vision of life' in a work of art lies 
in the effectiveness of its portrayal, not in its moral 
value and that an aesthetically satisfying vision of life 
is not the same as a morally satisfying one. If it were 
otherwise, we could not appreciate the art of the Aztecs 
because it embodies and expresses what to us is a hideous 
vision; we could not enjoy Omar Khayyam's poetry because 
we do not share his epicureanism; we could not enjoy 
Baudelaire's "Fleurs du Hal" because we do not share his 
pessimism; and, like Tolstoy, we would have to reject 
Shakespeare, Dante and Goethe because their respective 
'visions' are either non-religious, or not conducive to 
universal brotherly love.
We are faced then with a seemingly irreconcilable
1. B.C.Heyl: "New Bearings in Esthetics and Art Criticism", 
.(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1943). P- T/ii.
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contradiction: on the one hand, we demand that art should 
reflect its age and period, men’s beliefs and principles, 
their experiences, their life and their ’vision of life’; 
on the other hand, we are aware that as generation 
succeeds generation, men’s beliefs and principles, men's 
ways of life, their values and their vision are continually 
changing, and concomitantly, the art in which they are 
embodied is changing too. In order to appreciate fully 
a work of art of the past, say, Dante's Divina Commedia, 
we must be able temporarily to adopt and "imaginatively 
reproduce the world outlook of Aquinas, and certain 
attitudes to woman and to chastity".^  Unless we do so, 
we cannot fully understand or respond to the v/ork, and 
our over-distanced attitude would preclude aesthetic 
appreciation. It v/ould seem to follow that our* pleasure 
in appreciating the works of the past would have to be 
bought at the price of a chameleon-like change of attitudes, 
beliefs and 'visions.of life' appropriate to genuine and 
imaginative appreciation.
I said that this contradiction is only apparent: 
and we must only look to our own and others' experience 
of works of art, works which belong to world-literature 
and world-culture and which will be enjoyed as long as our 
civilization lasts, to find the answer. Richards himself
1. Richards: op.cit., p.222.
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points to a partial answer when he says that "Only so far 
as a work avoids the catchword type in its method, and 
relies upon elements likely to remain stable, formal 
elements for example, can it escape the touch of time."^
The universal appeal and the universal intelligibil­
ity of works of art from different periods and cultures, is 
grounded in their formal excellence. This may well be a 
necessary condition of artistic greatness, though not a 
sufficient one. It must be supplemented by my admittedly 
vaguely-phrased statement that great literature expresses 
some "basic facts of human nature" and human striving.
The permanence and the wideness of appeal, and the 
appeal at different levels which great art does in fact 
have, cannot otherwise be explained. "The Song of Songs", 
the "Venus de Medici", "Don Quixote", and "Mona Lisa", 
Michelangelo*s "Moses" and "David", Shakespeare, to take 
but a few examples have appealed to men in the past and 
appeal to us today for very similar reasons, which 'formal 
excellence' does not exhaust. (By different levels of appeal 
I mean the same thing as Eliot when he says that "In a play 
of Shakespeare you get several levels of significance. For 
the simplest auditors there is the plot, for the more 
thoughtful the character and conflict of character, for 
the more literary the words and phrasing, for the more
1 .  R ic h a rd s :  op c i t . ,  p . 222
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musically sensitive the rhythm, and for auditors of 
greater sensitiveness and understanding a meaning which 
reveals itself gradually.")
No actual audience can in fact he so neatly 
classified; and the above classification is only useful 
if we apply it to the individual auditor as well, whose 
sensitiveness "is acted upon by all these elements at 
once, though in different degrees of consciousness.
In my conclusion I wholeheartedly agree with 
Richards that
"It is impossible to divide a reader into so many 
men - an aesthetic man, a moral man, a practical man, 
a political man, an intellectual man, and so on. It 
cannot be done. In any genuine experience all these 
elements inevitably enter." Moreover, "To say that 
there is a purely aesthetic or poetic approach to, let 
us say, the Sermon on the Mount, by which no consideration 
of the intention or ulterior end of the poem enters, 
would appear to be merely mental timidity, the shrinking 
remark of a person^who finds essential literature 
too much for him."
But those of us who do not shrink back from 
'essential literature' will have to admit that the passing 
of time cannot touch works of art in which beauty and 
moral seriousness and truth are inextricably blended 
together. So
"And Ruth said, Intreat me not to leave thee, or
1. T.S.Eliot: The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, 
p.153#
2. Richards: op.cit., p.79*
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following after thee: for whither thou 
goest, 1 will go; and where thou lodgest, I will lodge;
hy people shall be my people, and thy God my God:
"^ vhere^  thou diest, will I die, and there will
^ 4. me, and more also, if
ought but death part thee and me.”
or
By night on my bed I sought him whom my 
soul loveth: i sought him, but I found him not.
I will rise now, and go about the city in 
the streets, and in the broad ways I will seek him 
whom my soul loveth: I sought him, but I found him 
not.”; so
The Lamentations of Jeremiah, the Psalms, Ecclesiastes, 
speak to all men, at all times, in all tongues. And in 
these simple, ancient words, the poet speaks not as a 
religious man, a moral man, a practical man, an 
intellectual man or an aesthetic man, but he speaks as a 
man who is all these - he speaks as I'/lan. As T.S.Eliot 
says,
"The aim of the poet is to state a vision, and no 
vision of life can be complete which does not include 
the articulate formulation of life which human minds 
make.”1
It is perhaps this completeness of vision which is the 
distinguishing characteristic of all 'great art'.
1. T.S.Eliot: The Sacred V/ood, p. 170.
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d) 'Art and Truth'
We saw above the intimate connection between 
aesthetics and morals, between 'great art' and moral 
seriousness. We shall now inquire into the relation of 
art and truth.
It has been argued that "Truth” as a concept of
evaluation in the arts is not the same kind of truth as
scientific truth, and we saw in the first chapter that
Richards had relegated art to the limbo of "emotive
meaning” where the criteria of truth-or~falsehood do not
apply as they do to 'referential' or 'scientific'
statements. We had rejected his viev; as untenable both
in theory and in practice. We prefer to follow Kospers
in his distinction between science and art by distinguishing
scientific 'truth-about' from artistic 'truth-to'.^
The difference between science and art is not that the
one is true and the other neither true nor false, that
the one makes statements about the world and the second
merely pseudo-statements as Richards argued, (and that in
art, "so far as words are used emotively no question as
2
to their truth in the strict sense can directly arise” 
and again that "It is not necessary to know what things 
are in order to take up fitting attitudes towards them, 
but that there are here two kinds of truth, perhaps two
1. John Hospers: "Meaning and Truth in the__Arts” passim, esp.
2. Richards: M.H., p. . Part II.
3. M.K., p.271.
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ways of expressing sometimes the same truth, at other times 
truth about different sorts of things.
The truth of science can in principle be empirically 
verified by confronting it with the facts it is describing 
or explaining ; the truth of art cannot be verified or 
disproved by an appeal to the facts of the physical world 
but by an appeal to the facts of human experience, both 
actual and possible human experience. The 'truth-about' 
of science and the 'truth-to' of art are two different 
true ways of describing different aspects of reality - 
physical reality on the one hand, moral, psychological, 
and poetically experienced (or experienceable) reality 
on the other. I admit that the above is odd and sounds 
odd : How else can we describe reality except as experienced 
or experienceable? And v;hat is the difference between 
plain reality and poetically experienced reality? I think 
the difference can best be illustrated by an example :
In a poem entitled "Perspectives ere Precipices" 
by J.P.Bishop, there are the lines:
"I see a road sunned with white sand 
Wide plains surrounding silence."1
This cannot be called a scientifically true statement 
about silence - silence cannot be treated scientifically 
as a physical object which can be surrounded or enclosed 
by other physical objects. And yet the line corresponds
1. Quoted by Allen Tate: "On the limits of poetry", p.244.
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to human experience, and the poet merely gives a striking 
expression to what others might have felt or have felt 
and not been able to describe, for example, when alone in 
a desert, where the silence that surrounds one is so 
absolute that one feels it to be tangible. I myself have 
experienced this when driving through the Southern Negev 
in Israel, and when I read Bishop’s poem my immediate 
reaction v/as: "How true to that feeling I had but could 
not express."
T.H. Greene in "The Arts and the Art of Criticism" 
says that "there is truth specific to art, the expression 
of an insight which, though original in the sense that the 
artist was the first to achieve it, must be such that 
others, following in his footsteps, can more or less 
closely approximate to it.
Thus, although the kind of truth we demand of 
art is not such that it can be verified by an appeal to 
facts (though in historical novels, biographies and 
autobiographies we do demand factual truth too), it is 
yet not completely divorced from them. Our demand for 
intelligibility in literature is a simple demand not to 
do violence to the common usage and function of language 
as a means of communication. In the case of works like 
Joyce’s Finnegan ' s V/ake (and to a lesser extent Ulysses),
1. LM. Greene: The Arts and the Art of Criticism,(Princeton, 
Princeton University rress, 1940). p.445•
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of poetry like Gertrude Stein's, of much abstract painting, 
etc. , v/e have no actual or possible standard by which to 
judge their truth-to anything. They remain, as far as v/e 
are concerned (exception being made for the specialist) 
outside our field even of aesthetic judgment as 'true'.
I do not want to suggest that 'being true-to 
human experience' is the only aesthetic criterion. Of 
course vivid presentation is aesthetically important.
But as I believe that our aesthetic judgments are never 
purely aesthetic, that they are complex and multiple- 
grounded, I think myself justified in emphasizing the 
part played by not purely aesthetic terms like 'good' 
and 'true' in our experience of works of art and in our 
subsequent evaluation of this experience.
Perhaps the demand that works of art should be
characterised by moral seriousness and of being true-to
experience is not generally made except of great works
of art, probably because we have been led by these works
themselves to make these demands. Sometimes the discovery
or the attribution of truth-value to certain works of
art takes time. This explains why "A poem may be found
greater in one age than in another", since its truth-value
itself depends on two factors: "Y/hat the poem itself says
q
and the fitness of the audience it manages to reach."
1. Ph.Wheelwright, The Criterion, Oct.1930."Poetry and Logic"
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If the poem - or any other work of art - does in fact 
have value, its value will eventually be recognized; and 
similarly, if value was attributed wrongly to a v/ork, 
its disvalue, or negative value will also be recognized 
in time. (As Sir Kenneth Clark in a recent Television 
programme, "Is Art necessary?" said, no, or only very 
few, fake paintings can stand the test of time; ultimately 
they are all found out.)
Art, or rather literature and the representative 
arts, reproduce, recast, and recreate human experience.
F r o m the manifold of human experience, whether actual or 
possible, the artist selects vfnat seems to him important, 
interesting, significant. If he is a good artist, his 
selection from and presentation of human experience will 
have a meaningful, intelligible pattern. And if the pattern 
presented for our contemplation implies a definite attitude 
to life, be it religious or irreligious, be it tragic 
or ironic, our aesthetic demand for the attitude and the 
pattern to be true to human experience does not entail 
our own, individual acceptance and approval of the artist's 
beliefs v/hich form the ground of his attitude. As T.S.Eliot 
puts it,
"When the doctrine, theory, belief, or 'view of life' 
presented in a poem is one which the mind of the reader 
can accept as coherent, mature, and founded on the 
facts of experience, it interposes no obstacle to the 
reader's enjoyment, whether it be one that he accept<
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or deny, approve or deprecate.
The vital point is that it must he "founded on
the facts of-experience", i.e. that it must in some way
he true to human experience. Richards, on the other hand,
argues that if we say of a poem, a drama, a novel, "How
true" we are not judging them aesthetically at all, we
are taking them to he what they are not - statements
about man, about life, about the world, which can be
verified or'falsified by confronting them with the
individuals, the facts or the states described:"The
people who say 'How True I * at intervals while reading
Shakespeare are misusing his work, and, comparatively
2
speaking, wasting their time."
This seems to me quite unwarranted. I do not see 
why our judgment 'How true' is any less valid than our 
judgment 'How beautiful', granted that we use 'true' 
here in a special sense which does not imply for example 
that King Lear is true because there was a man called 
Lear, who lived and acted and suffered in exactly the 
way as 'King Lear'. When we say that King Lear is true we 
may mean several things:
That it is humanly possible that a man deliver 
himself into the hands of those who despise and hate him
1. T.S.Sliot: The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism, p.96.
2. Richards: PTl TcTI p.273•
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and torment the one v/ho loves him; that not only is this 
a human situation - whether actual or possible - but 
the characters who find themselves in it - and perhaps 
who create the situation because of the sort of people 
they are - behave in a way v/hich again is true to the sort 
of people they are. Richards himself admits that this 
sense of Truth, i.e. as 'internal necessity' or 'rightness' 
is applicable to our experience of a r t A l l  I wanted to 
point out is that our aesthetic demand for this 'internal 
necessity' or consistency and convincingness of behaviour 
of even 'fictitional' characters implies the existence of 
an external standard of comparison, viz. truth-to particular 
facts and aspects of human experience.
In keeping with my rejection of Richards' position 
that our demand of truth in art is mistaken - arising 
from a confusion of the use of ordinary and poetic 
statement - I must also reject his position as to belief 
or beliefs in relation to art.
According to Richards, we must - if we are to
appreciate King Lear - not only refrain from judgments
as to its truth to human experience but must also put away
from our minds any or all our beliefs whatever; "... in the
reading of King Lear what facts verifiable by science, or
accepted and believed in as we accept and believe in
ascertained facts, are relevant?" And the answer he gives
2
is "None whatever."
1. F.L.C., p.269. 2. P.L.C., p.282.
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we could really divest ourselves of all our 
beliefs while watching King Lear, we surely v/ould not be 
able to appreciate it as a tragedy. If we had no beliefs 
as to the natural bonds of love between daughters and 
father - how could we feel the unnaturalness of Lear's 
daughters? If we had no beliefs as to the suffering 
inflicted on a father when disowned, despised, rejected, 
by his own flesh and blood - how could we feel for Lear 
and with him? All these are not, indeed, "facts verifiable 
by science", but they are beliefs grounded in and verifiable 
by human experience. This is the sort of truth we demand 
in art, and in fact, the greatest tragedians and poets 
have all deepened and broadened our awareness and under­
standing of human experience.
If man had never loved, or could never love, 
like Romeo and Juliet or like Antony and Cleopatra; 
if man had never been jealous, or could never be jealous 
like Othello; if man had never doubted and refrained 
from action like Hamlet, if Lesdemona and Portia, if 
Miranda and Cordelia, if Lear, Hamlet and Othello were 
but completely figments of the imagination, unrelated and 
unrelatable to human experience, they would not be the 
tragic characters they are, but merely strange and pathetic 
puppets, manipulated by the hand of the invisible artist, 
not acting from understandable human motives.
It is to disregard completely our experience of
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tragedy and of art in general, to hold, like Richards, that 
we need no beliefs in order to enjoy and appreciate King 
Lea^. if such a case would be at all possible, we would 
have ceased to be men, craving "to satisfy in certain ways 
our love both of beauty and of truth, of truth to life and 
about it, and would have become 'ideal* observers, who 
watch, unmoved, the sport and follies of men.
But, as we saw before, Richards is not consistent 
in upholding the same position, and it is when he comes 
to refute the 'Poetry for poetry's sake' school of 
criticism, that he comes nearest to my own position. Thus 
he says that "We cannot for example, read Shelley 
adequately while believing that all his views are moonshine 
- read Prometheus Unbound while holding that 'the 
perfectibility of man is an undesirable ideal' and that
•hangmen are excellent things'."^ That means that our
beliefs as men are relevant to our understanding and 
correct appreciation of poetry and other arts, since 
these do not form "a world by itself, independent, complete, 
autonomous" i.e. a world where our normal demands for 
intelligibility, order and truth are irrelevant. And since 
Richards himself admits that "The world of poetry has in
1. P.L.Lucas,M.A.: 'Tragedy'in relation to Aristotle*s 
Poetics, p.51
2. Richards : P.L.C., p.79.
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no sense any different reality from the rest of the world 
and it has no special laws and no other-worldly peculiarit­
ies,"^ it only enforces my argument that our demand for 
truth to human experience in art is not only generally 
made hut perfectly justified.
We do not judge all the arts hy the same standards, 
and even within each art there are different criteria
for different kinds. Leaving aside the difficult case of
music, we should hardly demand of architecture and 
abstract designs, of pots or carpets, to have meaning, 
to refer to something beyond themselves of which they 
are true or false. But of poetry and drama, of the novel 
and of representative painting and sculpture, we expect 
not only values of aesthetic surface and form but also 
meaning or content, i.e. those life-values which come
"from the world of experience outside art,"but are conveyed
2
by the aesthetic surface and form.
If the work of art is a whole, if it is what is
nowadays called "an organic unity", then our judgment
of it should be of it as such. And if our judgment is 
of the total work, of its total meaning, then we cannot 
separate the 'thing said' from the 'way of saying it'.
It is mostly those who uphold the separateness of art 
from 'life', those who dub any demand for moral and
1. Richards: P.L.C., p.78.
2. J.Hospers: "Meaning and Truth in the Arts" p.12.
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truth values from art as non—aesthetic, who are prone to 
make this artificial separation of the work into autonomous 
elements.
Richards is right in insisting as against such 
critics that "The separation of poetic experience from 
its place in life and its ulterior worths, involves a 
definite lop-sidedness, narrov/ness, and incompleteness 
in those who preach it siin erely.^
Perhaps the demand that art be true to human
experience must be exactly specified for otherwise the
demand itself would be vacuous. We could say with Richards
that just as there are various kinds of poetry, so there
are various arts, "and that the different kinds are to be
2 -judged by different principles." in some of them, the 
judgment of ulterior ends (truth and goodness for example) 
is integral to the aesthetic judgment ; in others, the 
intrusion of the pursuit of ulterior ends may lower their 
value; and there are yet other kinds where ulterior ends 
can have no place at all.
But it is only those works of art where ulterior 
values are embodied, the 'great works of art', speaking 
to the whole of man about the most important things in 
the world and in human life, about the things that are
1. Richards: P.L.C., p.79
2. P.L.G., p.77. '
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universally and permanently valuable, that heighten and 
enhance our consciousness of ourselves, of other human 
beings and of the world in which v/e live. And it is only 
works which are both beautiful and good and true to human 
experience that "may effect revolutions in sensibility 
such as are periodically needed: may help to break up 
the conventional modes of perception and valuation which 
are periodically forming, and make people see the world 
afresh, or some new part of it." They
"may make us from time to time a little more aware 
of the deeper, unnamed feelings which form the substratum 
of our being, to which we rarely penetrate; for our 
lives are mostly a constant evasion of ourselves, and 
an evasion of the visible and sensible v/orld. "1
And if art can teach us to look and to observe 
what we never knew was there, it can do this only when 
it neither falsifies the real nor pretends that its 
fictions have a reality of their own, unrelated and 
unrelatable to reality.
1. T.S.Eliot: The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism,
p. 155.
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Chapter 7
I.A.RICHARDS AND E.BULLGUGH: SIMILARITY AI'TD CONTRAST
a) Psychical Distance
If, as we have found, one of the functions of 
Aesthetics is the demarcation of the aesthetic from the 
pseudo- or non-aesthetic judgments and the investigation 
of the character of aesthetic judgments proper, i.e. their 
logic, content and the criteria involved, this theoretical 
investigation is not to be regarded as an end in itself, 
or as the ultimate task of Aesthetics. There is a limit 
to the profitability of logical analysis of even a great 
number of different instances of aesthetic judgments, 
just as there is a limit to their classification according 
to the different aesthetic theories which they imply or 
state. There are many theoretical works on Aesthetics 
which expound metaphysical or psychological, subjective 
or objective theories of beauty. But they are worthless 
if they are divorced from pr*actical art criticism. On 
the other hand we also find a great number of critical 
works on the appreciation of literature, poetry, music, 
painting, etc., which, although they may deepen our 
understanding of familiar works of art and help us to 
appreciate new ones, do not fulfil om important task: 
they do not offer any principle of choice which will 
enable us, the laymen, to discriminate correctly between
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what is and what is not aesthetically valuable, and give 
valid reasons for our choices# In short, theoretical 
Aesthetics alone is barren, practical or applied aesthetics 
alone is capricious: only the two together can yield 
fruitful results — theoretical aesthetics by constant 
connection with practice, and applied aesthetics by 
having a theoretical grounding - generally applicable 
in at least some degree - as a safeguard against the 
caprices of personal or non-aesthetic likes and dislikes.
Thus the logical analysis of the aesthetic 
judgment, and the classification of the relevant features 
of works in the different arts and of different 'genres* 
within the same art, are only the necessary means to 
practical criticism: the distinction, in particular cases, 
between what is and what is not a work of art, the correct 
assignment of merit to particular works of art, and the 
discrimination of justified from unjustified instances 
of appreciation.
Is there any theory of aesthetics which can 
fulfil this task? Is there a theory which does not 
violate the facts of our aesthetic experience, yet can 
account for the variety, the differences of degree and 
kind of individual appreciation, and the fluctuations 
of taste in different periods and peoples and cultures?
If there is such a theory it would be well worth the
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trouble to find it, bring it to light and see if and how it 
works.
-J- think that such a theory does in fact exist 
but has unfortunately not received the attention it 
deserves: I refer to the theory of Psychical Distance, 
which Edv/ard Bullough put forward nearly half a century 
ago, in an article called '‘Psychical Distance" as a 
Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle', in the 
British Journal of Psychology for 1912. This precedes 
Richards' work by many years, but offers many parallels 
to the more promising aspects of his psychological 
treatment of aesthetics.
Bullough justifies adopting a psychological 
approach to aesthetics by considering the history of 
aesthetic speculation up to the 20th century. In the 
past, says Bullough, aesthetics was concerned with:
"The problem of a definition of Beauty. - 
The problem of a criterion of Beauty.*
The problem of a cause of Beauty." ^
To the first group belong most ne taphysical a 
priori theories of beauty. Thus for Socrates Beauty is 
utility, for Plato, Baumgarten and the 18th century 
rationalists it is knowledge», for Plotinus and other 
metaphysical aestheticians it is the deity, for some it
1. "Aesthetics" Lectures and Essays by E.Bullough, p.37. 
(ed.by ijJ'TirJilkinson, Bowes and Bowes, 1957;.
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is perfection or the ethically good, for others it is the 
Infinite revealed in the Finite, for Hegel it is the Idea 
in a concrete Form.
In the second group the outstanding case is 
Burke and others v/ho tried to find, not an a priori 
definition of Beauty, hut some common quality in the object 
which, when present, would be an infallible sign that the 
given object is beautiful. Burke's criteria of beauty for 
example v/ere smallness, smoothness, gracefulness, 
delicacy. Bater writers rejected these criteria in favour 
of those concerning the manner of the combination of 
single qualities: regularity, evenness, symmetry, proportion, 
measure, harmony.
The theorists of the third group wanted to find 
some one and only cause of beauty, and suggested for example 
a representation of "unity in vai’iety" (Hutcheson) or 
the use of "the golden section" (Zeising).'
All three groups of theorists shared a belief 
in the o b j e c t i v i t y  of beauty and a belief that works of 
art are beautiful in virtue of partaking of some common 
quality which v/as, or caused, absolute Beauty. They thought 
that if we could only pinpoint the essence of intrinsic 
beauty, that very essence which seemed for ever to elude
us, our task would be done.
Nov/, just as there are revolutions in science, 
there are revolutions in philosophy: the great turning
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point for aesthetics came when thinkers realised that the 
pursuit of absolute Beauty was an idle dream, that 
Beauty is not to be found in a special type of object 
or a special type of feature of objects but in a special 
way of perceiving objects^and that the whole problem of 
Beauty had only seemed insoluble because approached from 
the wrong point of view. It was with Kant that the modern 
> conception of Aesthetics began, the conception of Beauty 
as pertaining to, and a function of, the perceiving mind 
and not as a quality of the object. It was Kant Wio 
showed that the ground of the aesthetic judgment is the 
feeling of pleasure of a special kind evoked in the subject 
by his perception of the object - and this became the 
starting-point of modern, psychological aesthetics. From 
now on the pursuit of the absolute, metaphysical entity 
•Beauty' was generally abandoned, and aestheticians 
began to look for and to find Beauty in the eye and heart 
of man. So the psychologists took over from the philosophers 
and began to probe deeper and deeper into the soul of 
man: first the (special) feeling of pleasure, then 'the ' 
aesthetic emotion and experience, and now man's conscious 
and unconscious longings and neurological impulses have 
become the subject-matter of treatises in aesthetics.
The similarity between Bullough's account of 
earlier theories of aesthetics and Richards' classification
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of the same in The Foundations of Aesthetics is very striking. 
It is probable that Richards heard Bullough's Lectures on 
Aesthetics at Oambridge, agreed with his psychological 
approach to aesthetics but not with the particular form 
it took (based largely on introspection and referring 
not at all to neurological impulses), and finding his 
classification of alternative approaches both simple and 
useful, adopted it (though he did not refer to its source).
It is interesting to note that Richards alluded to 
Bullough but once in his writings, and his comment on the 
notion of Psychical Distance shows that he did not think 
highly of it. ("Such 'distancing’ would, hov/ever, on any 
interpretation seem to be far from essential in the 
description of aesthetic experience."^)
Whatever their differences, it is clear that 
both Bullough and Richards belong to the fourth - and till 
now - the last group of aesthetic theories, ^et the 
difference between them is as great as their similarity, 
and we must elucidate it if we want to understand why a 
psychological approach enables Bullough to discover an 
important aesthetic principle but leads Richards into a 
blind alley from which he escapes only by altogether 
abandoning his theory in his practice.
Bullough, who saw in the subjective, psychological
1. Richards: The Foundations of Aesthetics, p.89 (note).
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approach to the problems of Beauty the only alternative
to the traditional and vain quest for the objective
quality of beauty, was yet fully awai*e of the limitations
of the psychological treatment of these problems. He
reiterated that "it is essential to preserve continual
contact with the forms of Art,because  these are the
major source of our aesthetic experience. Favouring,as
he did, an aesthetics whose starting point was the individual
perceiver, his aesthetic experience and attitude, he yet
knew that psychological aesthetics was in as much danger
as metaphysical aesthetics of losing contact with its
true object of inquiry, the manifestation of beauty in
actual works of art and what we appreciate in them. He
therefore suggested that aestheticians take the middle
way, and, avoiding the extremes of metaphysical and
psychological aesthetics, should learn to see in their
true relation both the experiencing mind and the object
of the experience, the work of art and its psychological
effect. So we find him saying:
"Differentiations of effect must be considered in 
relation to differentiations of the objective forms 
V7hich produce them, "
and he points out that subjective, psychological 
aesthetics have often lost this vital contact, resulting 
in "accounts of emotions, pleasure, perception, etc.,
1. E.Bullough, op.cit., p.61.
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in general, instead of research into aesthetic perception, 
aesthetic pleasure, aesthetic emotions.
He praises experimental aesthetics (and actively 
contributed to its development in his experiments on 
types of colour—appreciation)  ^ just because it tries to 
correlate the objective features of the aesthetic object 
with the effects on the subject. Indeed Bullough sums up 
the task of modern Aesthetics as "the study of the 
objective features of Art, not as objective characteristics 
of Beauty, as in older theories, but always in relation 
to their aesthetic effect."'^ In this way the whole world 
of Art, as a collection of objective phenomena, and 
"Art-history as the tale of its evolution, finds its 
place within Aesthetics.
With such a liberal definition of the task and 
function of Aesthetics few would want to quarrel. And 
it is, I believe, mainly due to his constant vigilance 
against taking a one-sided view, that Bullough's conception 
of "Psychical Distance" as an aesthetic principle and 
aesthetic criterion represents an improvement on the 
general notion of "disinterested satisfaction" or "detached 
contemplation" which has long been recognised as an element 
in aesthetic experience.
1, 3, 4- op.cit., p.62.
2. E.Bullough, "The Perceptive Problem in Aesthetic 
Appreciation of Single Colors", British Journal of 
Psychology, II (1908).
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The primary function of Bullough*s principle is 
to demark the aesthetic domain» 'Distancing', as Bullough 
explains it, is specifically an attempt to distinguish 
the attitude peculiarly appropriate to works of art, hut 
this attitude can be, and sometimes is, adopted towards 
any objects whatever and in certain moments towards events 
in our life.
The conception of 'Distance' is a difficult one 
and we could probably discover certain ambiguities and 
inconsistencies in Bullough's own account of it. He is at 
all events quite clear in his negative description of 
'Distance':
1. 'Distance' is not "actual spatial distance,
i.e. the distance of a work of Art from the spectator.
2. 'Distance' is not temporal distance, i.e. 
the remoteness of the work of Art from us in point of 
time.
Spatial and temporal distance are kinds of
distance, but Bullough is trying to describe Distance in
its general connotation, which includes these special
kinds, yet transcends them. He therefore puts forward
the notion of 'Psychical Distance' as the genus from
which both spatial and temporal distance derive "whatever
2
aesthetic qualities they may possess." In short, the 
1, 2. op.cit., p.93. (Author's italics).
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this Distance is neither spatial nor temporal 
l^ s.y^ hological. V/hereas both spatial and temporal 
distance can be regarded as independent of our volition, 
as part and parcel of our normal perception of objects 
in space and time, as given, 'Psychical Distance' is not 
given, but depends on us, on our conscious (or sometimes 
unconscious) adoption of a certain point of view, outlook 
or attitude to experience.
Bullough distinguishes four modes of consciousness
and their correlative attitudes to experience: the practical,
the scientific, the ethical and the aesthetic.^ We can
regard an object, an event or a human action from any or
all of these different points of view^though probably the
practical attitude is primary and the one most generally
held. We can however consciously change our normal,
practical attitude to an aesthetic one by the insertion
of 'Psychical Distance'. In analysing this change of
attitude we can distinguish several stages, of which the
first and most important "is obtained by separating the
object and its appeal from one's self, by putting it out
2
of gear with practical needs and ends." Although this 
is a conscious change of attitude, once adopted, we no 
longer attribute it to ourselves and may come to think 
that Distance really pertains to the objects which
1. op.cit., p.69"
2. E.Bullough, "Aesthetics", p.96.
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to us distanced from our personal affections, 
emotions and ideas.
Bullough*s description of the aesthetic attitude 
is strongly reminiscent of Kant's disinterested response 
to beauty. But whereas Kant probably regarded only works 
of art and natural beauty as the proper objects of aesthetic 
judgment, Bullough's ’distanced' response is far more 
comprehensive. It covers art and nature and life and man.
The predominantly aesthetic-contemplative attitude 
towards art and life is rare because it completely 
disregards our normal everyday interests in what we are 
currently perceiving and acting upon. In the practical 
attitude with v/hich we usually meet life, the practical 
attitude of pursuing our personal interests and ends, 
we need to regard objects and events as instances of 
general classes of objects and events of a sort that 
will serve our purposes, subsumable under general laws 
rendering their operation predictable. The aesthetic 
attitude, by contrast, isolates the object of attention, 
and regards it not just as one of a kind of objects 
fit for a certain purpose, but regards it in and for 
itself. It is an attitude difficult to maintain for . 
long, and it is’nearly impossible to give a detailed 
but generally applicable description of those 
sometimes supreme moments of heightened consciousness.
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Even Bullough uses illustration rather than description 
in general terms in his attempt to describe it. The example 
he gives as an illustration of 'Psychical Distance' - 
a fog at sea, in which we disregard our personal danger 
and look only at the objective features of the phenomenon - 
is a good one because we can recall similar experiences 
oi our own. There are moments in life when "we watch the 
consummation of some impending catastrophe with the 
marvelling unconcern of a mere spectator.At those 
moments the object of our contemplation appears more real 
than ourselves; the distance between us and the object 
seems now to be in U£, a distance between ourselves as 
perceivers and ourselves as agents and sufferers. V/e do 
not fret, we simply wait and see: practically passive, 
yet mentally alert, contemplative yet curious, disinterested 
yet involved. I recall a scene from a film in which this 
complex state of mind was beautifully shown. It was a 
film about the resistance of French railway workers 
against the Nazi occupation. Having successfully sabotaged 
a train carrying German arms and supplies, a number of 
French railwaymen are caught and taken before the execution 
squad. The face of one man is engraved in my memory: he 
stands facing .a bleak brick wall; German voices snap 
out commands; he smiles and looks at the wall; a fly is
1, op.cit., p.94.
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crawling across it, tracing its curved path, apparently 
intent on this alone. On the point of being executed, the 
man's full, calm gaze is concentrated on the fly, and, 
like it, is intent yet unconcerned: emotionally unconcerned 
for himself but mentally supremely active in a last effort 
to extract from the appearance of this insignificant 
object, all there is. Then he is shot.
Perhaps this is a rather extreme instance of the 
operation of 'Psychical Distance', but this scene is for 
me a concrete, visual illustration of a difficult, complex 
and important concept in Aesthetics.
In her Introduction to Bullough's Lectures on 
Aesthetics, P.M.Wilkinson says that "Bullough's principle' 
(of 'Psychical Distance') "has remained an almost isolated 
phenomenon in modern aesthetics.Formulated as it was 
fifty years ago, it seems nowadays to have been silently 
adopted by writers on aesthetics, though it has not been 
widely discussed or applied.
'Psychical Distance' is a wide enough notion to 
allow its being applied to different arts inducing 
different sorts of distanced responses. It is, I think, 
a useful working hypothesis based on observation and 
generalisation from experience, whose value must be found 
in its fruitful application to many long-standing aesthetic
1. op.cit., p.xxxviii.
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problems. Thus Builough regarded it:
1. As a factor in artistic creation and the 
distinguishing feature of the 'artistic temperament.'
("... artistic production is the indirect formulation 
of a distanced mental content.")^
2. As an aesthetic principle in art-appreciation, 
a criterion of the specific "aesthetic values as distinct 
from practical (utilitarian), scientific, or social 
(ethical) values.
3- As the defining characteristic of the aesthetic 
attitude or 'aesthetic consciousness', "... of that 
mentality or outlook upon experience and life, which 
leads to Art.
4. As a criterion for distinguishing the beautiful e.g 
from the agreeable: "the agreeable is a non-distanced 
pleasure,whereas the beautiful describes a distanced 
pleasure.
5. As describing a personal relation between the 
perceiver and the object of his perception, but a personal 
relation of a specific, aesthetic kind.^
6. As an explanation of some of the differences
of response to different art-objeots and art-forms, and
1. op.cit., p.126 3. op.cit., p.130
2. op.cit., p.129 4. op.cit., p.xl8
5. op.cit.cf.p.96.
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7* As a solution of many apparent antitheses 
in our demands upon art, e.g. between 'naturalistic' and 
'idealistic' views of art, 'sensual' and 'spiritual' 
values in it, demands for the 'individualistic' and the 
'typical* . These antitheses it solves by means of 
making intelligible
8. The antinomy and variability of Distanc e.
The last point is the most important, and
Bullough's explanation of it is: "Distance" (i.e.'Psychical
Distance') "may be said to be variable both according to
the distancing-power of the individual, and according
2to the character of the object."
This careful, non-dogmatic formulation of the 
principle of variability of Psychical Distance shows that 
Bullough is fully aware that he is dealing with two 
complex factors - the individual perceiver and the 
specific character of the object of his perception - and 
that both factors have variable distancing-powers. He 
therefore does not try to fix the correct distance for 
any one object or individual, but only suggests the 
maximum and minimum distance-limits beyond which aesthetic 
experience merges into experience of a different kind.
1. op.cit., pp.106-117
2. op.cit., p. 100.
272
d i a g r a m TLLUSTRATIïïG the operation Qg THE PRIHGIPLB OP
PSYCHICAL DISTANCE
Distance of attitude of subject (S) to ob.lect (O) from X to Y
Increasingly pure 
aesthetic response
Ideal
aesthetic
Diminishing 
aesthetic response
response
Completely detached 
Objective
Noxi"-ae s the tic
Individual
Personal
Practical
Non-aesthetic
response
Scientific 
Impersonal response 
to an instance of a type 
of object.
X represents extreme under-distance ) at which aesthetic
) experience is
Y represents extreme over-distance ) impossible.
Let us now try to illustrate the antinomy and 
variability of 'Psychical Distance' in relation to a 
given individual perceiver S, when appreciating a given
object Q.
Let S be a man, who believes he has cause to be 
jealous of his wife^ let 0 be a given performance of 
Othello; then, in so far as he feels the situation, 
conduct and character of Othello to be like his own, 
his 'appreciation' will become identification with the
1. op.cit., p.99. The example is taken from Bullough.
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tragic character, which will render him more conscious 
of his ov/n situation and less conscious of the play as a 
play; insteaa of seeing Othello apparently betrayed by 
lesdeniona, he will see himself betrayed by his ovm wife;
i.e. by his complete loss of distance, S will nojt be 
appreciating 0 aesthetically, but merely reacting in a 
practical way to a quasi-real situation. In such a case, 
both the distancing-power of the individual is nil, and 
the object of his appreciation has not enough distancing- 
power in itself to induce in him the appropriate attitude,
bullough indeed classifies the drama v;ith those af^ ts
where loss of distance is due to their character and 
form of presentation.)
At another time, at another place, the same
individual S, may be able to adopt a better distance, if
for example, he succeeds in putting out of mind practical 
questions arising from his concerns as agent and 
sufferer, and leaves himself able to respond as ’mere' 
spectator. (This Bullough calls putting the play "out of gear 
with our practical, actual self."^) Then he may perhaps 
be able to regard Othello as the dramatisation o± one 
individual’s — Othello’s — situation, and, although he 
may be the better able to comprehend Othello s feelings 
and experiences tlirough his ovrn, he will no longer project
1. op.cit., p.95'
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his own feelings on to Othello. Y/e may say that S has 
at least succeeded in adopting an attitude ultimately 
conducive to correct distancing for 0.
At yet another time when watching Othello, S may 
perfectly he able to appreciate the situation, conduct, 
character, feelings and experience of Othello, because 
his own past experience has prepared him for this particular 
kind of appeal. Yet, by adopting the aesthetic attitude 
of ’psychical distance*, his own feelings appear unreal, 
filtered or distanced, and he now is "able to distance 
the subject-matter sufficiently to rise above its practical 
problematic import and to regard it simply as a dramatically 
and humanly interesting situation.This attitude corresponds 
to Bullough's account of the ideal, aesthetic attitude :
"Utmost decrease of Distance without its disappearance"^
So far we have examined only one of the variable 
factors in the aesthetic situation, viz. the individual 
perceiver and his varying capacity to adopt and maintain 
a greater or lesser degree of distance. We saw that loss 
of distance or under-distancing is a (common enough)
1. op.cit., p.102.
2. op.cit., p.100 (author's italics).
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failing of the subject, and we shall see in the sequel 
that over—distancing is induced by certain art—forms and 
art-objects. let us now examine the second variable factor 
in the aesthetic situation, the work of art, which, like 
the individual subject "may impose a greater or smaller 
degree of Distance.
The theatre, dancing and sculpture generally, e.g. 
tend to induce loss of Distance because of the manner of 
presenting their subject-matter. Painting and literature 
tend to induce a normal Distance-limit, which varies 
according to the kind of painting and literature 
('idealistic*, 'realistic', 'naturalistic'). Music and 
architecture again induce variable Distances: thus 'pure',
'classical' or 'heavy' music usually induces an over­
distanced response, whereas light music (not to speak of
jazz and rock-and-roll) induces a very low Distance, if 
2
any at all.
5
b). Psychical Distance and catharsis
The notion of Distance is, of course, not 
a wholly new one in Aesthetics « Bullough himself 
refers to Aristotle as having mentioned the beneficial 
effects of spatial distance in the Poetics, i.e. 
the distance of a work of art from the spectator
/
1. op.cit., p.100.
2. cf. op.cit., pp.104-106.
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as a factor in our appreciation. But I should go further 
and say that the whole notion of 'Psychical Distance' 
and the theory of psychological detachment as the 
distinguishing feature of aesthetic experience, was 
already adumbrated, to a certain extent,in Aristotle's 
theory of tragedy.
Before proceeding to compare the notions of 
'Psychical Distance' and catharsis, we must first point 
out their difference, namely, that whereas Bullough is 
trying to account for the peculiar effect of the aesthetic 
attitude towards any object in general, Aristotle is 
trying to account only for the peculiar effect of tragedy. 
However, it is clear that Aristotle was aware of the 
specifically aesthetic character of our experience and 
appreciation of tragedy, and his statement in Chapter 25 
of the Poetics, viz. "that the standard of correctness 
is not the same in poetry and politics, any more than 
in poetry and any other art," can be regarded as the 
first declaration of independence of Aesthetics.
The, connection between catharsis and 'Psychical 
Distance' is apparent at two points :
1. In Aristotle's account of the tragic emotions 
of pity and fear.
2. In Aristotle's account of the ideal tragic hero.
1. Aristotle's Poetics, ed-.by S.H.Butcher., (Macmillan & Co., 
Ltd., 1932).
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In his account of the emotions of pity and fear and 
the catharsis of these emotions which it is the proper 
function of tragedy to effect, Aristotle describes them as 
peculiarly and specially the tragic emotions. By assuming 
that the real emotions of pity and fear can be aroused by 
imaginary happenings, Aristotle assumes the possibility 
of distanced responses, and postulates them as proper to 
tragedy. In Book II of the Rhetoric Aristotle defines fear as
"a kind of pain or disturbance due to a mental picture 
of some destructive or painful evil in the future."1
similarly, pity for others is aroused in circumstances in 
which we should fear for ourselves. But in passing through 
the artistic medium, the emotions are themselves transformed; 
they are become divested of the immediacy, strength and pain­
fulness which they have in real life. They are transmuted 
from the personal to the impersonal plane, and because of 
this transformation and clarification they are capable of 
affording us aesthetic satisfaction. Aristotle thus regarded 
both 'pity' and 'fear' to be in themselves distanced emotions 
(since to feel pity we have to apply others' situation to 
ourselves in imagination), and to be distancing emotions as 
applied to drama. As he says, they are the characteristic, 
necessary, tragic emotions.
In Bullough's terminology, we could interpret 
Aristotle as implying that the artistic medium induces
1. Rhetoric, (translated by W.Rhys Roberts. Vol.XI of the
Works o l Aristotle in English. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
1924.) Bk.II, Ch.V. (My italics.)
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the spectator to adopt a 'distanced' attitude. Only by 
the interpolation of 'Psychical Distance' between ourselves 
and the tragic action and the tragic heroes can the proper 
tragic effect occur, i.e. the aesthetic satisfaction of 
apprehending human life and suffering as a whole, ordered, 
intelligible, process.
Aristotle's view of the ideal tragic hero follows 
from his view of the function of tragedy.
Thus he says, if tragedy should imitate actions
which excite pity and fear,
"It follows plainly, in the first place, that the 
change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle 
of a virtuous man brought from prosperity to adversity ; 
for this moves neither pity nor f ear ; it merely shocks 
us. Nor, again, that of a bad man passing from adversity 
to prosperity: for nothing can be more alien to the 
spirit of Tragedy; it possesses no single tragic 
quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense nor 
calls forth pity or fear. Nor, again, should the 
dovmfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot 
of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, 
but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity 
is aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the 
misfortune of a man like ourselves."1
If we transpose Aristotle's account into the 
modern terminology of Bullough, and more specifically 
apply to it the notion of 'Psychical Distance' as induced 
in the spectator because of the varying distancing-powers 
(or qualities) inherent in the aesthetic objects, we could 
interpret the above passage as follows :
1. Aristotle's Poetics, ed.by Butcher, Ch.XIII, p.45*
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The proper tragedy should not present "a virtuous 
man brought from prosperity to adversity", because by its 
very nature it cannot induce a properly distanced attitude; 
on the contrary our moral judgment is so strongly developed 
that this gives us a real shock and leaves us unable to 
appreciate the play aesthetically.
If tragedy is to fulfil its proper function -
i.e. if it is to induce in us the properly distanced 
attitude, then the tragic character must be of a certain 
type : "a man who is not eminently good and just, yet whose 
misfortune is brought about not by vice or depravity, but 
by some error or frailty'*^ (hamartia). (In Bywater's 
translation, "by some error of judgment".)
Aristotle's ideal tragic hero is 'ideal' because 
his character is such as to induce an "ideally distanced 
attitude", i.e. a response involving the utmost decrease 
of Distance v/ithout its disappearance. The demand that 
he be 'like ourselves' justifies Bullough's assumption 
that 'Psychical Distance' describes a personal reaction.
But we saw that if the reaction is too personal, if the 
self-identification with the hero is so strong that it 
finds relief in real sympathy and real tears then we can
no longer appreciate tragedy, we only find it "sad, dismal,
2
harrowing, depressing."
1. Aristotle's Poetics, p.45
2. Bullough: op.cit., p.113*
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Aristotle's 'middling man', neither too remote 
from us (and thus inducing an attitude of indifference), 
nor yet too close to us (and thus inducing an attitude 
of personal involvement) is the ideal tragic hero, because 
he alone can induce in us emotions v/hich are properly 
distanced.
V/e see. therefore that not only is there a 
similarity between Aristotle's account of tragedy and 
•Bullough's account of 'Psychical Distance', but also that 
the latter enables us to understand the aesthetic validity 
of the former. Moreover, just as Bullough always 
emphasises the peculiarly aesthetic character of 'Psychical 
Distance', so Aristotle is careful to emphasise the 
peculiarly aesthetic character of the pleasure of tragedy: 
"for we must not demand of Tragedy any and every kind of 
pleasure, but only that v^hich is proper to it.
Like Bullough, Aristotle never falls into mere 
psychological description, because he always tries to 
show the necessary relation between a certain type of 
tragedy and a certain kind of effect produced, i.e., he 
recognizes the objective features of the work of art 
as the grounds for the aesthetic-contemplative emotional 
effect on the spectator. Catharsis is a necessary condition
1 .  Aristotle's P o e t i c s ,  ed. by Butcher, C h .X IV ,  p.49*
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for the tragic experience, 'Psychical Distance' is a 
necessary condition for aesthetic experience in general. 
And just as only a good tragedy can produce the proper 
catharsis, only a good aesthetic object can induce an 
effect with the proper psychical distance.
And Bullough would agree with Aristotle that the 
ideal man is the man who is healthy, morally, mentally 
and emotionally balanced, i.e. he who can feel both 
pleasure and pain, but "... feel them at the right times, 
with reference to the right objects, towards the right
1
people, with the right motive, and in the right way..."
c ) Psychical Distance and Synaesthesis 
We have found certain similarities between the 
concept of psychical distance and catharsis. Let us now 
examine its similarities - if any - with, and differences 
from, synaesthesis.
Richards had defined aesthetic experience by 
reference to synaesthesis and had at the same time made 
this the criterion of value. But Bullough, after 
demarking the aesthetic domain, does not try to provide 
a criterion of worth within that domain, unless we 
take him to advocate a doctrine of 'optimum distance' 
irrespective of the perceivers, (which he does not). As
1. Aristotle : Nicomachean Ethics, (translated by W.D.Ross. 
Vol.IX of the Works of Aristotle in English. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 192$.) Bk.II, VI.
/against synaesthesis, which is simply a particular 
psychological state which may or may not occur, Psychical 
Distance is a universal condition of aesthetic experience 
and its distinctive characteristic. Suppose now that this 
initial condition is fulfilled, that a 'distanced'
cjt.
attitude towards an object is adopted by us, does it 
follow that this object is worthy of it, i.e. that it 
possesses qualities in such a configuration that it ought 
to elicit from us a favourable judgment on its aesthetic 
merit?
No, it does not follow, because Psychical 
Distance is not, like synaesthesis, a value-term; it is 
neutral v/ith regard to the origin and significance of our 
aesthetic experience and its possible consequences ; it 
is only the condition essential in aesthetic contemplation 
and is applicable towards all objects impartially. If, 
therefore, we want to find out anything at all about the 
value of the object, if we want to know whether it justifies 
the distanced attitude in us, and if so, what properties 
pertaining to the object correspond to what emotions, 
attitudes, ideas evoked by it, we reach the second stage 
of our aesthetic journey - the aesthetic judgment.
Richards regarded synaesthesis as the psychological
state which ^ ve value to the work of art evoking it, and
by implication would have to accept the purely personal 
validity of aesthetic judgments. But the concept of
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Psychical Distance, being a condition and not a consequence 
of aesthetic experience, does not free us from the 
necessity of further inquiry. It is this characteristic 
aesthetic inquiry into the features of the object which 
appears senseless in Richards' case. Once synaesthesis 
has occurred, what more can we desire? But psychical 
distance does not occur - it is an attitude adopted, and 
just as in the case of our other attitudes we can and 
should ask ourselves: "Is my attitude reasonable, justified, 
appropriate? And if so, why?"
Thus, whereas psychical distance marks only the 
beginning of our inquiry, synaesthesis purports to mark 
its end. I would concede this much to Richards, that if in 
our aesthetic inquiry we have found justification i.e. 
reasonable grounds for our initial aesthetic attitude, 
synaesthesis might very well be one of its psychological 
effects, and a justified one. But although, given an 
aesthetically valuable object, synaesthesis may well 
occur, in itself it cannot be that which gives value to 
the object.
Morris Weitz in his essay "The role of theory in 
Aesthetics", says, that the theory of synaesthesis stems 
from a confusion of "the conditions under which we say 
something evaluatively with the meaning of what we say.
1. Morris Weitz: "The role of Theory in Aesthetics", The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Sept., 1956.
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Richards, at all events in his theoretical work, was 
simply describing the emotional state which accompanied 
some of his ovm and others* more valued aesthetic 
experiences. In his practical criticism he justified 
his aesthetic judgments not by reference to the occurrence 
of synaesthesis, but, rightly, by reference to the objective 
properties of the art-objects concerned.
V/here Richards emphasises the response of an 
individual to an object, the emotional impact of an art- 
object regarded merely as a stimulus inducing synaesthesis, 
where Marxist critics equate aesthetic value with a 
special social content, regardless of the impact this has 
upon the spectator, Bullough emphasises neither the one 
nor the other. Bor him the relation between the two 
fundamental factors in the aesthetic situation: the individ­
ual and the art-object, the emotional response and the 
objective features which evoke it is essential. By taking 
his standpoint on a principle which takes account of both 
of two apparently irreconcilable points of view - the 
subjective and the objective, Bullough clearly points 
the way to their solution: they are both to be seen as 
part of the truth but have each been taken to be the whole.
Aesthetics must be able to accommodate all these 
complementary viewpoints as true but partial views of a 
complex situation. And if we are to understand the aesthetic
iws:
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attitude and consciousness and exhaust its many facets |
and possibilities, we must see it as composed of two sets'
of variables, where each in turn modifies the other. V/e
may start at either side - the work of art or the  ^^
individual experience - provided we do not stop there
but go on to its opposite but complementary side. ■
If, aided by the principle of Psychical Distance
we could rewrite the history of Aesthetics, not as a
series of theories and counter-theories, art-traditions I
and reactions against them, but as a struggle to reach
a comprehensive view by partial stages which must be
superseded in order to be incorporated, we might find
that all aesthetic theories have some contribution to
make : those who sought for an objective property of
beauty and those who sought for the subjective response
\
to it, the formalists who looked for significant form and j
did not know what it should be significant of, and
those who preached expression of emotion or comi-unication ,
through art v^ithout saying what was worthy of being \
communicated, the intuitionists who regarded art as a
higher kind of knov/ledge, and the I,iarxists 'who regard /
it as part of an intellectual superstructure, which either
reflects or distorts the actual economic structure of \
I
society, and therefore plays a part in the class-struggle•
To say that all these views are true, though
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only partial statements of the truth, looks like a complacent 
kind of eclecticism. But it seems to me the only alternative to 
narrow dogmatism which results inevitably whenever one of these 
views alone is proclaimed the true one.
The very fact that Richards' theory of aesthetics with 
its one-sided dogmatic, psychological approach, has not found 
any adepts but only a host of critics from psychologists like 
Harding, aestheticians like H.Osborne, Susanne Langer and B.C. 
Heyl, Marxists like C.Caudwell, critics like Allen Tate and L.J 
James, and philosophers like Morris Weitz and î,ïax Black^, is a 
sure sign that the study of Aesthetics has reached maturity. 
Today any view of aesthetics which excludes the study of 
aesthetic values in relation to our experience of them as 
embodied in works of art is regarded as inadequate.
Seen in its historical perspective, Richards* theory is 
important not for what it is in itself but for what it 
signified in the history of modern thought. Thus positively, it 
signified the rejection of metaphysical speculation and its 
replacement by linguistic investigations, involving both 
excursions into psychology and a preoccupation with
the meaningfulness of words and the functions
1. L.W.Harding: Essay on I.A.Richards in Determinations, 
Critical Essays, (ed.F .R.Leavis, Chatto & Hindus, 1534)*
2. H.Osborne: The Theory of Beauty.
3. Susanne K.Langer: Philosophy in a New Key*
4. B.C.Heyl: New Bearings in Esthetics and""%rt Criticism.
5. Christopher Caudwell: Further Studies in a Dying Culture 
(ed. by E.Rickword, London, 1Ô49T*
6. Allen Tate : On the Limits of Poetry.
7. D.Gr.James: Scepticism and I'oeiry.
8. Morris Weitz: "The Role of Theory in Aesthetics", The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Sept., 1956.
9. Ivlax Black: Language and Philosophy.
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of language. But in i'Cs negative aspect his theory involved 
the abandonment of rational explanation of aesthetic 
judgments in favour of a psychological causal account of 
then in pseudo-scientific terms; the uncritical 
acceptance of behaviourism, the reduction of values 
in art to the fluctuating states of mind of each individual 
spectator; an inappropriate emulation of descriptive 
science and an attempt to reduce both ethics and aesthetics 
to branches of such a science.
His obvious failure to establish his position 
has played a large part in provoking a more careful 
analysis and explication of aesthetic judgments, in tune 
with recent developments in philosophy generally.
The emergence after the last war of a new 
approach to problems of philosophy, ethics and aesthetics, 
free alike from irrational scepticism and metaphysical 
dogmatism, involving a strict delimitation of the problems 
to be solved, the clear definition of terms and the 
recognition that the function of the inquiry should 
determine the methods to be adopted in pursuing it, marks 
perhaps the beginning of a new epoch in Western thought.
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APPENDIX A on Defining a poem
Richards' definition of a poem as "a class of
experiences which do not differ in any character more
than a certain amount, varying for each character, from
a standard experience"...^, strange as it may seem,
reminds us of Gollingwood's negative definition of a work
of art proper which "is not something seen or heard hut 
2imagined."
Richards the positivist and behaviourist and 
Gollingwood the Grocean and idealist philosopher find 
themselves in agreement when rejecting 'the poem', the 
objective, public poem, as the work of art proper. Although 
for the one the poem is "a collection of impulses" and 
for the other an "imagined experience of total activity", 
both commit the initial fallacy of trying to define what 
is indefinable. We can neither define a work of art in ^
I
general, nor a poem in general, though we can give, in a 
definite context, an adequate description of the work of 
art, or the poem in that specific context. In that case 
we can as far as possible avoid misunderstandings, failure 
of communication and talking at cross-purposes. If we come 
to recognize that 'A Poem' in general is indefinable 
(that we should be trying to force language to do something
1. P.L.G., pp.226-7.
2. G.R.Gollingwood: The Principles' of Art, Gh.7* p.142.
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it is incapable of doing, i.e., to define and describe in 
an informative way the specific relation deemed to relate 
an unspecified subject to an unspecified poem), then we 
shall not condemn Richards' or Gollingwood's definitions 
for their respective shortcomings, but for their purporting 
to be definitions as such. With this in mind, let us 
nevertheless see whether anything useful and general can
be said in answer to the question "What is a poem?"
and whether Richards' definition helps us to say it.
The problem of giving a clear, unequivocal 
answer to the question "What is a poem?" is then a complex 
one, corresponding to the hidden complexity of the question. 
As Stevenson in a recent article^ has shown, the question,
"What is a poem?" may be any one of at least the
following three distinct questions (and there are 
doubtless many more):
1. What are the differentiae or characteristic 
properties which distinguish a poem from other literary 
kinds?
2. What are the sources of poetic value?
3. What is the proper way of interpreting the 
words of the poem?
If we recall in this connection Richards' remark 
that no general prescription, especially in great poetry
1. C.S.Stevenson: "What is a poem?" Philosophical Review, 
July, 1957.
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is possible, and chat "Poetry may be almost devoid even 
of mere sense, let alone thought, or almost without
sensory (or formal) structure, and yet reach the point
than which no poem goes further, we realize that Richards
is not trying to answer the first question at all. He
simply takes as obvious vfhat a poem is in this sense. His
definition of a poem as a class of experiences which do
not differ much from a standard experience which is the
relevant experience of the poet when contemplating the
2
completed composition is clearly a persuasive definition 
of 'a poem', in answer to question 3), namely, what ^  
considers to be the proper way of interpreting its meaning. 
We must inquire whether such a definition is plausible 
at all. V/e immediately come upon the following objections :
1. A poem is not to be defined as a class of 
experiences of any sort. If Richards had defined a statue 
as "a class of experiences", the absurdity would have 
been immediately apparent, except on some special sense- 
datum theory of perception. But 'the poem' stands in the 
same relationship to people's experiences of it as does 
the statue to its viewers' view of it, though a poem is 
admittedly a less straightforward type of object than a 
statue. Though different people may admire different 
aspects of a poem and take them to be the "essence" of
1. P.L.G., p.130. (Author's italics).
2. P.L.G., pp.226-7.
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the poem, they can no more ^  the poem than someone's 
admired aspect of a statue the statue, however it is 
true that the statue the marble thing, whereas the 
poem is not identical with any particular set of written 
marks or voiced sounds. Then it must be some more 
exotic type of thing - why not one of the claimed 'essences' 
or the class of experiences similar to this essential 
experience ?
2. Because a poem is at least a certain structure
of language and meaning, which is what it is, timelessly
and independent of what anyone actually experiences on
reading it. Just as language itself has an enduring
structure in spite of the fact that it grows and changes
with time, so a 'poem' written 100 years ago is still the
same poem, although it may give rise to quite new
individual experiences, readings and interpretations. If
I read The Song of Songs in Hebrew and you read it in
English our visual or auditory experiences would be
different but we have st:ill read the same poem, viz. The
Song of Songs. Now Richards might say that to the extent
that you and I both understand the poem in these versions,
our understanding of it must be members of the same class
of experiences. We find therefore that the notion of "an
experience" here is not less complex than the notion of
"a poem". But 'the' experience of understanding the poem 
can only be identified by reference to the poem, i.e. the
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use of the words, as parts of a given language, or of 
their equivalent expressions in other languages, in the 
poem.
But to define a poem by reference to experience I 
as so distinguished is clearly not helpful.
At this point I should like to emphasize once 
again the step which appears to unite Richards' theoretical 
and practical value-concepts namely that theoretically 
an experience is valuable according as its homogeneous 
motor-impulses are more numerous and more complexly 
ordered; practically the test is that understanding 
a word-structure involves producing a more or less varied 
and ordered complexity of ideas (true of life and human 
nature) together with the large scale or ordinary-language 
'impulses' appropriate to these ideas; where understanding 
entails just appreciation because the lack of just 
appreciation entails a failure to catch an idea actually 
embodied in ... the work !
Thus the basic fact is the work and its contents 
and structure. Proper appreciation = understanding = having 
the required experience, distinguishable only as that 
involved in understanding the work. The real (unsupported) 
value-judgment here (not a psychological fact 1) is that 
we ought to value experiences according as they consist 
of understanding and properly responding to varied groups 
of complex but ordered, true ideas.
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V/e are interested in ’the poem’ and not in the 
experiences it gives rise to, except in so far as these 
constitute ’understanding the poem’ - whether in the poet, 
in "the right kind of reader" or the right kind of critic.
A fortiori it seems quite unplausihle to want to reduce 
the difference between Keats’ "Ode to a Nightingale" and 
Scott’s "Coronach"^ to a difference of structure in
respect of the ’impulses’ contained in two different
experiences. For us they are first of all two different 
v/ord-structures of the kind we call a poem. And as a 
basis of evaluation of the poems, from the fact that A
prefers poem 1 to poem 2 and B prefers poem 2 to poem 1,
we are entitled to infer that a ’s experience of poem 1 
seemed to him more valuable than his experience of poem 
2, but there is no basis of comparison, so far, between 
A's experiences and B ’s; and even in so far as for Richards 
these constitute ’the poems', (providing they do not stray 
too far from Keats’ (problematical) and Scott's (equally 
problematical) standard experiences) there is no basis 
of comparison between the poems.
3. In evaluating the poems we cannot compare the 
values of our experiences but we can estimate the degree 
of complexity and coherence the poem, manifests. We
might succeed in convincing one another that there are
1. P.L.G., p.250.
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good reasons for judging the one better than the other 
because, for example, of its greater complexity, depth, 
coherence, or some other characteristics we usually find 
of value in works of art: profundity, restraint, subtlety, 
vividness of imagery, unity, economy of expression, etc. 
Perhaps these are criteria of value we usually associate 
with 'great' art; and in evaluating a poem as a good 
poem we might value its simplicity of means and its striking 
effect. But both the simplicity and the complexity of 
structure is predicated of the poem and not of our 
experience.
One may, of course, defend Richards by pointing 
out that he was not trying to give a definition of a 
poem except in terms of the bit of language constituting 
it, i.e. he was making more precise (or trying to) in 
what way the language was to be taken as constituting the 
poem.
Now it is true that it is the use of the marks 
or sounds making the words of the poem which is important, 
not the physical objects themselves. But it would be 
simply a type-mistake to replace 'use' here with 'class 
of experiences', since '.use' is a function whereas 
'experience' is a mental event. To this Richards might 
reply that the 'use' in question is to give people the 
proper experiences in reading the words (the experience
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of understanding them), and it is this experience of 
understanding the words which one comments on and evaluates 
in commenting on and evaluating a poem. But if this is 
what Richards means, then it is only a more complicated 
roundabout but not very illuminating way of saying that 
we comment and evaluate the poem itself.
What can be positively said on this point of 
definition?
The word (or concept) 'poem' is being constantly 
used and continually adapted for novel conditions and 
cases. We find therefore that however detailed our 
specification of the properties of a poem (words, images, 
rhythm, etc.), there may always arise cases where some 
of these properties and new ones are there and nevertheless 
the question of applying the concept 'poem' awaits our 
new decision: Bo we extend our 'definition' to cover 
this thing or do we coin a new concept for it? On what 
considerations should we agree or refuse to apply the 
word? And if we enlarge our conditions for being a poem 
to include it, does it follow that other poems not 
fulfilling these conditions will be excluded?
(It is interesting to recall in this connection 
a case from another art, viz. sculpture. The kind of 
modern art-products we have agreed to call 'mobiles’, 
though to some extent similar to many pieces of modern 
sculpture are yet different enough to be called by a
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different name.)
Waismann's 'open texture'^ Morris Weitz's 'open
2  ^concept' , G-allie's 'essentially contested concepts'
are important in showing the futility of pinning down to a
static formula something that is continually changing and
hence either in need of constant redefinition or simply
incapable of being forced into the straight-jacket of
precise definition at all. ;
Having found that we cannot define 'a poem', we
are yet able to refer to it, to discuss it, communicate
about it and evaluate it. We can then try to classify
the various statements that can be made about 'a poem';
for example;
a) A poem is a sequence of words, spoken or written.
b) A poem is a sequence of words, in measured rhythms,
perhaps with rhymes, etc.
c) A poem is a sequence of meanings arising out of the
two foregoing.
d) A poem is a sequence of experiences to which these can
give rise in
1. the poet when reading the words
2. any other person reading these.
e) A poem is a structure of linguistic symbols expressive
of feelings, ideas, experiences.
1. Dr.F.Waismann: "Language Strata" in Logic and Language 
(second series), ed.A.Plew. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1953.
2. M.Y/eitz ; , "The. role of theory in Aesthetics, The Journal 
of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Sept.1956.
3. Prof.Bailie : "Essentially Contested Concepts" in The 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1955-56.
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If we agree that these statements can be logically 
derived from the concept 'a poem’, i.e. are implicit in our 
usage of the term, then we can proceed to our analysis 
of any one of these strata, bearing in mind that it is 
only one among many others. This will prevent us from 
transforming literary analysis and criticism into either 
individual psychology (e.g. if we take the poem to be 
merely the expression of the experience or intention 
of the poet), or general psychology (if we take it to be 
merely the expression of what is common to different 
experiences of all individuals or of some of them - "the 
average reader"), or into a study of words and meaningful 
expressions and types of ambiguity occurring in this use 
(the criticism of texts) or into the conscious desires 
and unconscious complexes resulting in the expressions 
(psychoanalysis), or into a social, religious or political 
commentary.
After disentangling the various strata of a 
poem - linguistic, psychological, conceptual - we usually 
feel we know or understand it better and are hence more 
able to evaluate it properly. Usually the slighter its 
value, the easier will the work of analysis within its 
different strata be.
To say that a good poem is so complex, integrated 
and coherent that it defies analysis, is simply to recognize
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that although we can create works of art, either we have 
not yet developed a sufficiently fine method of analysis 
to enable us to account for the elements and the success 
of artistic creation, or such a project is prohibited by 
our concept of a work of art, as something of which all 
the characteristics in precisely that individual form and 
combination presented by this work, are essentially 
contributive to its worth, which therefore defies analysis.
